Brussels’ new approach to Beijing
When the average person typically thinks of EU interests, they would be forgiven if the word “China” did not cross their mind. Developments concerning the EU are often so internally focused that we might forget it operates as a geopolitical actor in the international system, representing a conglomerate of European interests and values.
The EU’s relationship with China is one such international involvement that has become increasingly important.
The EU’s new Strategy for Co-operation in the Indo-Pacific was passed earlier this year on the 16th of September. Additionally, a report for a New EU-China strategy was also passed. It specifically proposed and laid a new strategy and direction for the EU in dealing with China, whilst the EU is more involved with the Indo-Pacific region. Relations between Brussels and Beijing have become increasingly complicated as of late, one can already see where the new strategy is influencing relations between the two powers, as it seeks to promote a more proactive, cooperative, and defensive EU.
The background
Brussels and Beijing have a decent history of contact and cooperation with each other, with diplomatic relations beginning in 1975. After several decades of largely friendly relations, the EU and China were brought closer together in 2003, with the EU’s adoption of a “Strategic Partnership”. Which committed the EU to concrete proposals to enhance relations with China on several fronts. Since then, the relationship between the EU and China has seen its ups and downs, there have been several disputes over conflicting interests ranging from Trade; The EU debate on the weapon embargo on China; Human Rights issues surrounding the Uighur Muslim minority; and the Taiwan question.
There have been many calls for Brussels to update its China policy to be both more defensive, and tougher on Beijing. The new strategy report that was proposed in September, has sought to meet these demands. The new strategy has six main policy areas, or “pillars” that it focuses upon, whilst “placing the defence of EU values at the heart of this strategy”, as stated by the report.
What are the six pillars?
Cooperation on global issues
The EU parliament outlined its intention to include China in dialogues surrounding global issues, specifying that these issues would focus on key areas of interest for the EU such as human rights, environment and climate change, nuclear disarmament, economic recovery, and multilateral organisation reforms. It further elaborated that the human rights dialogues should include topics specific to China such as media freedom, minority rights in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, as well as freedom of expression in Hong Kong.
Furthermore, Members called for an EU-China dialogue on how to better strengthen the nation’s response abilities to infectious diseases that may have epidemic/ pandemic potential.
Further engagement on human rights
Parliament urged China to take decisive steps toward ending human rights abuses within the country, condemning various instances of violation. The report further emphasised the EU’s commitment to defend human rights, as a part of their core values.
Specific areas of concern were the systematic persecution of Uighur Muslims and other religious minorities, as well as respect for the international commitments China had regarding Hong Kong and its people. It called upon the EU Commission to use the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which would provide greater market access to China, as leverage to improve human rights protection in China.
Additionally, as a further statement on the CAI, it was stated the ratification process for the CAI could not even start until China lifts the restrictions it has against certain Member States, such as Lithuania.
Identifying risks and challenges
The Commission was invited to carry out an audit to assess the EU’s dependence on China in several strategic areas. As the new strategy should be able to provide the means and data necessary to prepare for “political, economic, social, and technological threats from China”.
It further calls for continued EU unity and cohesion in these shared values at the Member State level, with a need for the implementation of this new strategy and future China-oriented policies, to be well coordinated between EU institutions and the Member States.
Building partnerships
Parliament called for the EU to coordinate with like-minded partners, (particularly the U.S, the U.K, Japan, members of NATO) who share its values in the areas of protecting human rights in China, defending liberal democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and encouraging China to respect international law.
Particular focus was placed upon Taiwan, where concerns were expressed about “China’s assertive and expansionist policies” near the Taiwan Strait and South China sea. Highlighting the importance of trade relations between the EU and Taiwan, the need for progress toward a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan was made pivotal to future dealings.
Open strategic autonomy
It was outlined that Parliament considered it necessary for the EU to invest in research and innovation to find ways to increase autonomy in several strategic industrial areas such as microchips, rare-earth mining, and telecoms, to reduce dependency on China in these areas.
Members stressed the need for increased funding for several areas such as 5G roll-out, 6G research, and mega-data technology, etc, to enhance digital sovereignty and ensure network security.
There were again further calls for the Commission to analyse the EU dependencies in strategic sectors, and to find ways for the EU to both consolidate and diversify EU access to important resources.
Defending of European values
There was strong support for the EU to continue its efforts in becoming a greater geopolitical actor, via the promotion of its autonomy and strategic capacity. Members called for a further strengthening of EU defence to protect its interests abroad, as well as taking a more proactive role in the EU’s neighbourhood, and to ensure greater unity on these policies amongst member states.
Additionally, the strategy stressed the importance for the European External Action Service (EEAS) to monitor and deal with Chinese disinformation operations, with the Far-East Stratcom Task Force being set up to deal with this specifically.
Contemporary challenges
The timing of this report is not surprising, as previously mentioned there have been calls for the EU to change its approach to dealing with China acting more on the defensive and viewing the “rising hegemon” as both opportunity and threat. This view was summed up quite well back in 2020 when President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said “the relationship between the EU and China is simultaneously one of the most strategically important and one of the most challenging that we have”.
The EU and China have been engaged in diplomatic relations for several decades, the strategies that each has employed toward the other have reflected the issues they were facing at the time. Such is the case with this outline for the new strategy, where several contemporary issues are at the centre of this new strategy.
Controversies surrounding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the general treatment of religious minorities in China, have all led to diplomatic problems between the EU and China. The report addressed many of these issues and laid out the stances the EU wished to continue to take on them. Incidentally, the stances outlined in the strategy can be seen in recent events.
Taiwan in particular has been the new focus of the past couple of months. Lithuania caused problems for EU-China relations after it announced in July it is going to allow Taipei (capital city of Taiwan) to open a representative office in Lithuania. Causing outrage in Beijing will “inevitably have an impact on overall EU-China relations”, as stated by an EEAS spokeswoman. It very much id have an impact, the incident was discussed (among other important issues) in September by the top diplomats of both the EU and China. Josep Borrel and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met for the 11th “strategic dialogue” between the two powers, where Borrel expressed that the EU supported Lithuania in its dispute with China.
This stance complimented the sentiment made both in the report for a new China strategy and in the Indo-Pacific strategy, where it said it would seek “trade and investment relationships with partners with whom it does not have trade and investment agreements, such as Taiwan”. The EU has a stake in Taiwan not only because of its stance on the defence of liberal democracy but also in the area of technology, as the most advanced type of semi-conductors that are imported into the EU, come from Taiwan.
As much as the EU is interested in Taiwan, it is still trying to repair and maintain friendly relations with China. It seeks a direction of cooperation, viewing China as a vital player in all conversations surrounding its involvement in human rights issues as well as the protection of liberal democracy under Chinese expansion. China has been dubbed the EU’s “systemic rival”, but this is not a suggestion of conflict. The Indo-Pacific strategy has outlined that the EU desires a greater presence in that region to “protect its interests”, depending on the extent of such a presence it might be complemented by something such as the AUKUS alliance. This coupled with the report for a new EU-China strategy suggests a strategy for a more actively engaged EU in that region, with a greater focus on China and its actions.
