When it comes to internet freedom, even in China, where there’s a will, there’s a way

In the run up to the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Congress on October 18, Beijing continues to ramp up its thought control over the population, and particularly access to the internet: a number of people have already been jailed as a result of a ban on VPNs, while app stores have been told to stop offering them; online anonymity is now forbidden and fines have been dished out to ISPs for not controlling content, blocking WhatsApp and other instant messaging tools; all backed by other measures to prevent anything happening on the internet without the regime’s say so.

In response, growing numbers of people have begun using an open source proxy called Shadowsocks to access censored content. It creates an encrypted connection between the user’s computer and another used as a proxy and seems to be proving difficult for the authorities to block: despite the original project being taken down after its developer received a visit from the police, different versions of the project are being maintained and improved by other people. One way to explain how Shadowsocks works is through a parallel with the physical world: a VPN is equivalent to using a private messaging company that is responsible for ensuring the privacy of your missives; Shadowsocks is like sending a package to a friend with instructions as to the real recipient so she can send it on.

Configuring Shadowsocks is not easy: it is intended for use by developers and requires access to a server outside the country or beyond the Great Fire Wall of China, which must then be configured. Most people using it are not involved in subversive activities, but instead simply want access to content that has been censored accidentally or by the application of overly zealous policies that have seen sites such as YouTube, Vimeo and many others blocked: users include businesses suddenly unable to access their suppliers or customers’ sites, content producers who want to see videos from abroad.

The Chinese government has been reasonably effective in using machine learning to detect traffic patterns to identify the use of VPNs. However, the decentralized nature of Shadowsocks makes it more difficult to identify and control, which seems to be driving its growth. Is it really possible for a government to control internet access? The Chinese government seems determined to try. Whether technology allows it to do so in the medium or long term is another question.

(En español, aquí)