Ethics in a Pluralistic Society
A Review of Moral Value and Human Diversity by Robert Audi
Ours is a time of extraordinary diversity in the history of human society. We are a diverse people — diverse in our beliefs, our values, our ways of life. That diversity makes the recognition of objective moral value both more convoluted and more crucial than ever. Relativism is on the rise and a case for cooperation is sorely needed. It is against this backdrop that Robert Audi offers his “short, non-technical book” (p. ix), Moral Value and Human Diversity. In it, he develops his ethical theory of pluralist universalism as a solution to the fragmenting tendency of diversity. In essence, he argues that a pluralistic society should be pluralistic about morality.
Audi begins by identifying the four foundations of ethical thought — virtue ethics, Kantianism, utilitarianism, & intuitionism — and combines them in an attempt to establish an ethical standard that can guide our lives and relations in a diverse world. That standard, pluralist universalism, is to “optimiz[e] happiness so far as possible without producing injustice or curtailing freedom (including one’s own)” (p. 17). Audi then turns to the question of value and, more specifically, what constitutes a good life. Like with his ethics, Audi attempts to combine multiple theories in a way that captures the set of values we all share in common amidst our diversity. This set, he proposes, includes hedonic, intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual, religious, social, emotional, athletic, and moral values (p. 78).
The second half of Audi’s book concerns the application of ethical and value theory to structuring the individual lives and collective society of a diverse people. Here, Audi explicates his moral pluralism as a manner of combining or weighing universal values in different ways (p. 80). Audi follows this with a discussion of institutional ethics and very brief explorations of “ten pressing contemporary ethical problems” (p. 91), such as the influence of religion on politics, the unbridled advance of technology, and the mental atrophy of old age.
Relativism Is on the Rise . . .
Audi’s refutation of relativism is neither novel nor phenomenal, but it is necessary and noteworthy given the “widespread confusion about relativism” that continues to afflict our civilization (p. 26). He identifies an important distinction between circumstantialism — which recognizes “that the application . . . of moral principles varies with circumstances” — and the noxious notion of relativism — which denies “that the justification of moral principles depends on . . . [something] objective” (p. 25). Relativism simply does not follow from circumstantialism; this explains why every ethical theory denies the former while accepting the latter.
In addition, Audi deftly disentangles the claim of relativism from the main motivation of its claimants: their desire for tolerance. Ethical objectivism, the antithesis of ethical relativism, appears to many to “license an intolerant absolutism” (p. 26). But this is not necessarily true — it depends on the ethical theory that is claimed to be objective. Of course, history can provide plenty of horrific instances of individuals and groups that believed in the objective truth of intolerant absolutism — e.g., the KKK, the Nazis, the Soviets, the Maoists, etc. But, ironically, it is only through ethical objectivism that we can “account for tolerance as a valid ideal” because relativism “implies that there is no universally valid justification for believing . . . that the Nazis did wrong in massacring Jews, and that lynching black teenagers for looking at white women is grossly unjust” (p. 26).
If we ought to be tolerant, then there must be “a universally valid principle of tolerance” (p. 26). Indeed, ethics may be objective without being absolutist in the same way that science exhibits those qualities. We may regard both disciplines as “fallibilist,” that is, as “develop[ing] degrees of evidence for . . . hypotheses and theories, but . . . not pretend[ing] to prove them . . . in a way that prevents rational doubt” (p. 27).
. . . A Case for Cooperation Is Sorely Needed
Audi’s case for cooperation is pluralism. Given our diversity, “one could say that what constitutes a good life is [somewhat but not completely] relative to the kinds of people we are talking about and to their opportunities in life” (p. 80). It follows from this, Audi assumes, that “there is a range of equally meritorious permissible options . . . choice among them may reasonably be determined by personal preference” (p. 80). Therefore, in recognition of this range of options, we ought to tolerate and cooperate with people who may be vastly different than ourselves.
But there is an issue with Audi’s argument: Pluralism — a range of equally meritorious options — does not in fact follow from diversity — a range of equally good lives. It could be (and I believe it is) the case that what constitutes a good life is merely being the very best one can be given the circumstances they are in. By this understanding, we may each differ in the good lives we lead due to our different circumstances; however, we would each have one meritorious permissible option available to us: to be our very best, to manifest as much of the Good as we possibly can.
The case for cooperation is found not in pluralism, but rather in the fact that, regardless of our circumstances, we can all manifest the inherent goods of rationality and civility. According to rationality, we ought to cooperate with others because we are fallible and others may help us identify our mistakes. According to civility, we ought to cooperate with others because we would have them cooperate with us.
Audi’s summary of the four foundations of ethics provides an invaluable starting point for anyone approaching the field for the first time as well as for seasoned ethicists seeking a vantage of the bigger picture. Audi’s writing, however, tends toward redundancy and away from the straightforward nature that one hopes to find in a non-technical book. Moreover, the ambition of covering so many topics in so few pages leaves nearly all of Audi’s thoughts underdeveloped — especially his sketches of the ten pressing problems in chapter 4 — leaving his remarks dangerously close to the point of platitude. Nonetheless, this book teems with fascinating ideas begging to be discussed with greater sophistication.
Audi, R. (2007). Moral Value and Human Diversity. Oxford University Press.
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