EU-Turkish Relations and the Southern Gas Corridor
In it’s search for an end of the dependency of Russian energy the EU might find itself at the hands of the Turkish political and geopolitical system
As the war rages on in Ukraine, the European Union has been stirred to re-think its energy policy. Following the Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent conflicts in the Middle East and the Caucasus, the EU sought Russia as an alternative energy source, but the invasion of Ukraine dramatically changed this. The EU has ceased importing the majority of Russian oil and many countries have stopped importing Russian gas altogether, with architects of this diminishing relationship like Frank-Walter Steinmeier, declaring that it was a mistake.
Due to this turbulent situation, new alternatives have been explored which include nuclear energy, LNG, and pipelines through the Iberian Peninsula connecting to Algeria. One of the main alternatives for gas supply has been the pipelines that run through Turkey, connecting to Azerbaijan and the Caspian sea gas fields.
Since Turkey is a member of NATO, this should theoretically provide a more stable gas supply. However, the recent actions of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could lead to similar issues in the future if a dependency occurs.
Pipelines from the Caspian Sea
The Caspian Sea region is full of gas fields. Many of these are owned by Russia, with this gas travelling through pipelines in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, to Germany. In the past, the Soviet Union owned the entirety of these gas fields. However, after its fall, the new states which emerged had ownership and could export the gas. The most exemplary country that increased its power by selling gas, was Azerbaijan.
A Shia-majority and Turkic-speaking country, the Republic of Azerbaijan is an authoritarian state in the hands of the Aliyev family. Its first President, Heydar Aliyev, was succeeded in 2003 by his son Ilham Aliyev and his wife, Vice President Mehriban Aliyev, both of whom still rule to this day.
Due to its export of gas from the fields of Shah Deniz, the country has been able to increase its power and influence in the surrounding region and abroad. Shah Deniz is one of the biggest gas fields of the world, the reserves are estimated at between 1.5 to 3 billion barrels (240 to 480 million cubic metres) of oil equivalent from 50 to 100 billion cubic meters of gas. This has granted the country a lot of funding which was a factor in Azerbaijan’s win over Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Azerbaijan is a close military ally of Turkey, due to cultural and historical ties. This partnership, alongside its importance for gas supply, has placed Azerbaijan in a tense situation with Russia. Which worsened following Russia’s support of Armenia during the conflict. On the other hand, Russian diplomacy approaches Azerbaijan with suspicion, as during the 90s, Azerbaijan made partnerships with European energy companies to extract their gas instead of Russia’s.
In addition to that, the military reliance of Azerbaijan upon Turkey, alongside a strategic rivalry between Istanbul and Moscow, has hindered the expansion of Russian interests in the region.
Currently, gas from Azerbaijan arrives in Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor, formed by three pipelines. The South Caspian Pipeline connects Baku and the gas fields of the Caspian Sea with the Turkish border, from there the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) crosses Turkey arriving at the Greek Border, and then the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) goes through Greece and Albania and under the Adriatic ocean where it arrives in Southern Italy. These three pipelines are administered by consortiums formed between the Azerbaijani state-owned energy company, SOCAR, and Turkish and European energy companies such as British Petroleum, Sanam, Fluxys, and TPAO.
Incidentally, Azerbaijan is not the only Caspian country that could supply the EU, the other is Turkmenistan. Another authoritarian regime under President Serdar Berdimuhamedow, who took the Presidency in March 2022 from his father Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who had ruled since 2006. Turkmenistan suffers from issues of poverty and underdevelopment since its independence from the Soviet Union, however, like other countries in the area, it’s blessed with gas fields. In total Turkmenistan has the fourth-largest gas reserve in the world.
Originally planned was the building of a pipeline connecting the country with China, but due to the insecurities of the Taliban regime in nearby Afghanistan, the project was halted. For many years now there have been proposals to build a pipeline under the Caspian Sea, connecting both countries and allowing Turkmenistan’s gas to flow into Azerbaijan and from there into Europe. In 2021 the Turkmen government espoused support for the project, it still hasn’t begun but it’s estimated to be able to transport as much as 30 billion cubic meters.
This prospect would allow the EU to diversify its gas supply even more, and as the war in Ukraine continues, the EU could potentially cut all the pipelines with Russia whilst avoiding a recession.
However, there are some issues. Should the EU receive an increased gas supply from the Caspian sea, then any geopolitical event in the Caucasus could affect the energy supply. Currently, the region of the Caucasus is in a very tense situation, mostly due to ethnic conflicts and territorial disagreements. The South Caspian Pipeline goes through Georgia, which has a long history of conflict with Russia; two of its provinces are currently occupied by the Russian army. At the same time, the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is very tense after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and future conflicts are not off the table. If there was further conflict, both Iran and Russia would be interested in disrupting the flow of gas and could support Armenia in a future conflict.
There is also the question of whether the human rights violations in either Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan could become a liability for the EU. However, it is highly likely that similar to other authoritarian regimes that supply Europe (including Russia in the past) neither of the countries would receive significant opposition from Brussels. As they are small countries in Central Asia, they don’t present any security threat to European security.
On the other hand, there is the issue of Turkey. Currently, most of the corridor goes through Turkey, and considering that the partnership between Ankara and Baku is crucial here, the gas will only flow as smoothly as the current EU-Turkey relations. Since this relationship hasn’t been very good these past few years, this could become a strategic nightmare, if dependency increases too much.
The Turkey of Erdogan
For the past 20 years, The Republic of Turkey has been ruled by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Similar to Russia or Hungary the country has seen a series of reforms that have increased authoritarianism in the country. In 2018 Turkey became the Presidential Republic, with a President who is both the head of state and government.
Under Erdogan, Turkey has pursued revisionist and even imperialist policies abroad, and it has been precisely this direction that has led to tensions between the EU and Turkey. A major issue was the Turkish intervention in Syria in 2019 against the YPG and the Kurdish militias. This was heavily criticised in Brussels, being seen to have almost caused a further destabilisation of an already fragile region. However, the most serious security concern that Europe has regarding Turkey is its position in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, an issue that also has strong implications for energy policy.
Turkey, Cyprus and the Mediterranean Gas
Currently, Turkey is going through an overly complicated economic crisis stemming from high inflation. The lira’s value is consistently declining, and many people blame the economic decisions of President Erdogan, which seem to harm the currency more than help it. The current Turkish monetary policy is based on very low-interest rates, as Erdogan believes that this will decrease inflation, but the economic consensus is that this kind of policy just makes the situation worse.
This has been happening for years now, Turkey has been previously able to solve this issue due to its partnership with the State of Qatar. This alliance is based on military support, with Turkey protecting Qatar from the neighbouring states such as Saudi Arabia, and Qatar helps Turkey with funding and energy supply. But this relationship can only go so far, and the economic situation of Turkey is worsening. Due to this, as a way of financing itself and obtaining foreign currency, the Turkish government has increased its interest in securing the newly discovered gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, this is precisely what could lead to a conflict with Greece and Cyprus, as well as the rest of the EU.
The relationship and history between Turkey and Cyprus are complicated. Following a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was founded, which is now a country only recognised by Turkey. This event is now displaying its full ramifications.
The gas in the Eastern Mediterranean is mostly located in the waters of Cyprus on one side, and Israel on the other. However, the Turkish government disagrees with this reading and is currently disputing the gas fields. Considering that Cyprus does not recognise Northern Cyprus, the situation has become very tense. Cyprus has made deals in the past with Shell and Delek while the drilling of Turkey is mostly done by Qatar Petroleum. Other companies expected to drill in Cypriot waters are Total and ENI. Due to the precious resource, Cyprus, Greece and Israel signed a deal in 2020 to build the EastMed Pipeline.
This pipeline was planned to go from the gas fields of Cyprus and Israel through the Aegean Sea into Greece and from there crossing the Adriatic into Italy. It was this accord that led to tensions between Greek and Turkish warships on the Aegean Sea.
Recent activity suggests that Erdogan seems to be interested in breaking the partnership, making Turkey the sole supplier of gas to Europe. In a recent visit to Ankara by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, Erdogan suggested the possibility of Turkey transporting the Israeli gas to Europe, although he did not provide any specifics. Erdogan has also increased his diplomatic activity with Iraq and its security on the border for extracting gas from Kurdistan for Europe. But there are fears that Kurdistan’s PKK might try to disrupt the flow of the gas. It is not clear how successful Erdogan will be in his attempts to hoard the gas supply to Europe.
Across the sea, the Biden Administration seems quite interested in the situation. According to Greece, the US seems to be more interested in improving its relations with Turkey and reconciling the country with Israel.
Turkish Political Future
Whilst Erdogan tries to manoeuvre Turkey into the position of the sole gas supplier to Europe, Turkey is faced with political turmoil at home, further amplified by the economic crisis.
The biggest party in the opposition to Erdogan is the Republican People’s Party, (CHP) which represents the ideas of republicanism, secularism, progressivism, and social democracy, and is pro-Europe. The party became the main opposition party when Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2002 and is currently polling at 25–30% ahead of the elections in 2023.
The Good Party (iYi) is polling second in popularity at 20%. A centrist-based ideology, it supports secularism and is pro-Europe, alongside conservative economics and nationalism.
Also worth mentioning is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which supports Erdogan and represents the most radical wings of Turkish nationalism. The party is accompanied by a paramilitary wing called “The Grey Wolves”, who espouse an Islamist and ultranationalist ideology. The group are known to violently attack non-Turkish minorities, such as Kurds and Armenians. The party is polling at 7%. On the other hand there is the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) which represents the interests of the Kurdish Minortity.
Erdogan and his AKP are currently allied with the Nationalist Movement Party and some minor parties. Opposing them is the National Alliance formed by both the Republican People’s Party and the Good Party and other minor parties. The bloc that supports Erdogan is facing the loss of its majority, in the past, this would have meant Erdogan having to face a government against him, but since the reform of the country into a presidential system that is no longer the case.
The situation for the Presidential elections doesn’t look much better. So far, the most likely outcome is that Erdogan will have to face the Republican People’s Party candidate. The three Republican candidates are polling over Erdogan for the second round in the elections, if this remains the case Erdogan could lose the presidency, the parliament, and his regime.
The elections in 2023 will undoubtedly send out political shockwaves, whatever the result. Many fear that an unpopular Erdogan will seek to cheat the ballot, leading to internal conflict, and an uncertain energy situation.
Conclusions
The war in Ukraine has shown the consequences of energy dependence, especially when it comes to authoritarian regimes. That is why changing Russian dependency for a Turkish dependency is being carefully considered.
Erdogan has recognised the halting of Russian gas in Europe as an opportunity to substitute Moscow as the main supplier. His intentions appear to be concentrating all the gas from the Middle East to flow through Turkey and into Europe. The fact that Turkey is in NATO means that the US would prefer this alternative, but the EU foresees future problems if both Brussels and Ankara on issues such as the Turkish policy toward Kurdistan, a potential coup, as well as clashes in the Mediterranean.
One way or another that gas will find its way into Europe, but Brussels must decide if it prefers to be supplied by Cyprus and risk a conflict with Turkey or allow Turkey to drill the area and become the sole provider.
Then there is the issue of how long Erdogan will stay in power. If short-term deals are done with Turkey, with the long-term guarantee that democratic rules will be respected, then the EU could see a more friendly Turkish government a year from now. In that case, an increase in energy dependency would not entail many risks.
The problem with Russia was that Germany and other states expected the country to be reformed and did not make it a condition because they had objectives solely for the short term and not for the long term. If the EU wants to have a gas supply that does not bring more security risks, the political process in Turkey must be carefully watched to avoid problems in the future.
