Task saturation occurs when there is simply too much to do with not enough time, not enough resources, and way too many tasks and tactics initially being established and implemented on an emergency incident. It can be real or imagined, but in the end it can kill your firefighters working on the incident.
It takes a very disciplined and organized incident commander (IC) to navigate around and through task saturation. As the IC’s task saturation increases, individual performance decreases; as task saturation increases, executional errors increase at the command post. It is critical that each IC knows how he or she individually copes with task saturation.
What coping strategies do you use when task saturation occurs with you? Do you know when you are task saturated? Perhaps you are the IC who looks busy at the command post making your checklists and drawing a really nice map, but all the while you are missing critical command inputs from your crews that are not being addressed. Then someone says, are we going to put the fire out today?
The scientific research from Dr. Ted Putman (http://bit.ly/TedPutmanSIZEUP), who has served as an investigator on several monumental fires, explains how our mind works. His evidence-based research identifies that “human factors” play a major role (70–80 percent) in negative outcomes of decision-making because of the effects on situational awareness and the stress factors of task saturation.
Putman’s research identifies that our mind works attending to one object at a time. The mind works quickly and that is where we begin to multitask, utilizing our senses (seeing, hearing, etc.). Then stress begins to eat up our capacity to think and we begin to shut down and LOCK into ONE object (hence the moth to the light syndrome). What do these “human factors” look like in the form of task saturation at the command post? Seeing or hearing what you want to see or hear instead of what was really said, highly stressed emotions, emotional overload, and a feeling of sensory overload.
In addition, lack of experience, unrealistic time constraints, faulty information, incorrect assumptions by person(s) reporting the situation that are not congruent to what is really occurring, and inability to see the “big picture” are contributing human factors as well. This is where the IC fails to pick up on the danger signals and to take the necessary actions to protect crews. But because the IC looks like they’re in control, no one knows there is a weak link in the command chain – until the command chain breaks, which usually leads to firefighter injury or death.
Task saturation for incident commanders takes place before they even arrive on scene. Usually, the first IC is an engine company officer, and that officer begins to assign other engines and trucks tactical/task assignments. Very rarely, if ever, do you hear the first arriving company officers (IC) communicate their “strategy” over the radio. The usual announcement over the radio is offensive or defensive mode by the first arriving IC. However, offensive/defensive modes are NOT a strategy, but rather the mode of operation, which is intended to support the tactics/tasks being assigned or implemented.
My question: how can you determine offensive or defensive mode of operation when you first haven’t asked yourself the strategic question, “What am I trying to accomplish?” There is much more depth involved within strategy than just saying, “I’m trying to put the fire out” – no kidding. Strategy communicated effectively helps make the incident problems (task/ tactic) easier and better understood. The primary “antidote” for the IC in reducing task saturation is to pay attention and refocus your mind back to the primary objective of your command algorithm and align the four levels of command; task to tactic, task/tactic to mode of operation, task/tactic/mode of operation to strategy, and task/tactic/mode of operation/strategy to the incident priorities. Included under “Additional Reading” are links to articles published in Firehouse and SIZE UP magazines, where I review command algorithm more in depth.
Here is how you integrate the “antidote” to connect the levels of command and reduce your task saturation. When your crews are assigned the task, and then you provide them with the “why”/”purpose,” it now brings clarity and importance (what needs to be completed first, second, third, etc.) for the short, midrange, and long-term goals that have been communicated/ identified by the IC. When you provide task, purpose of the tasks, and the end state of what it looks like when it is completed, you now have empowered your engine/truck officers to take the correct action (“the how”) by aligning their tasks/actions to your IAP strategy and incident priorities (life, incident stabilization, property preservation, and protection of the environment). Now, your crews and personnel will be far more effective in getting the job done safely and effectively. Your commander’s intent is based on the company/truck officer understanding what is supposed to happen a few levels above them, so as their action(s) move from directed to delegated and, at times, highly independent so that when they perform their next task and tactic through numerous threats and hazardous environments, it is in line with what the IC expects it to look like when completed.
After reading some recently released NIOSH fatality investigation reports regarding firefighter fatalities over the last few years, it appears that ICs fall into the task saturation trap of what Dr. Putman calls “autopilot.” This is a mindset that becomes a fluid automatic response in your day-to-day command operation. This is where ICs operate off a comfortable “tactical platform” after communicating offensive or defensive mode, where the mind automates everything it recognizes and you go ahead and do what you have been wired or trained to do.
The internal wiring of doing what you have done in the past is seen when the IC (chief officer) receives a transfer of command from the first in engine officer, which is primarily a verbal IAP. Now, the IC has to quickly catch up and align (connect) the IAP strategic components with the incident priorities so that the many current tasks and tactics being performed can be accomplished safely. This is the critical moment for every IC and it is important for an effective IAP. This is where task saturation can affect the IC, by shutting down and focusing on one object. Many ICs are very comfortable saying offensive or defensive mode of operations and believe this is their strategy for the incident. Task saturation occurs because many ICs, department SOGs, NIOSH, fire department training officers, and lecturers believe that offensive and defensive modes are the primary driving force in the strategy of the incident.
ICs who identify a mode of operation as their only strategic piece can become task saturated and this is magnified when the IC makes their next IAP decision off a “tactical platform.” Strategy is NOT the mode of operation as a singular component. Tactics without strategy are just the noise before the defeat.
In closing, strategy is the “commander’s intent,” by effectively communicating what we are trying to accomplish. Let’s face it, words are the swords in combat and when your officers have a clear understanding of “what you are trying to accomplish,” it now brings clarity for the tasks and tactics (the how) being performed and will lead to more positive and safe outcomes on your next emergency incident. ●
