Morphing the
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM
BOOK KNOWLEDGE VERSUS EXPERIENCE
This morphing or transformation comes from each individual and his or her organizational perspective or culture. One of the reasons for this is book knowledge versus real life experience. Perhaps the lack of fires, combined with newly promoted people in command level positions and the reliance on only “book knowledge” without supporting experience, could be a contributor to the various perceptions of those that teach and use the ICS frequently.
Throughout my career, I have realized how many of the things I thought were absolute about ICS really aren’t. I’ve valued the opportunity within my department to experience hundreds of fires as an incident commander. I’ll be the first to admit that I’ve made mistakes while in the seat of command, more than many others could imagine! However, from these command experiences, I’ve learned how to take what has happened to me (the challenges and accomplishments), evaluate and process those events, and learn to improve from them; I never want to make the same mistake twice.
Books are wonderful and there is much to learn from them. However, when it comes to an incident command process and how it is supposed to work to support safe fireground operations, there are numerous perceptions that fire service personnel have been taught, have individually morphed or developed over time, or have maintained because they believe everything they have read in a book about the best methods of incident command.
I’ve read numerous fire command articles and books, which have provided good information. But from these articles and books, I’m always trying to absorb another person’s take on command topics. Regardless of how amazing the author is, I’ve always felt a few degrees removed from the actual experiences they are trying to convey in their writings. Therefore, there may be the possibility of disconnect.
ICS TOOLBOX MENTALITY
I sure wish fire service members would stop saying that ICS is a “toolbox” for incident commanders to use command tools as they are required or need for a particular situation. I do agree there are many tools in the ICS toolbox, but here is the problem. When you do not have the experience or training to make the correct choice in selecting the correct tool from the ICS toolbox for the appropriate situation, at the right time, for the right reasons, it becomes a disaster and leads to an organizational mess.
This is where many fire service incident commanders incorrectly use the ICS toolbox; they assign divisions and/or group supervisor positions like they are giving out candy at Halloween (everyone gets one). Part of the reason is that the ICS books show incident organizational charts with many positions listed. However, there is little explanation of when, where, and how these positions should be assigned.
EXAMPLES OF MORPHING ICS
Here’s a specific example. Incident commanders often assign the first arriving advanced life support (ALS) unit as “medical group supervisor” on a building fire. One of the individuals from that medical resource becomes a command/supervisory position. Many of these individuals assigned as division/group supervisors have not received any type of specific training for the position and responsibilities they’re going to manage. Most haven’t even attended a division/group supervisor class to obtain a basic knowledge of the duties for the position. So when the ALS “medical group” is called to transport an injured patient from the incident to the hospital, your “medical group supervisor” is now en route to the hospital? Instead of assigning the “medical group” position to an ALS resource, a better choice would be to assign the single ALS resource a “tactical objective” of “triage, treat, and transport” injured patients. By doing this, you accomplish a single resource tactical objective assignment in case firefighters or members of the community require transportation to the hospital.
This is another example of morphing ICS. You are the incident commander (IC) at a residential single family dwelling fire (1,500 square feet). You reach into your ICS toolbox and begin to assign single resources (engines/trucks) as division and/or group supervisor positions. Why do ICs do this? Well, geez, the ICS book says when I reach my span of control I need to expand the incident organization. So now your incident organization with six or eight resources at the scene of the incident has three or four division/group supervisors assigned and supervising at a ratio of 1–1 or 1–2 to facilitate the span of control. How complex do you think this single family dwelling fire is going to get with six to eight resources at the scene? Is it going to burn down the entire neighborhood or adjacent exposures? Does this incident have the complexities of multiple stories, building size or type, with large life loss potential? Probably not! However, i f your incident has t hat potential, then the expansion of the incident organization (division/group) is totally appropriate to support the large number of additional resources arriving.
CONCLUSION
It is evident to me that fire agencies are encouraging the assignment of divisions/groups and supervisors through their instructional methods. The justification seems to be driven by span of control instead of complexity. This is why divisions and groups are assigned to identify a working task/tactic or area, i.e. “ventilation group.” So then you have an officer assigned to a command position; the officer is actively involved at the task level. As a division/group supervisor you manage the tactical objectives and are NOT actively involved at the task level. This demonstrates how much the fire service relies on what they’ve learned in a book and a true lack of experience for real life application of ICS.
