Carrick, Revisited
An old favourite from when I used to write words about football.
[Note: I originally wrote this post in the middle of the the 2010–11 season, when Michael Carrick was going through the worst run of form of his career, and being slated by press and fans alike. It’s one of my favourite things I’ve ever written, and needless to say I’m really happy with how the rest of his time at United has turned out. Hope you enjoy the piece.]
Michael Carrick is one of my favourite footballers around. I sometimes joke that he’s the Geordie Guardiola, then I realise that Guardiola may have been the Catalan Carrick. I like alliterations. Anyways, he’s come in for a huge amount of stick over the years, and I’ve felt the need to defend him on numerous occasions, not least to my fellow Manchester United supporters. Despite the bags of success that have coincided with his arrival at Old Trafford, and the immense praise he’s earned from teammates, rivals and coaches, “he never does anything” is a common complaint I’ve heard from mates, especially during his annus horribilis of 2009/10. At Spurs, he was an ever-present as the club rose up the table, culminating in a 5th-place Premier League finish in 2005–06. Yet similar doubts about the Wallsend man were expressed — many of which were addressed in this comprehensive blog post by The Boys from White Hart Lane. Even in the good times, many football fans have wondered whether he was worth the £18.6m that United shelled out for him in the summer of 2006. This post is an attempt to get things right about Carrick’s tenure at United: what he does in the side and why he deserves the praise he gets from some quarters; how he’s played over time; why he struggled for form last season; and finally, some optimistic conclusions based on his form in the present term — 2010/11.
What Carrick does, and why he’s a good player
In Italy, the strolling, elegant regista, such as Pirlo or Pizarro, is given great praise for his style and intelligence. In Spain, the cultured talents of Guardiola and Redondo were given free expression with little regard for their relative physical weakness. In England, it seems that the economy of movement shown by deep-lying midfielders — Veron, Xabi Alonso, Mikel — is a sign of inactivity, as though the best barometer of midfield performance were the amount of stud marks left in the turf. The aggression expected of midfielders in this country is, to my mind, best captured by the phrase “taking the game by the scruff of the neck.” It’s difficult to argue that any of the above players have ever possessed such scruff-grabbing ability, but no serious football fan can dispute that they are all excellent midfielders, with individual and club successes to back it up. This is not to deny that energetic performances are important. My intention is merely to point out that midfield is a zone in which mind can count for as much as might — Juan Roman Riquelme’s entire career has been based on this very fact.
Zonal Marking has noted that the role of a central midfielder has evolved substantially over the past decade — his article on this is essential reading. To crudely summarise it, the modern central midfielder is primarily concerned with possession of the football — get it, and keep it. As a result, the main stats I will be using to assess the central midfielder’s performance are successful passes, pass completion ratios, and interceptions.
As even his critics would concede, Carrick is one of the finest passers England possesses. On form, his distribution is as good as anyone in the Premier League, and can match anyone in world football, bar a few Spanish geniuses. But what about winning possession? We’ll get to that, but first, a bit more background. For a variety of reasons, box-to-box midfielders in the Roy Keane/Patrick Vieira mould are becoming very rare in the modern game, as Jonathan Wilson has observed. Even those with the physical capabilities to play the position, such as Steven Gerrard and Michael Essien, have been more recently deployed in specialised positions, with Gerrard playing mainly as a supporting attacker for Fernando Torres since 2008, and Essien’s versatility seeing him used — among other things — as a right back, attacking midfielder and holding midfielder in his time at Chelsea. Indeed, when Gerrard has been used as a central midfielder, as against Manchester City earlier this season, his blatant lack of positional sense has been exposed by less talented but more disciplined middle men.
That same positional discipline is one of Carrick’s strongest and most under-appreciated features, having developed tremendously in his time at Old Trafford. Both by direct observation and looking at the stats, Carrick’s ball-winning ability has come on significantly since his arrival in 2006. Though tall, he has never been a terribly imposing presence, and he either can’t or doesn’t do the lung-bursting running of Fletcher, Essien, Cambiasso, Schweinsteiger or Gerrard. Yet he now wins the ball about as much on average as any of them. He is an underrated tackler, usually winning more than 50% of his duels, and he makes far more interceptions than most midfielders in the league: 22 in 8 EPL games this season. The main difference between himself and the more noted ball-winning midfielders is that his good defensive play comes despite, not because of his physical attributes. Instead, itis based on good timing, an understanding of space on the pitch, and that same energy conservation which makes him an easy target for some critics. One aspect of his defensive play that isn’t picked up by the stats and Chalkboards is how often he presses players into giveaways — ‘forced turnovers,’ to borrow a phrase from basketball. This was especially pronounced in the second half at City this season, where on four consecutive occasions he forced his direct opponent into hitting passes either straight out of play, or straight to a United player.
The Chronicles of Carrick
In his first year at United (2006–07), Michael Carrick took time to get settled in, starting few games early in the season. As we came to learn, starting a season slowly would become the norm for him. But on one of his first starts, a 1–1 draw with Reading, Carrick played a blinder, completing 87/96 passes and making 5/6 successful tackles. His performance against Aston Villa at Old Trafford was also noteworthy, as he completed 82/92 passes, dropping a goal and an assist into the bargain.
The prodigious student to Paul Scholes’ passing maestro, he was usually less ambitious with his distribution, content to keep the ball moving, while leaving the more progressive passing to the Ginger Prince. As we can see from the following Chalkboard, the Carrick-Scholes axis was well greased in that game against Villa (Scholes made 114 of 124 passes that day).
The two midfielders dovetailed immediately, showing excellent coordination, with Carrick’s tidy work making up for Scholes’ understandably reduced mobility. In games where Scholes didn’t play, however, Carrick’s passing became more expansive, as he assumed more of the creative duties with Darren Fletcher (and occasionally John O’Shea) doing more of the ‘dirty work’ for him. With the addition of Owen Hargreaves and Anderson in summer 2007, there were even more bustling midfield runners at Old Trafford, the better that Carrick and Scholes could get on with their quarterback artistry. By the end of his triumphant second year, 2007–08, Carrick had developed his game to a significant extent, finishing with one of the highest passing totals and the fourth highest pass-completion ratio in the league (1585, 83.22%). He finished third, behind Scholes and Fabregas, in terms of minutes-per-pass (1.39), a reliable measure of influence for a central midfielder. Not bad for an “overrated” player. His measured, precise performances continued well through 2008, as he was influential in United’s excellent defensive record in the latter half of that year.
I’ve heard some United fans claim that his form dipped markedly from January 2009 onwards but my recollection, coupled with the stats, suggest otherwise. Contrary to some recent revisionism, he was very, very good in the 5 months leading up to the Barça final. Indeed, in February 2009, one football writer audaciously suggested him as a candidate for Footballer of the Year. In the Premier League run-in, he was superb: even in the painful 4–1 defeat to Liverpool he acquitted himself in the midfield battle (7/8 tackles); he passed Sunderland to death (79/82 passes). He played brilliantly in a tense game at Wigan, making 62 from 69 passes, and of course scoring this late winner, which put the seal on a close title race. Going into the Champions League final in Rome, his form was such that Xavi Hernandez — surely the greatest midfielder of this era — was inclined to describe the Geordie as “a complete player.” Barcelona’s strategy of deliberately and incessantly harrying the United #16 can be interpreted as high praise from Guardiola’s men, though paradoxically the effect of Barça’s show of respect was a complete shattering of Carrick’s confidence. As with many of the United players that night, his performance was diabolical, well short of the standard expected on such a big stage, and of the standard he had set for himself over the previous three seasons.
Unfortunately, 2009–10 saw Carrick pick up where he left off in Rome, with a penalty miss and a giveaway leading to a goal in the 1–0 loss at Burnley. He was quickly dropped. Weirdly, the Chalkboards for 2009–10 don’t show Carrick having a particularly sub-par season, with 45/50 passing at Hull, 73/79 against Wigan, 77/88 from centre-back at Fulham, 77/90 in the 1–0 defeat against Villa, 59/70 against Liverpool, and 63/72 in the 3–1 win at Arsenal. It would serve my interests to claim this as a vindication of my unwavering support, but I honestly think it says more about the limitations of the Chalkboards than about the quality of his performances in particular. For one, it’s noticeable that even though he gave the ball away rarely in most games, his giveaways often led to dangerous counter-attacking opportunities for the opposition. I take this as a sign that his two key attributes, i.e. intelligent passing and defensive positioning, were way below their best. One other observation is that his passing became less and less ambitious as the season wore on, with more sideways passes in his own half, and fewer forward passes in the opposition third. Comparing his Chalkboards from the October 2009 game against Blackburn and the March win over Liverpool illustrates this nicely.
Overall, Carrick’s 2009–10 form was below his usual standard, yet he still produced big performances in the biggest games. In the undeserved 1–0 loss at Stamford Bridge, he was a man-of-the-match contender (44/53 passes, 1 interception, 7/7 tackles) with him, Anderson and Fletcher bossing the midfield as very few teams do against Chelsea. In the 3–1 victory at the Emirates, he switched positions with Scholes after ten minutes, and promptly took over the game — his positioning nullified Arsenal’s build-up play, and his distribution ruthlessly exposed the Gunners’ naive approach to defending. He bossed the first leg of the Champions League knockout tie against Milan, though he was stupidly sent off at the end. All that good work was quickly forgotten, though, after two appalling performances against Bayern Munich in the Champions League quarterfinals. For the second year running, Carrick’s worst performance of the campaign came with the result that United were out of Europe — the scapegoating was inevitable, and he didn’t start a football match for the rest of the season.
Possible reasons for last year’s struggles
After developing into a top midfielder, Carrick suffered a shocking fall from grace. Could it just have been because of his damaged confidence after the Roman final? That certainly seems plausible, but I think other important factors came into play too.
- Tactics: It shouldn’t be forgotten that between 2006–09, most Premier League teams were still playing 4–4–2, and as a consequence were being outgunned by the more packed midfields of Chelsea and Manchester United. Of course the solidity of Vidic/Ferdinand and the inexorable rise of Cristiano Ronaldo had massive roles in United’s success over this period, but their consistent midfield dominance shouldn’t be overlooked. In 2006/07, playing a fluid variant of 4–2–3–1, United routinely bossed possession, despite playing with no recognised midfield ‘tackler.’ Carrick and Scholes started most games together, with Ryan Giggs or Wayne Rooney as the side’s trequartista.
But as several of the lesser EPL sides have become wiser to tactics over time, they have increasingly adopted three-man midfields, with the consequence that Carrick often had less time on the ball than in his first three years at United. As we’ve seen earlier, a combination of a congested midfield and high pressing from the opposition can unsettle Carrick — and he is not alone in this. Even the greatest central midfielders such as Xavi and Pirlo can be put off their rhythm by consistent pressure, soundly applied. What Carrick arguably lacked last season, relative to those two, was the confidence to continue attempting forward passes even under pressure. As we’ve seen before, this led him last season into a proliferation of high-percentage, low-impact backwards and sideways passes, of the type so loathed by English fans and journalists who would prefer a “boot it up there” approach. - Harsh treatment: After his costly mistakes against Burnley (September 2009) he was consigned to the bench for a few games. After his poor performances against Bayern the following spring, he played a grand total of 65 combined minutes in the final 7 games of the season. To me, both punishments seemed to be needlessly harsh, the latter possibly contributing to United’s narrow loss in the title race. A further disruption to his rhythm came from the defensive injury crisis which hit the club in late 2009. After his post-Burnley exile, his re-introduction to the team was as a covering centre-back — not the best way to regain one’s form and confidence as a midfielder. All in all, he can have legitimate claims that external forces — unjustly lengthy spells on the bench, injury-enforced games at CB — contributed to his bad season.
- Pressing: His poorest performances have come against teams which press intensely and high up the pitch, employing the equivalent of the ‘full-court press’ in basketball. In Rome against Barça (2009), and away at Liverpool (September 2008), Birmingham (2010), Bayern (2010) and Aston Villa (November 2010), Carrick routinely gave the ball away, usually under pressure from younger, fitter or stronger central midfielders operating in a staggered band of three. The exception to the ‘rule of threes’ was in the Bayern first leg, where United operated with three in midfield, and Bayern with only two — van Bommel and Altintop. While Bayern pressed hard, Carrick often found himself as the spare man in the middle. Yet his passing was dire that evening — an indication of how low his confidence had sunk by that point.
Conclusions and Reasons for Optimism
Conversely, his best performances have come against big teams which tend to employ a more patient, stereotypically ‘European’ approach. In the Champions League his performances in the 7–1 over Roma (2007), 2–0 at Roma, both legs against Riijkard’s Barça, the first half of the Champions League final (2008), 0–0 at Inter — La Repubblica hailed “un magnifico Carrick” — and 1–0 at Porto (2009) all spring readily to mind. In the Premier League, his finest games have been in the 3–0 against Liverpool (2008), 3–1 at the Emirates and 0–0 at City (2010). When teams don’t press, Carrick has time on the ball. And when a passer of his quality has time on the ball, more often than not, he’ll do lots of damage. In addition, the slow, intricate build-up play of most of these teams allows Carrick to position himself well, shielding the backline, and allowing only harmless passes in front of the United rearguard. This was especially true in the 2008 Barça tie and the 2010 Arsenal win.
After a month-long injury layout, Carrick has returned to the squad in 2010/11, and looks like being back to his best. With a few games under his belt since his comeback, he’s rekindled productive midfield partnerships with Fletcher and Anderson — and when Scholes returns in the New Year, they’ll have the chance to dominate as they did against City a few weeks ago. One so-so game against Aston Villa apart (46/57, 4 interceptions, 2/4 tackles), he’s been brilliant in games against Spurs (62/70, 5 interceptions, 3/5 tackles), City (68/73, 7 interceptions, 2/2 tackles), Wigan (58/63, 1 interception, 4/6 tackles), Blackburn (88/95, 2 interceptions, 6/6 tackles) and Rangers (a Xavi-like 107/117 passes).
Although his worst passing performance this season (37/52, 2 interceptions, 3/5 tackles) came in the recent win against Arsenal, it was significant that he continued to play forward passes despite an insistent physical approach from the Gunners.
In a scrappy game, both sides forced each other into mistakes, and all the usually silky passers had poor numbers. Under midfield pressure last season, he often shrivelled; it seems like he’s emerging from that now.
With a relatively kind fixture list ahead — the postponed game against Chelsea notwithstanding — this is an excellent opportunity for Michael Carrick to re-assert his place in the Manchester United midfield, get a consistent run in the side, and display the football intelligence that for 3 years made him a bellwether for this club’s success.
Originally published at crimesagainsthumility.tumblr.com.
