RECEO VS and SLICERS– Where Do They Fit?
Do we need any more evidence that command and control procedures and processes are not being effectively applied at building fires, consequently contributing to the failures of incident commanders (IC) and leading to many negative outcomes at emergency incidents?
Let’s face it, “You don’t want to be the incident commander who does not know what they are required to know at the time they need to know it!”
An abundant amount of “empirical evidence” has come out recently from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) regarding live fire testing that will guide improvements in tactical/task applications and methods. From the empirical evidence many good leaders in the fire service are now expanding the dialogue and taking the initiative to reduce property loss, prevent injuries, and save firefighter and occupant lives.
First, I want to commend those individuals, organizations, and agencies for demonstrating courage by challenging the preconceived notions, myths, and others in the fire service who are resistant to any form of change.
I would like to continue the dialogue and perhaps “replace” the way fire service members and organizations “think” about command and control (incident management). If incident commanders begin to “think” differently about the command and control process perhaps they will feel and act differently. Since the NIST findings, new mnemonics and calls for action have surfaced. In December 2013, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and its sub-committee, the Health and Survival Section, in a joint effort with the International Society of Fire Service Instructors released the “Firefighter Safety Call to Action: New Research Informs Need for Updated Procedures, Policies.”
One specific item I would like to focus on is the recently created mnemonic (or acronym) SLICERS and what these groups are recommending. In IAFC’s call to action it says the recently created mnemonic “SLICERS should replace RECEO VS as a core component of firefighter training programs.”
When I mention “replace” the way fire service members and organizations think about command and control, what I am saying is these mnemonics have their specific place/location within the command and control (incident management) process when developing “one” incident action plan. We have an obligation as leaders to make processes simpler and less confusing for everyone involved. We as a fire service should provide better clarity and purpose by placing these mnemonics into a location(s) within the incident command process to help and support those commanding and fighting the fire.
As the author of SLICERS has very well articulated, his intent was his concern with his own personnel, their aggressiveness, and the speed at which they were attacking fires. Obviously, SLICERS is a very good tactical/task method for those aggressive firefighters and their company officers who are initiating size up to search for and rescue occupants, and to extinguish and limit growth of the fire.
My view of SLICERS developed after hearing the author speak and reading more about the concept to understand the context and background. It became clear to me that it is the risk analysis and decision making assessment process of identifying the hazards and establishing the necessary controls/mitigations for those hazards, so that the tactical actions are much more purposefully driven and safer for firefighters to achieve positive outcomes.
My assessment is that SLICERS would fit perfectly in the command and control (incident command) action plan under “tactical objectives,” which is the third component of the incident action plan. My solution/recommendation would be to place/locate RECEO VS under the strategic objective, which is the second component of the incident action plan. Strategy is not only investigation, offensive, defensive, indirect, transitional, etc. The strategy is what distinguishes the incident commanders who have a strong incident action plan and those that only operate from a tactical platform.
Fire service incident commanders have to STOP operating off a “tactical platform” as the primary decision making factor for the next tactical/task action to be performed. Tactics DO NOT drive the incident action plan’s outcome! “Incident priorities” drive all decisions within the incident action plan.
Too many times we see where tasks and tactics are the primary focus. There is no identification or communication of the incident priorities or strategic objectives by the IC within his/her incident action plan. Therefore, this is where the critical disconnect occurs within the command process, which leads to firefighter injuries, deaths, and other negative outcomes during building fires.
As previously stated, the incident priorities drive strategy and strategy drives tactics and tactics drive tasks. Therefore, RECEO VS has its place and should NOT be replaced “as a core component of firefighter training programs” — especially when it comes to command and/or incident management! I have personally used RECEO VS as effective strategic components of the “what” I want to accomplish on numerous “all hazards” emergencies.
Let’s take strategic objectives a little further. Strategy is thinking in the next, not in the now. The vision of too many incident commanders ends at the end of their nose. Strategy is the “leader’s intent” statement to everyone working on the incident. If you as a company officer or firefighter don’t know what the incident commander’s strategic objectives are, how can you effectively and safety implement your tactical/task actions within the operational area? You can’t, and that is why we continue to see over and over again good firefighters initiating actions without purpose or an end state defined (another way of illustrating — risk versus benefit).
The strategy is the “what” of the incident. In simple terms, “What are we trying to do?” It is also a short or long-term goal or plan of action designed to achieve a particular incident priority or desired result. The strategic objective identifies the mode of operation, but it also is used to make the problem easier so that everyone on the incident understands to effectively solve the problem by initiating efficient tactics and tasks for positive outcomes. I am tired of seeing fire service instructors/companies who instruct command and control by only saying strategy is “offensive or defense” and offering no other explanation of how it is supposed to be used, developed, and communicated.
The way to verbally express a strategic objective may sound something like: civilian and firefighter life safety, safely remove all occupants from the building, keep the fire to the room, floor, area or building of origin, extinguish and confine the fire in building one, protect and defend the five uninvolved exposure buildings, coordinate ventilation to support occupants and firefighters, extinguish all hidden fires, protect and secure occupants’ property. This is an example of how RECEO VS effectively applies to the incident commander’s strategic objectives and supports the incident priorities. The strategic objectives can also be identified and written on the ICS form 202 (incident objectives).
So the need for a logical incident command system thought process begins with the first step to ensure an effective, safe, and efficient incident action plan. This incident command process includes eight critical components (see below) of the incident action plan.
1. Incident Priorities (ICS form 202)
2. Strategic Objectives (ICS form 202)
a) Mode of operation
3. Tactical Objectives (ICS form 204)
a) Tasks
4. Incident Organization (ICS form 203)
5. Situation Status/Intelligence
(ICS form 201)
6. Resource Status (ICS forms 201 & 211)
7. Communication Plan (ICS form 205)
8. Safety Plan (ICS form 206)
For more on the eight critical components, refer to my three-part series of articles “Rescue of a Trapped Firefighter: Command and Control… Better and Safer” in SIZE UP Issues 1–3 • 2012. Archives are available at www.naylornetwork.com/nfc-nxt
As someone who has commanded numerous, complex, type one “all hazard” emergencies, my intent in writing this article was to provide an incident commander’s perspective on this topic. In addition, I would like to continue the positive dialogue between fire service members who “sit in the seat of command” with the goal of further evaluating the new and emerging “empirical evidence” regarding NIST testing and its effects on incident command. It is my belief the new as well as the older mnemonics have their specific place within the incident command process to assist incident commanders with a consistent approach in developing a “better” and “safer” incident action plan.
