THE BELGIAN COURT OF AUDIT’S ‘WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT’ AUDITS — ENCOURAGING THE TRANSPARENCY OF META STRUCTURES IN A FEDERAL STATE
Accountability challenges can easily arise in countries with multilevel governance, even more so than in those with centrally organised governments. Belgium, a federal state, has a multilevel structure which brings about challenges and risks in terms of coordination. The Belgian Court of Audit explicitly addresses these aspects in some of its audits. Vital Put, councillor and a Member of the Dutch speaking chamber of the Belgian Court of Audit, discusses the complexity of meta-structures and how the Belgian Court of Audit addresses this issue and its consequences through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach.
By Vital Put, Belgian Court of Audit
Transparency and accountability in a federal state
Belgium is a federal state. Besides the federal level, there are three regions (Brussels Region, Flemish Region and Walloon Region) and three communities (Dutch-speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking). Figure 1 illustrates this structure. Each level has its own parliament and government. In Flanders, the Flemish Region and the Dutch-speaking community have been merged into one institution. The Belgian Court of Audit works for the six parliaments. One characteristic of the Belgian federal model is the exclusive division of powers — in principle, each specific matter falls within the competence of only one government, as far as possible. Furthermore, the federal state, the regions and the communities are on an equal footing — there is no hierarchy among them or their regulations¹ . Originating from a unitary state, the federalisation of Belgium has often been described as centrifugal and is still evolving.
Cooperation remains indispensable no matter the division of competences, due to inevitable interference and numerous interfaces. This is particularly evident when addressing complex policy challenges such as the climate, employment, health, etc. Moreover, European policy and international agreements also require cooperation across the different levels of the Belgian state. Like in other federal states, there are mechanisms in place to ensure this coordination.
These mechanisms consist of a multitude of institutions and instruments, a kind of ‘meta-structure’, resembling a spiderweb across the state structure:
- the Concertation Committee (the central body);
- 24 inter-ministerial conferences (e.g. on labour market policy or public health), each housing many working groups;
- numerous inter-federal plans (e.g. on integrated care or road safety);
- hundreds of cooperation agreements;
- many inter-federal institutions (e.g. the National Climate Commission) set up on the basis of cooperation agreements;
- the COORMULTI consultation structure to coordinate Belgium’s international positions (also regulated by a cooperation agreement);
- representatives of the regions in the management bodies of national institutions;
How well do these structures and mechanisms work? In a European Commission study² , Belgium and seven other EU member states are considered countries with a high degree of fragmentation and a low degree of coordination in policy making. Similar observations are made in the country reports on Belgium (European Semester), e.g. ‘policy coordination in climate, energy, digital and transport policies is complex and not always effective’ or ‘budgetary coordination is not sufficiently effective yet, as the 2013 cooperation agreement has not been fully implemented.
Ministers account for their policies in their annual policy letters. These letters often refer to activities related to the inter-ministerial conferences, cooperation agreements and inter-federal plans, but the information provided is — with a few exceptions — very limited (for example, simply stating that a cooperation agreement will be prepared or reviewed). Therefore, these policy letters don’t allow an evaluation of these mechanisms. Some inter-federal bodies, such as the National Climate Commission, provide more information about their operations through their websites.
Various parliaments have held hearings and exchanges of views in preparation for a seventh state reform. In 2022, the Committee on the Evaluation of State Reforms since 1970 (Senate and Chamber of Representatives) published reports on issues such as healthcare, energy, climate, mobility and cooperation. The Working Group on Institutional Affairs (Flemish Parliament) published reports on topics such as the environment, climate, labour market policy and justice. Instances of both successful and underperforming mechanisms were highlighted during these discussions. However, the information provided remains fragmented and relies solely on testimonial evidence. Systematic empirical evidence is lacking. About the functioning of many mechanisms, simply nothing is known. Some academics present in the hearings raised concerns about the limited transparency and called for a comprehensive evaluation of cooperation mechanisms.
The SERV, a Flemish advisory body, also concluded that transparency and parliamentary oversight are limited. It therefore recommended a thorough assessment of the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the existing cooperation mechanisms³.
In summary, Belgium boasts a myriad of coordination mechanisms, with indications of varying degrees of success. However, these mechanisms are poorly understood overall. This is problematic, as there can be no accountability without transparency. High quality information is a prerequisite for holding a government accountable⁴.
The Belgian Court of Audit — a unique helicopter view
Since the Belgian Court of Audit (BCA) assists the federal parliament and the parliaments of the regions and the communities in overseeing their governments, it has a unique comprehensive overview of the entire state structure.
Before 2020, this helicopter view was only used to a limited extent. For example, in its budget reviews, the BCA sometimes highlighted the lack of coordination between different levels of government concerning budgetary efforts. Performance audits occasionally also identified coordination problems. For instance, in its 2016 audit on the federal plan against poverty, the BCA found that the Inter-ministerial Conference on Social Inclusion had not held a meeting in years. Moreover, the BCA has specific assignments relating to federal funding to communities, which also require it to oversee the whole state structure: it verifies the accuracy of the school student counts in each of the communities and the counts of the federal assignments to the regional houses of justice. Both figures serve as the basis for the distribution of federal funds among the communities.
Since 2020, as part of its 2020–2024 strategy, the BCA has decided to make more use of its unique oversight position. It has conducted more ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘whole-of-government’ audits, evaluating different levels of government simultaneously, including the coordination between them. The BCA then reports the audit findings to the parliaments concerned. Box 1 contains a few examples.
The challenging path to whole-of-government audits
‘Whole-of-government’ audits will become increasingly important in Belgium given that current challenges such as climate change, the energy transition or the digital transformation fall within the competence of different levels of government and therefore require cooperation. However, conducting this type of audit presents several challenges.
First, these audits are challenging on an organisational level, since the BCA’s internal structure mirrors the structure of the Belgian state to a large extent. Therefore, for each cross-sectional audit a matrix organisation has to be set up, with an audit team being composed of auditors from different directorates within the BCA.
Second, the audit scope and criteria must remain within the BCA’s competence. The BCA does not comment on the distribution of competences or on the principles behind state reforms since those result from political choices. The BCA only assesses to what extent cooperation is successful, given the division of competences. ‘Cooperation’ can mean many things, from just keeping each other informed in consultative bodies to jointly implementing a cooperation agreement. Working together does not necessarily mean that there should always be a fully consistent policy within Belgium, as our state structure inherently allows for each level of government to make different choices regarding policy (as previously explained, all levels are on an equal footing)
Third, in the audits described in Box 1, intra-Belgian coordination mechanisms were evaluated as part of a larger audit. Even if the BCA were to audit these mechanisms specifically, covering the full range would not be feasible in practice.
In brief, our modest contribution is to draw more attention to these mechanisms and encourage more transparency, presenting high-quality information to help hold accountable those responsible.
[1] Unlike in Germany, for example, where the Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht principle applies [federal law takes precedence over state law].
[2] Palaric, E., Thijs, N., Hammerschmid, G., A comparative overview of public administration characteristics and performance in EU28, European Commission, Publications Office, 2018, p. 34.
[3] SERV, Oproep voor een betere samenwerking tussen het Vlaamse en federale niveau en de andere Gemeenschappen en Gewesten, 2023; SERV, Rapport samenwerking tussen het Vlaamse en federale niveau en met de andere Gemeenschappen en Gewesten, 2023.
[4] Schacter, M., When Accountability Fails: A Framework for Diagnosis and Action, Institute on Governance, Policy Brief No 9, 2000.
