The Worst Industrial Disaster — Bhopal Gas Tragedy

“The article is being written to describe one of the worst industrial tragedy which had taken place in India during 1984. Bhopal Gas Tragedy is been considered as one of the worst industrial disaster, the article is been written to describe the reason of the disastrous and the aftermath of the event.”

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), a plant which was set up in 1969 was responsible for producing pesticide Sevin with the use of methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediary. A production plant was been added for MIC to the UCIL site in 1979. The chemical process employed within the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to make MIC, which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to make the ultimate product, carbaryl. Another manufacturer, Bayer, also used this MIC-intermediate process at the factory once owned by UCC at Institute, West Virginia, within The US.

As the Bhopal plant was developed, other producers (including Bayer) which had begun their manufacturing of carbaryl without MIC, though at a more expensive manufacturing cost. This “route” differed from the MIC-free routes used elsewhere, during which the identical raw materials were combined in a very different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacting with naphthol to make a chloroformate ester, which was, in turn, reacted with methylamine. Within the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen, but production continued regardless, resulting in an accumulation of stores of unused MIC where that method was used.

The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000-litres liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619. Within the months leading up to the December leak, liquid MIC production was current and being employed to fill these tanks. The UCC safety regulations had specifically mentioned that none of the tanks should be filled more 50% (here, 30 tons) with liquid MIC. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of every tank as needed, and also kept impurities out of the tanks.

In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the flexibility to effectively contain most of its nitrogen pressure level, which meant that the liquid MIC contained within couldn’t be pumped out. At the time of the failure event which had occurred, the tank E610 was containing 42 tons of liquid MIC. Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant stopped working for maintenance. Maintenance was responsible for the shutting down of the plant’s flare tower so a corroded pipe might be repaired. With the flare tower still out of service, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November, using MIC stored within the two tanks still in commission. a shot to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, therefore the 42 plenty of liquid MIC contained within still couldn’t be pumped out of it.

Tank 610 in 2010. During decontamination of the plant, tank 610 was off from its foundation and left aside.

Methylamine (1) reacts with phosgene (2) producing methyl isocyanate (3) which reacts with 1-naphthol (4) to yield carbaryl (5).

By early December 1984, most of the plant’s MIC related safety systems were malfunctioning and lots of valves and features were in poor condition. in addition to its several gas vent scrubbers which had been out of service in addition because the boiler, intended to wash the pipes. During the late evening hours of 2nd December 1984, water was believed to have inrushed in a side pipe and into Tank E610 whilst trying to unclog it, which contained 42 tons of MIC that had been present there since late October. The introduction of water into the tank subsequently resulted in high runaway reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and various other factors, like the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. The pressure in tank E610, although initially nominal at 2 psi at 10:30 p.m., it had to reach 10 psi by 11 p.m. Two different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was instrumentation malfunction. By 11:30 p.m., workers within the MIC area were feeling the outcome of minor exposure to MIC gas and commenced there search for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m. and informed to the MIC supervisor on duty during the time. the choice was made to handle the matter after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and within the meantime, employees were instructed to continue searching for leaks. The incident was discussed by MIC area employees during the break.

In the five minutes after the bite ended at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 reached a critical state at an alarming speed. Temperatures within the tank were off the dimensions, maxed out beyond 25 °C (77 °F), and also the pressure within the tank was indicated at 40 psi (275.8 kPa). One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack because the emergency valve burst open, and pressure within the tank continued to increase to 55 psi (379.2 kPa); this despite the actual fact that atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had already begun. Direct atmospheric venting should be prevented or a minimum of partially mitigated by a minimum of three safety devices which were malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized or otherwise rendered inoperable:

A cooling system meant to chill tanks containing liquid MIC, which stopped working in January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June 1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high-temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long ago been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F)

A flare tower, started to burn the MIC gas because it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to neutralise a leak of the dimensions produced by tank E610

A vent gas scrubber, which had been deactivated at the time and was in ‘standby’ mode, and similarly had insufficiently hydrated oxide and power to soundly stop a leak of the magnitude produced.

About 30 tonnes of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 minutes to an hour. This may increase to 40 tonnes within two hours. The gases were blown towards the southeasterly direction over Bhopal City.

A UCIL employee triggered the plant’s device at 12:50 a.m. because the concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to tolerate. Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms: one that sounded inside the UCIL plant itself, and a second directed to the outside, which might alert the general public and also the city of Bhopal. the 2 siren systems had been decoupled from each other in 1982 so it absolutely was possible to go away the factory warning siren on while turning off the general public one, and this could be exactly what was done: the general public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the general public round the factory over tiny leaks. Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.

Bhopal’s superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were feeling a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m. Calls to the UCIL plant by police were made between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. which gave assurances twice that “everything is OK”, and on the last attempt made, “we do not know what is going on, sir”. With the dearth of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city’s Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. Finally, they received an updated report that it absolutely was “MIC” (rather than “methyl isocyanate”), of which hospital staff had never heard of and had no antidote for, nor did they receive any immediate information about it.

The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 faded at approximately 2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant’s public siren was sounded for an extended period of time, after first having been quickly silenced an hour and a half earlier. Some minutes after the general public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had occurred at all), which “the leak had been plugged.” Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made tuned in to the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to research the commotion, instead of having been instructed to shelter in situ or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas within the first place.

The reversible reaction of glutathione (top) with methyl isocyanate (MIC, middle) allows the MIC to be transported into the body.

The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a sense of suffocation, burning within the tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, and stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled far from the plant. Those that ran inhaled more rather than those who had a vehicle to ride. Because of their height, children and other residents of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations, as methyl isocyanate gas is approximately twice as dense as air and, therefore, in an open environment incorporates a tendency to fall toward the bottom.

Thousands of individuals had died the subsequent morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only within the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis. The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and also the death rate by around 200%.

Apart from MIC, supported laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud possibly also contained chloroform, dichloromethane acid, methylamine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine and greenhouse gas, that was either present within the tank or was produced within the tank when MIC, chloroform and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed near the bottom and spread within the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities. The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol. Laboratory investigations by CSIR and UCC scientists did not demonstrate the presence of the compound.

In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government, which subsequently did not make data public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and also the Central Bureau of Investigation. The UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson, along with a technical team, immediately travelled to India. Upon arrival, Anderson was placed under confinement and urged by the Indian government leave the country within 24 hours. Union Carbide organized a team of international physicians, in addition of supplies and equipment, to figure out with the local Bhopal health profession, and also the UCC technical team began assessing the reason for the gas leak.

The health care system immediately became overloaded. In severely affected areas, nearly 70 per cent were under-qualified doctors. Medical staff during the time were not prepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and hospitals weren’t tuned in to proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.

There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo Bartholemew, on commission with news organization Rapho, took an iconic colour photograph of a burial on 4 December, Bhopal gas disaster girl. Another photographer present during the moment, Raghu Rai, took a black and white photo. The photographers didn’t kindle the identity of the daddy or child as she was buried, and no relative has since confirmed it. As such, the identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the suffering of victims of the Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew’s went on to win the 1984 World Press Photo of the Year.

Within some days, trees within the vicinity became barren and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce because of suppliers’ safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages.

Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC by reactivating the plant and continuing the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions like having water carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal. the govt. of India passed the “Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act” that gave the govt. rights to represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of a scarcity of data or misinformation were widespread. An Indian government spokesman said, “Carbide is more curious about getting information from us than in helping our relief work”.

Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned to not consume fish. The number of youngsters exposed to the gases was a minimum of 200,000. Within weeks, the government established a variety of hospitals, clinics and mobile units within the gas-affected area to treat the victims.

Victims of Bhopal disaster march in September 2006 demanding the extradition of Warren Anderson from The US.

Legal proceedings involving UCC, The US and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and also the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the govt. of India to act because of the personal representative for victims of the disaster, resulting in the start of legal proceedings. Initial lawsuits were generated within The US jurisdiction system. On 17 April 1985, administrative division Court Judge John F. Keenan (overseeing one lawsuit) suggested that “‘fundamental human decency’ required Union Carbide to produce between $5 million and $10 million to instantly help the injured” and suggested the cash might be quickly distributed through the International NGO. UCC, on the notion that doing so didn’t constitute an admission of liability and also the figure might be credited toward any future settlement or judgement, offered a $5 million relief fund two days later. The Indian government turned down the offer.

In March 1986 UCC proposed a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs’ U.S. attorneys, of $350 million that will be in line with the corporate, “generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500–600 million for over 20 years”. In May, litigation was transferred from The US to Indian courts by a U.S. District Court ruling. Following an appeal of this decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer, judging, in January 1987, that UCIL was a “separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India”.

The Government of India refused the offer from Union Carbide and claimed US$3.3 billion. The Indian Supreme Court told either side to come back to an agreement and “start with a clean slate” in November 1988. Eventually, in a settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused within the Bhopal disaster. the number was immediately paid.

Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the initial $470 million, dismissing the other outstanding petitions that challenged the initial decision. The Court ordered the Indian government “to purchase, out of settlement fund, a bunch of medical insurance to hide 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms” and canopy any shortfall within the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL to “voluntarily” fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The corporate agreed to the present.