Rescue of a Trapped Firefighter, Part 1 of 3
I write this article with a heavy heart, because Fire Captain Gary Morgan passed away early on Christmas morning, 2011. He lost his 2½-year battle with lung cancer, which was directly caused from this incident.
I am writing this article with Gary’s permission on the 11-year anniversary of the truly amazing successful rescue of Fire Captain Gary Morgan from the County of Los Angeles Fire Department. Morgan has always wanted his story to be told so that others could benefit from his fight to stay alive while trapped in a fiery basement. His story is remarkable and provides many firefighting lessons learned for all to read and share.
Summary
On October 29, 2000, a third alarm commercial structure fire occurred in the city of Whittier (Los Angeles County Fire Department) in which a fire captain was gravely injured. During this incident, an engine company was engaged in an interior attack mode when the wood floor of a two-story wood frame, Victorian-style residential dwelling collapsed beneath the captain, resulting in second- and third-degree burns on his back and causing him severe respiratory damage. Rapid intervention crews (RICs) were initiated and the captain was rescued from the basement only five minutes before the entire structure collapsed in the area where he had been trapped.
Incident Narrative
At 0130 hours, a first alarm commercial building fire assignment was dispatched. The temperature was in the low 60s with clear skies and little to no wind. The first alarm assignment consisted of four engines, one truck, one emergency support team (EST) with two personnel, one paramedic squad (two personnel… Johnny and Roy) and one battalion chief. At 0136, Engine 17 arrived on scene and reported a large commercial building fire with fire through the roof. Engine 17’s captain named the incident “Whittier IC” and requested a second alarm assignment. The second alarm assignment consisted o f f our engines, one truck, a hazardous materials task force (nine personnel),a USAR task force (six personnel), one mobile air unit, one battalion chief, and one assistant chief. The USAR (urban search and rescue) task force assumes the RIC responsibilities on incidents such as this.
Engine 17’s captain intended to take command of the incident and give Engine and Squad 40 personnel the assignment of the west side (D-delta) of the building. Engine 17 also wanted to give Engine 28 the east side of the building, but Engine 28 did not acknowledge the assignment for reasons unknown. Battalion 8 chief arrived on scene within a minute or two of Engine 17. Battalion 8 chief reported to dispatch that he would assume command as Whittier IC. Once Engine 17’s captain heard Battalion 8 take command, Engine 17 laid a 4-inch supply hoseline from a hydrant across the street to the west (D-delta) side of the building (parking lot). Battalion 8’s chief assigned Engine 17 as fire attack and assigned Engine and Paramedic Squad 40 to support Engine 17. Engine 17 personnel deployed two 2 ½-inch hoselines and activated the engine pre-plumed master stream monitor into action because of the heavy volume of fire activity.
Whittier IC then gave Engine 28 (the trapped captain’s engine) the assignment of interior fire attack with the assistance of EST 59. Once Engine 28 made entry through the front door (A-alpha side) of the showroom of the Whittier Glass Company with two 1¾-inch attack hoselines and hand tools, the initial fire they encountered was knocked down. As they proceeded farther inside the building, smoke conditions worsened and fire activity increased at the back part of the building. Smoke and fire was moving toward them on the ceiling of the interior showroom.
In order for Engine 28 (interior fire attack) to gain further access into the building, the firefighters inside found a back door, which led to an outside atrium or courtyard area.
Firefighters passed through that back door, walking in a direction toward the (C-Charlie side) of the building and found themselves on the steps of a residential porch that was approximately 4 feet wide and running in the direction of east and west. What they came upon (did not know it at the time) was a two-story (with basement) wood-frame, Victorian-style residential building (fire’s origin). The dwelling was built in 1912 and had been converted over the years into a storage area for the Whittier Glass Company.
Because of very poor visibility and extreme fire conditions, the interior crews had actually left (through that back door) the Whittier Glass building without realizing it and were now standing in the atrium at the base of the steps that led to the porch area of the Victorian dwelling. The captain from Engine 28 thought that he and his crew were standing near the warehouse or back portion of the Whittier Glass Company. The captain looked up and recalls seeing a star-filled sky and concluded that the fire had burned through the roof of the warehouse. But he began to feel that something was not right (intuitive “gut feeling”). Looking to his left, he saw a large tree and wondered how it got there. They continued to fight the fire, which at this time was all around them. However, the captain from Engine 28 did not ever act on his “gut feeling.”
Engine 25’s crew (from the first alarm) was assigned by Whittier IC to support Engine 28 inside the building. They took a 1¾-inch attack hoseline inside the building and worked their way over to where the crews from Engine 28 and EST 59 were working. Truck 28 visually inspected the roof, reported heavy fire conditions and was unable to perform vertical ventilation operations to support fire attack crews below.
At this time, the two personnel from EST 59 informed the captain from Engine 28 that their air bottles were running low. They exited back through the Whittier Glass Company showroom to the front of the building. The second firefighter’s air bottle (from Engine 28) was now running low on air, so he exited the building at the same location as EST 59. This left the captain from Engine 28 and his other firefighter together. Engine 25’s crew was now assisting Engine 28 with interior fire attack. They were working within 30 feet of each other. Meanwhile, the last firefighter’s air bottle (from Engine 28) was running low. He informed his captain that he was leaving to change his air bottle and exited the building.
The first firefighter who exited the building to change his air bottle returned to the atrium area and mistakenly reported to the captain from Engine 25. After the firefighter realized he was not with his assigned crew, he turned and walked to the wooden porch area where the captain from Engine 28 was standing. Engine 28’s captain directed his firefighter to operate the 1¾-inch attack hoseline to continue fighting the fire. He and his firefighter began to advance the attack hoseline toward the front door of the residential dwelling.
Fire Captain Becomes Trapped
As the captain from Engine 28 stepped through the front door of the residential dwelling, he suddenly and without warning fell three-quarters of the way through the wooden floor. He stopped the momentum of the fall by holding onto the floor joists with both arms. But as the captain fell, his helmet was ripped off because his air bottle was violently pushed up directly in line with his back toward his upper neck during his fall. This action also ripped off his air mask. As he was hanging there he was unable to reach his air mask to put it back on (because the mask was already down at his waist level in the hole he was stuck in) and his turnout coat was lifted up under his armpits, exposing his lower torso and back.
Superheated gases were now pushing up through the hole. The fire was burning underneath the floor and beneath him in the basement. The fire was also burning his skin on his back and he was breathing in superheated toxic gases. Within a few minutes, the captain was suffering from initial stages of carbon monoxide poisoning.
When the captain fell through the plywood floor, the plywood (dry rotted) splintered into a thousand pieces and pinned him at waist level. He could not move upward nor could he push himself up out of the hole. The firefighter from Engine 28 saw his captain fall through the floor. He dropped his attack hoseline and immediately went to his aid.
At 0200 hours, Engine 25’s captain saw the distressed position of the captain from Engine 28 and radioed for emergency traffic “firefighter down.” The remainder of the crew from Engine 25 hurried over to assist their colleague. They tried to pull him up from underneath his armpits and by using his breathing apparatus straps, but these attempts were unsuccessful. They tried using their axes to cut around the hole, but those efforts, too, were in vain.
To make matters even worse, the Engine 25 captain’s air bottle was now critically low. He exited the building, but saw the two firefighters from EST 59 making their way back to where they had last seen the captain from Engine 28. Engine 25’s captain conveyed to the two firefighters that the captain from Engine 28 had fallen through the floor and was trapped. Firefighters from EST 59 met up with the rest of the crew from Engine 25. There were now six firefighters trying to free the captain, but all attempts were unsuccessful. The captain was just stuck in the hole where the plywood floor gave way.
The captain from Engine 28 was becoming exhausted hanging there between the floor joists and he was feeling the effects of the superheated smoke all around him. Carbon monoxide poisoning was now becoming a significant factor. He told his rescuers, “I cannot hold on anymore… the fire is burning on my back. Please let me go.” At that moment, the captain let go of the floor joists and immediately fell 15 feet into the basement, where he landed on his back on the floor of the basement. His rescuers were horrified at what they had just witnessed. All they could see was smoke and fire emitting from the hole in the floor. They looked down into the hole, but could not visually see him.
The Rescue
The captain from Engine 25 exited the building and met up with the captain from Engine 90 and a battalion chief (now operations). He explained the situation and the location of the trapped captain. When personnel on the incident had heard “emergency traffic,” no radio communication had been made until it was announced that a firefighter was trapped. Somehow, the initial information had been transmitted that the trapped firefighter was located at the rear of the building (C-Charlie side).
USAR Task Force 103 personnel had been given the assignment of RIC prior to the captain from Engine 28 falling through the floor. They entered the front (A-alpha side) of the building (same path as Engine 28’s crew had taken). They had just finished using their thermal imager inside the Whittier Glass showroom to try to locate the extension of the fire when the “firefighter down” notification was broadcasted across the radio. The communication stated that the firefighter was trapped at the rear (C-Charlie side) of the building.
With that information, USAR Task Force 103 personnel proceeded to the exterior south/west (C and D) sides of the building. When they arrived, there was a tremendous amount of fire activity. They inquired as to the location of the trapped firefighter, but the captain from Engine 17 informed them that no personnel had made entry into the structure from that location and that all personnel were accounted for.
After additional radio clarification, personnel from USAR Task Force 103 returned to the front of the building and followed the fire attack hoselines to the location of the trapped captain. The visibility was getting worse and the fire was gaining intensity, a very frustrating situation for the rapid intervention crews. Upon the initial notification, they had only been approximately 60 feet from where the trapped captain had fallen through the floor.
The USAR Task Force (RIC) personnel finally located the captain. The firefighter from Engine 28 was looking down into the hole where his captain had fallen. Through the smoke, USAR personnel could see a faint light, which proved to be the flashing LED strobe from the captain’s integrated PASS device. The captain from USAR Task Force 103 directed his personnel to cut the floor (expand the hole the captain fell into) in an attempt to make the hole wider and allow for a ladder to be placed down the hole to gain access and attempt a rescue. The USAR captain then took the attack hoseline used by Engine 28 personnel and placed it in the hole to wet down the captain. Smoke and fire were still coming out of the hole and there was a large volume of fire in the basement very close to where the injured captain fell. Because of the thick smoke and a very confined (tight) working area, RIC personnel were unable start their chain saws or any other power equipment to widen the hole and make access to the trapped captain.
At that point, the captain from USAR 103 (switch to plan B) directed one of his other RIC personnel to find another entry point. The firefighter specialist who was given the assignment went back to the atrium/courtyard area and checked the sides of the dwelling. He had to travel down about 8–10 feet on one side of the Victorian structure from where he thought the captain had fallen through the floor. There he found a boarded-up window on the east side (B-bravo). He tired to kick it in, but his attempts were unsuccessful. He then requested over his radio for chain saws to his location.
Additional companies were being assigned to the rescue efforts at the request of USAR 103’s captain. Truck 20’s captain heard the request for additional chain saws. He and his crew (three personnel) proceeded to the area of the atrium/ courtyard. They saw the firefighter specialist waving them over to his location. Personnel from Truck 20 started their chain saws (the air environment was much better at their location) and began to cut through the boarded-up window. As soon as the window was cut open, they looked inside to determine if they could locate the trapped captain, but they could not immediately see him. Heavy smoke continued to pour out the window and the fire was in many locations in the basement where they were working.
At this point, the captain from 28 was going in and out of consciousness in the basement. He remembers trying to find his radios (captains carry two radios, one is the command and the other is tactical). He finds his tactical radio and tries to call for help but no one hears his calls. The captain curls up in a ball and says, “It looks like I planned on dying here,” and then he loses consciousness again.
One firefighter from Truck 20 and the firefighter specialist from USAR 103 entered through the window of the basement to search for the captain. It is important to note that it has been approximately 17 minutes that the captain has been in the basement. They had proceeded about 20 feet inside the basement when the captain was finally located. He was motionless and laying face down when his rescuers arrived. The rescuers see lots of thick smoke residue around the captain’s nose and mouth. Firefighters shook the captain and, in a very weak voice, they heard him ask for air. The firefighter from Truck 20 took off his air mask and put it over the face of the injured captain. It appeared that the captain was going in and out of consciousness and the two rescuers immediately picked him up. The captain mumbled, “I can’t make it,” and the rescuer said, “Captain, we’ve got to make it,” because at this point there were no other options. They lifted him up under his arms and dragged him over to the window of the basement.
By this time, more firefighters were waiting for him outside of the basement window. These firefighters carried the severely injured captain over the atrium/courtyard area. Before they got there, they had to lift him up at least 8–10 feet where additional firefighters were waiting. As he was passed through the hands of many rescuers, the injured captain’s turnout gear was unintentionally stripped off his body. He was carried out of the building and was laid down in the street where additional firefighter/paramedics began providing BLS and ALS treatment for his injuries. He was then transported to the local emergency room (for stabilization).
The fire was now advancing into the areas where the RIC rescue teams were working to rescue the trapped captain. The fire was above, below, and to the sides of them. They had to immediately leave all of their rescue equipment behind and rapidly move away from this area. Within a few minutes of their departure, total collapse of the Victorian structure occurred in the entire area where the RIC and USAR personnel had been working and where the captain had fallen into the basement.
In Closing
This is a true testimonial to the value of rapid the intervention process and many hours of training spent throughout our careers when we are called to rescue one of our own. I commend my fellow firefighting colleagues who, through their training and experience, performed above and beyond their normal duties to make a successful rescue of Fire Captain Gary Morgan at probably one of the most dynamic incidents that I’ve ever been part of.
However, there were many challenges and actions that were not performed well, especially the command and control breakdowns that occurred throughout the incident. As the final part of this article that will appear in a future issue of SIZE UP, I will review the command, strategic, tactical, and task breakdowns that occurred on this incident.
I would like to leave you with a saying from Theodore Lee Jarboe, which is posted in my office. It is called “The Influence of Tragedy.”
“There is no greater influence of change in the Fire Service than the line-of-duty death of a firefighter. Yet, there is no greater tragedy than that of a fallen firefighter whose death prompted the passage of a safety policy which may have prevented his or her own death.”
