Rescue of a Trapped Firefighter, Part 2 of 3
Do we need any more evidence that command and control procedures and processes are not being effectively applied at building fires and, therefore, contributing to the failures of incident commanders? Let’s face it, you don’t want to be the incident commander who doesn’t know what you are supposed to know at the time you need to know it!
In last issue’s article “Rescue of a Trapped Firefighter,” I shared with you a tragic event and the amazing rescue of Fire Captain Gary Morgan when he fell through the floor into a fiery basement and became trapped at a commercial building fire. This incident is another example of a long line of near-miss and fatal fire outcomes.
Too many times incident commanders operate off a “tactical” platform of command, which is a major contributor to firefighter injuries and death while operating at building fires.
The evidence-based documentation can be found within NIOSH injury/fatality reports that have illustrated the common factors incident commanders are not identifying, implementing, or establishing during building fires. These fatality reports identify recurring failures throughout the fire service. They include: the incident commander not following department operational SOPs/SOGs; using inconsistent ICS terminology; not implementing an incident action plan; incident command not properly established, transferred or maintained; consistent policies on incident management system not followed; did not complete a size up or risk assessment prior to firefighting operations.
BOOK KNOWLEDGE VERSUS REAL LIFE EXPERIENCE
Perhaps the lack of fires, combined with newly promoted people in command positions and the reliance on only “book knowledge” without supporting experience, could be a contributor to the failures of command?
Throughout my career, I have realized how many of the things I thought were absolute about command really aren’t. I’ve valued the opportunity within my department to experience hundreds of fires as an incident commander. I’ll be the first to admit that I’ve made mistakes while in the seat of command, more than many others could imagine! However, from these command experiences, I’ve learned how to take what has happened to me (the challenges and accomplishments), evaluate and process those events, and learn to improve from them; I never want to make the same mistake twice.
Books are wonderful and there is much to learn from them. However, when it comes to an incident command process and how it is supposed to work to support safe fireground operations there are numerous perceptions that fire service personnel have been taught, individually morphed, or they believe everything they have read in a book about the best methods of incident command.
I’ve read numerous fire command articles and books, which have provided excellent information. But from these articles and books I’m always trying to absorb someone else’s take on command topics they are speaking about. However amazing the author is, I’ve always felt a few degrees removed from the actual experiences they are trying to convey in their writings. Therefore, there may be the possibility of disconnect. Perhaps the disconnect comes from the perceptions of each individual reader after absorbing the command article, book or reference.
The fire service as a whole is relying too much on each individual’s own perceptions from what they read. Fire agencies should flush out a command process (through actual real life fire experience) that really works well and what does not work well within the incident command process.
It is unfortunate that many incident commanders have not acquired the necessary experience, knowledge, skills and abilities to perform safety in the position of command. As mentioned earlier, we don’t have the volume of fires that we used to so that our incident commanders can receive the necessary qualifications and confidence for the position.
The goal of the fire service in our attempt to instruct others must be to enhance or bridge the cognitive book knowledge to the practical real life experiences for incident commanders. This can be accomplished through simulated (artificial) incident command post training utilizing the most advanced simulators on the market today. By conducting this type of (simulated) training your agency can now help provide visual slides in the individual’s (command officer’s) mental slide carousel.
We need to “command better and safer.” So, how do we accomplish this? The first step is to utilize and practice an effective command process. That process includes the eight critical components of the incident action plan.
The first step is what every strategic, tactical action and task performed on the fireground is driven by, the incident priorities! This helps the incident commander to think in the “next” instead of the “now!” It’s easy to think in the now, but it takes an experienced and knowledgeable incident commander to think in the next. You can’t have effective strategies or tactics without a strong foundation of incident priorities. However, it’s pretty obvious that fire service incident commanders are making their command decisions primarily on a tactical platform (directing General Patton’s Army — soldiers, tanks and aircraft). To make it simple for incident commanders, they should approach every building fire (and for that matter every emergency incident) in four primary categories: incident priorities, strategic objectives, tactic objectives, and tasks. On your next emergency incident, evaluate the scene and ask yourself, are the tasks in line with the tactics? Are the tactics in line with the strategy? Are the strategies in line with the incident priorities? If not, you know immediately where the problems are with your incident and now you can make the necessary adjustments to your incident action plan. The lack of incident priorities and working only in a tactical platform is a primary reason why Captain Morgan and his crew were in an offensive position in a defensive fire inside the structure, which eventually led to him falling into a fiery basement and becoming trapped.
The incident priorities may vary depending on the type of emergency, but for most emergencies the incident priorities will include: life, incident stabilization (limit growth), property preservation, and environment.
The number one priority is life! This is where we’ve taken, as firefighters, the oath that we will risk our lives to save the lives of people we don’t even know. These are the moments when we’ll put ourselves at the greatest risk we’ll ever face. Life, simply put, includes: Do people need to be rescued, are they trapped or do they need to be evacuated? In Captain Morgan’s incident all of the occupants were safely out of the building.
After an aggressive and rapid primary search is completed and once life (the occupants) are removed and confirmed out of the building it is then the fire and chief officer’s (IC) responsibility to transition their thought process and action plan to incident stabilization (limit growth). Limit growth means keep the fire to the room, floor, area, or building of origin and away from uninvolved exposures (interior or exterior).
If the fire is confined to a specific area within a building and there is no threat of it traveling anywhere else then the IC now needs to transition the thought process to property preservation. If you think about it and add up all the working building fires you have been on to this point in your career, at how many of those fires did you actually make a physical rescue of occupants? I bet it is a small percent in relation to the building fires you have worked on over your career. It is probably safe to say that most of the building fires that firefighters have fought fall in between incident stabilization and property preservation. Perhaps we spend most of our time in property preservation. This is where we need to ask the $64,000 question: Why are fire service incident commanders putting their personnel in dangerous positions on the fireground? This is exactly what happened during Captain Morgan’s incident Ask yourself, is the building worth more than Captain Morgan’s life? If not, then why were Captain Morgan and his crew in the position they were in inside the building in a property preservation priority?
The second step of the action plan is strategic objectives. This is what distinguishes the incident commanders who have a strong plan and those that only operate from a tactical platform. Incident priorities drive strategy and strategy drives tactics. Strategy is thinking in the next, not in the now. A strategy is the “what” of the incident — “What are we trying to do?” It’s a short or long term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal or priority. Strategy is used to make the problem easier to understand and solve and is the choice that affects tactical outcomes.
The way to express a strategy may sound something like this: safely remove all occupants from the building, keep the fire to the room, floor, area or building of origin, extinguish and confine the fire in building one, protect and defend the five uninvolved exposure buildings. The strategy can also be identified on ICS Form 202 (incident objectives). During Captain Morgan’s incident there were never any strategic objectives identified so that all units working on the incident could operate effectively under one action plan.
The third step of the action plan is the tactical objectives. This seems to be the place where incident commanders feel most comfortable and where their thought process resides. Heavy emphasis is placed on assigning resources, many times without purpose or relevance to the action plan’s strategy and/or priorities. Lloyd Layman in approximately 1953 wrote an excellent book called Firefighting Tactics. He identified rescue, exposures, confinement, extinguishment and overhaul as some of the primary tactical objectives that need to be identified and implemented at an emergency. In addition, ventilation, salvage, ladders, utilities, forcible entry, and rapid intervention are also important tactics.
This is the critical portion of the incident action plan where fire companies (company officers) are performing tasks and tactics in fire environments inside and out of the building. This is the “critical interface” between the company officer and incident commander, where good communication has to take place. The company officer is observing the changing fire behavior conditions and searching for missing or trapped occupants while trying to locate, confine and extinguish the fire. Fire companies should be utilizing their situation awareness while performing tasks surrounded by the elements in the working environment within a volume of time and space. The critical “cues and clues” are missed many times because of the tasks that individuals and fire crews are performing; therefore, they don’t understand what is about to occur around them and then no one on the crew can change their respective tactics or anticipate what is going to happen next. This is one of the major reasons why fire companies keep performing their respective tasks in the same manner and mode that they began with. These tactical fire situations and environments shout “watch-out!”
While fire companies are performing their necessary tactics, the tactical objectives need to be adjusted to the environment they are working in and around. How do you adjust your tactics and when is it time to do it? The tactical adjustments need to come by way of the incident priorities and strategic objectives.
For example, if the incident action plan has identified the incident priority as life and the strategic objective is remove all occupants from the involved building and surrounding exposures, your company’s tactical objective may be primary search. After primary search is complete and if no occupants are found your tactical objectives will need to be adjusted or reassigned and the tasks will be adjusted as well. On your next fire in the “seat of command” use this evaluation process by asking yourself, “Are the tasks in alignment with the tactical objectives? Are the tactical objectives in alignment with the strategic objectives? Are the strategic objectives in alignment with the incident priorities?” As an incident commander you’ll know immediately where and how you need to adjust your incident action plan.
The way to express a tactical objective may sound something like this: primary search second floor, confine and extinguish (fire attack) on the first floor, open roll-up doors on the B side of the building, recon and report on conditions, ventilate to support search and fire attack. The tactical objective can also be identified on ICS Form 204 (assignment list). During Captain Morgan’s incident, most resources were operating individually of each other. The resources working near the C and D corner of the building were pushing the fire toward Captain Morgan’s crew, which entered the building from the A side. Resources did not coordinate their fire attack efforts and pushed the fire from the involved to the uninvolved. In addition, the fire was being pushed toward the rapid intervention crews that were attempting to rescue Captain Morgan during the time he was trapped in the basement.
In SIZE UP Issue 3, part three of this series will conclude with steps four through eight of the incident action plan.
