Can China Take Over Europe?
A look into Xi’s attempts to conquer the old continent
Following the 2008 crisis, China began to outline its current geopolitical strategy all across the globe. As western markets were experiencing an unprecedented recession, Beijing managed to implement its soft power especially in less developed regions, such as Africa, South America, Eastern Europe, and neighboring Asian countries.
16+1 platform:
By mainly basing its foreign policy on bilateral agreements, in 2012 China aimed at establishing the 16 + 1 platform, which could bring together all the countries of the former communist block to trade with the Asian superpower. In 2019 it was further expanded to include Greece in the platform. The region was perceived by Chinese planners as a place to fill the investment gap by exporting products, technologies, and granting loans.
The main motive was to increase mobility and connectivity which was directly related to Beijing’s flagship Belt and Road initiative, thus most of the projects concerned transport infrastructure, motorways, ports, and in particular railway networks, crucial for the transport of goods between Europe and Asia.
Among the most significant intentions:
The first flagship project announced was a high-speed rail link between Budapest and Belgrade. Meanwhile, Beijing promised a 10 billion USD worth of investments in Romania’s energy infrastructure while Montenegro was assured a loan for the country’s first highway.
In addition, one of the most renowned purchases was Greece’s Piraeus port, meant to be one of China’s main gateways to the old continent. Another example is Italy’s agreement on Trieste’s port signed in 2019 to establish a custom-free zone and several rail links between the two countries.
Investments in Belarus:
Even of more significance is the Chinese presence in Belarus. With Xi Jinping’s visit to Minsk in 2015 dozens of agreements were signed, resulting in a total amount of almost 16 billion USD, including infrastructure, industrial, communication, and even cultural contracts. The flagship project is the recently opened great stone technology, worth half a billion dollars, in which 33 Chinese companies have already invested an additional 2 billion USD. According to the Chinese academy of social sciences the cumulative amount of Chinese loans, subsidies, and investments in Belarus is estimated at 20 billion USD.
The financial gap between Western and Eastern Europe:
Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2019 out of the 129 billion USD worth of Chinese investments in Europe only 10 billion USD went to the countries of central and eastern Europe, for example, Beijing invested in Germany two and a half times more capital. In fact, most of the statistics show the most investments occur in western and northern Europe. The share of Chinese investments in the eastern part of Europe, compared to the rest of the continent, in 2018 and 2019 was 2% and 3% respectively.
Failed promises:
Actually, Beijing’s inability to operate in the region is visible in the aforementioned high-speed train between Hungary and Serbia, which has not been completed after seven years. In Romania, after signing several agreements none of the projects worth 10 billion USD took off. Montenegro on the other hand with its highway project fell into the trap of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy. Still, Beijing has managed to create a perception of presence in the region, which is mostly influenced by the pro-Chinese actions aiming at geopolitical leverage mainly on the EU and the US. Especially by noticing the prestige stemming from gaining influence in a region that has been the main arena of Russian-American rivalry over the past 70 years.
On the Hungarian front, Prime Minister Viktor Orban warned in 2018 that if his government did not receive more funds from the European Union, Hungary would turn to China.
A peculiar example is the one of the Serbian president. Aleksander Vucic, accepting the recent Chinese medical aid for the coronavirus pandemic was even more expressive when he kissed the Chinese flag and stated that “China is the only country that can help”, even though the EU has allocated eight funds of much higher value in the Balkans than China. As the European Union struggled to give a common and durative response for vaccinations, the Sino-Hungarian relationship took an evident turn in 2021. On January 14th Hungary communicated that it stroke an agreement with Sinopharm covering “up to a million doses” even though European drug regulator EMA has not given the go-ahead for its distribution up to now. Subsequently, on January 19th 2021 a new branch of Shanghai’s Fudan University was announced. This project is estimated to cost around 2,2 millions euro, will have a capacity of 6000 students, and is scheduled to open its doors in 2024.
Relations with the Czech Republic:
Moreover, the Czech president Milos Zeman was also helpful for the cause when he described his country as a “Chinese unsinkable aircraft carrier in Europe” and participated in the military parade in Beijing in 2015 as the only EU head of state. However, his attitude began to change in the face of constantly failing promises. Five years after Beijing’s praise he threatened to boycott the 17+1 summit in 2020, due to the lack of Chinese investments in his country. Subsequently, relations further aggravated when senator Miloš Vystrčil visited Taiwan in august 2020, reassuring the strong ties between Prague and Taipei.
Relations with Poland:
In the same way, the largest economy of 17+1 system, Poland after the initial favorable attitude and interest in cooperation with China, which resulted in an agreement on strategic cooperation in 2016, recently became distrustful about relations with China. Like Bucharest, Warsaw treats its alliance with the United States as a priority, casting a shadow over its relationships with Beijing. Firstly, Poland is strongly against China’s investments in strategic infrastructure. In addition, the relationship did not improve when Polish counterintelligence detained the director of the Chinese telecommunications tycoon Huawei in 2019 on suspicion of espionage.
Different approaches:
Lastly, Beijing is using the perception of its presence in the region to leverage the United States and the European Union, that also applies to the selected countries in the region that use the Chinese card to strengthen their negotiation position in relation to Brussels or Washington, the clearest examples are Hungary and Serbia.
The second group of countries states that base their defense on Washington’s guarantees and see Chinese influence more as a threat than an opportunity, the geographic proximity of Russia is a common factor as it consists mainly of Poland, Romania, or the Baltic States.
Finally, we have countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia whose societies are clearly opposed to the values promoted by China, as evidenced by the group for Tibet established by the Czech Parliament and renewed interests towards Taiwan’s economy.
Conclusions:
Beijing’s influence in the region of central and eastern Europe is more a media topic than a real lever. China seems to have failed the attempts to enhance its soft power in the region. The single examples like the investments in Belarus, the takeover of the Greek port Piraeus or a soft power show during the pandemic fever are a drop in the pond.
The countries in the region are disappointed with the failure to fulfill Beijing’s promises and reluctant to the Chinese civilization idea. This fact will be very difficult for China to change and gain a wider influence in this strategically important place in the world.
