Formal Verification for n00bs -Part 3: An attempt to prevent classic hack with Act

Marek Kirejczyk
Feb 21, 2019 · 4 min read

This is the third post of a series Formal Verification for n00bs:
Part 1: The K ecosystem
Part 2: Proving the correctness of a token
Part 3: A try to prevent classic hack with KLab
Part 4: Understanding K language

In this post, we will try to use KLab to show how a classic hack - Batch overflow could be prevented. We will also explore ACT in more details as well as reach some of its limitations.

Reminder:
ACT is a fairly simple language provided by KLAB that helps in generating high-level semantics in K. The whole ecosystem is described in part1; some basics on ACT were already described in part2.

A tragedy that could be avoided

In the history of Ethereum, there were a few big hacks caused by implementation issues in smart contracts. One of the famous was the one with batch overflow. We want to show that this problem could be avoided if formal verification had been used.

The code of the considerate contract is here. The problem is in the following function:

The vulnerability is caused by code in line 3, where SafeMath should have been used:

The attack for the original code is the following: you can pick a huge _value such that for example (2 * _value) overflows the range of uint256, e.g.
_value = MAX_INT/2+1
This will casue amount to equal 2 and will bypasschecks in line 5, while amount added to receiver in line 9 will be much bigger than amount of all tokens in circulation.

Could this bug be noticed earlier? Let’s write high-level intended semantics for the batchTransfer function and check if it is consistent with the actual code.

Note: We have to change the interface of the batchTransfer function since at this particular moment dynamic arrays are not yet supported by KLab. So, we will alter solidity code:

The announced above high-level semantics for the batchTransfer function is as follows:

As an exercise, you can try to check that the above implementation of batchTransfer function fails the proof of consistency with the semantics, however after fixing the bug in line 5 — it passes.

The fixed code is here:

Watch out: the proof for the above on my MacBook Air took ~3 hours!

Conclusion

This example shows how formal verification could prevent the hack. It also shows the limitations of practical verification with ACT.

ACT cheatsheet

As we reached the first limitations of ACT it seems like a good moment to see what is the list of all available headers.

In part2 of this series we described the general structure of a specification written in ACT, in particular, three headers: IF, IFF (particularly to express assumptions) and STORAGE. More headers below:

SUCH THAT

This is used solely to express constraints for statements (S). Let us see an example (special thanks to MrChico from dapphub for this example; all following examples are from official dapphub materials):

As you can see the above specifies that a function change behaves in such a way that it modifies two particular positions at the storage (0 and 1 stands for the first two variables of the code of the function) with the constraint that the final values must sum up to the input value x.

GAS

You can specify accurate usage of your gas:

STACK

You can specify direct changes to stack:

CALLS

You can specify that an external function is called.

RETURNS

You can specify what is returned by your function:

BALANCE

You should be able to specify that a balance of a specific address is somehow changed. However, this is not yet available in KLab.

Act vs K

KLab gives a great promise for a solid, reliable tool for formal verification. However, it is a tool on an early stage and there are significant limitations: lack of support for account balance or arrays are two examples. To be able to efficiently obtain a proof of correctness, one has to write Solidity code in a specific manner:

  • All functions should be short and do just one specific thing. If you have a complicated multi-purpose function in your contract, we recommend splitting into a few smaller specialized functions.
  • Calls to unknown code should be avoided.
  • The code should be as simple and straightforward as possible.

KLab is an upper layer of a stack of technologies (Details: part1). Directly underneath KLab, there is a language K, in which we can also state our high-level semantics.

K is a more expressive language but comes with its own trade-offs:

  • K’s prover outputs just TRUE or FALSE, while KLab’s prover is equipped with a graphical debugger that helps to find a counterexample for a failed proof. (We will cover debugger in a future blog post)
  • Second, to write directly in K, one has to understand accurately EVM (more specifically: KEVM, which description of EVM written in K) which isn’t a piece of cake.

So that reality of today’s formal verification of EVM code is that one should understand both ACT and K to be efficient.

And so: next time, we will give you a smooth introduction to K!

Marek Kirejczyk

Written by

Ethereum blockchain Engineer. Ethworks, Universal Login.

Ethworks

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All about blockchain: Design, smart contracts, ICOs and distribiuted future

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