THE NEW EUROPEAN APPROACH TO THE INDO-PACIFIC:
A Security Perspective
If we look at Europe on a map, the regions that border it are the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Maghreb. It is therefore no surprise that when it comes to foreign policy strategy (both from an EU and a member state perspective) these regions are the main areas of interest. However, even though the EU’s neighbourhood was and still is extremely important not only for the European Union but also for the international stage, Asia and especially South and Southeast Asia are the two regions that are becoming a bigger theatre for world issues in matters not only for trade but also energy and security.
This document will be divided into two parts. We will first look into the proposals of the EU regarding its strategy in the Indo-Pacific (specially focusing on security), the second part will analyse the implications of the Australian Affair.
The EU and Asia
With booming economic activity this region has become an increasing issue for the monetary interest of many actors on the world stage. This makes security in this region an important policy issue for the same actors. Therefore, there is a growing interest among EU officials, state leaders and overall, the intelligence circles in Brussels in shifting some eyes from the more traditional areas of European foreign policy interest towards Asia. With this, it is hoped that the EU will not continue to be behind the United States or China regarding its diplomatic presence in the region.
In this regard, one major event that discredited the EU was the nuclear submarines deal between Australia and the US. This ended a previous deal for non-nuclear submarines that Canberra had with France. Leading to future diplomatic actions by Paris towards South and Southeast Asian countries.
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
In her state of the Union, President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen outlined the strategy that the European Union should follow in the coming years regarding the Indo-Pacific region. It firstly establishes the great importance that the relationship EU-Asia has for both actors, as well as for the overall world trade and investment.
“The EU is already the top investor, the leading development cooperation partner and one of the biggest trading partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Together, the Indo-Pacific and Europe hold over 70% of the global trade in goods and services, as well as over 60% of foreign direct investment flow”. (State of the Union 2021)
After that, she explains the seven policy areas of higher relevance for the EU. These are Sustainable and inclusive prosperity; Green transition; Ocean governance; Digital governance and partnerships; Connectivity; Security and defence; Human security.
These areas are varied and cover different topics. However, if we look closer it can be seen that more than one could be put in the area of “security”, most specifically Ocean governance; Security and defence; Human security. Through this, it is clear that the interest of establishing these areas as primordial is to increase the role of the EU as a security agent in the region, not just as an economic one. Because these policy areas could be seen as not very specific, later President von der Leyen explained a series of initiatives that could be tied with these policy areas.
Firstly, the initiative of establishing a “Green Alliance” ties with the policy area of Green transition. The two proposals of digital partnerships in the region and increase the cooperation in “Horizon Europe” with countries like Japan, Singapore or Australia are part of the Digital governance and partnerships. The proposal of Connectivity Partnerships with Japan and India fall in the Connectivity category. The proposals of trade agreements with Australia and Indonesia, an increase of diversity in trade and commerce is part of the Sustainable and inclusive prosperity policy area. Finally, the proposals of increasing the naval presence of the EU in the Indo-Pacific and of strengthening the ocean governance in the region are part of both Ocean Governance and Security & Defence policy areas.
EU MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY
The International relations are moving the sea and together with that the security issues, this is why currently different powers are currently trying to make sure that their naval capabilities are in place and that their interests in the governance of the Oceans are well defended. The US has the biggest and most powerful navy in the world and for the past years, the China of Xi Jinping is also trying to develop its strong naval capabilities amidst conflict in the South China Sea. There is a genuine fear that the tensions in this region could disturb international trade. However, it is not only that. Similarly, to the Horn of Africa, there is a growing fear of Piracy in Southeast Asian water. Some of these states are fragile, which allows the presence of pirate groups that inherently increases the threat to merchant ships.
Since the launch of the EU’s first naval mission (Atalanta) in 2008 and the adoption of an Integrated Maritime Policy the same year, maritime security has been amongst the fastest growing areas of EU security integration. It is particularly present in the Horn of Africa as well as in the Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, this has not been the case for the Asia-Pacific region since that area is considered to be too far away from mainland EU. The country with the biggest presence in the region has traditionally been France.
If the interest of the EU is to increase its naval presence and strengthen the governance of the oceans, then the next proposals and steps should be to focus on increasing their capabilities in maritime security and their partnerships in the region.
SECURITY IN THE REGION
The Australian Experience
Even though its population does not surpass 25 million inhabitants the country of Australia has great geopolitical importance in the Asia-Pacific region. A traditional ally of the United States and as a developed democracy, Australia was seen as a prime partner for the EU in the region. In her state of the Union, President von der Leyen mentioned various times in the proposals for the EU strategy in the Indo-Pacific in topics like trade or technology. In addition, due to the fact of the extensive diplomatic network that Canberra has with Southeast Asian nations a closer partnership with them could open the door for the EU to increase their own network.
This seemed like a step in the right direction. The deal that France had signed with Australia was a $37 billion deal to build 12 submarines. If this happens this could increase the ties of the EU with Australia and the involvement in defence in the region. However, this deal never materialised. This was because instead, Canberra signed a deal in September with the US for a series of nuclear-powered submarines and also adhered itself to AUKUS, a pact between the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand.
As a consequence, Australia was perceived as an untrustworthy partner. The reason for this is that the establishment of a common foreign policy strategy goes through the Gaullist idea of making this strategy independent from the US foreign policy, based on the idea that the interests of America on many occasions do not collude with the interests of Europe. By cancelling the deal, Australia gave an impression of untrustworthiness but at the same time, Washington gave an image of unfair play.
The main outcome of this event of the security aspect of the European strategy for the Indo-Pacific is that it might divert The European strategy for the Indo-Pacific from the American strategies and instead will try to find new partners in the region.
New Partnerships
Soon after the cancelling of the deal fall through between Paris and Canberra by Morrison, Emmanuel Macron started to search for new partners in the region. The main objective of these partnerships was to counter the influence of the two big superpowers (the USA and China) in the area. That is why Macron in the G20 met with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia and with Prime Minister Narendra Modi from India. Even though no document was signed, various declarations were made that signalled an interest in establishing partnerships with both Delhi and Jakarta. “There was a common willingness to go further with the Indo-Pacific strategy,” the French side said after talks with Modi. On the other hand, according to the Elysee Palace, Macron and Widodo spoke for half an hour and “decided to work on a true strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific,”. Macron also held a meeting with Moon Jae-in and “agreed to work together to make the Indo-Pacific an area of stability and prosperity.”
These partnerships had a clear strategic significance. The three countries mentioned before, and especially Indonesia and Korea, have recently found themselves in a complicated relationship with their traditional ally, the US and the increasing regional power that China holds. Because of this, they tend not to be that keen on just following the US strategy in a similar way to Australia. Furthermore, there is India that has a very clear antagonistic relation with China, mostly due to their shared border. However, the issue here is with Russia, since India has a long-lasting defence relation with Moscow and a closer relationship with the EU might not be as compromising as the one with the US. Simultaneously, both India and Indonesia have been increasing their partnership to counter the economic and demographic weight of China in South and Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, it should be clearly noted that no document or deal of major importance has been signed between the EU and India or Indonesia. At the moment, all seems very much hypothetical and what France has done has been marking a way forward. It will also be very important to notice how much the policies of India and Indonesia find it useful to have a defence partnership with the EU as well as how much this relationship might diverge or influence other topics such as trade or even immigration.
WAY FORWARD
At the end of the day, there are two clear ideas that can be pulled out of all of this. One: the EU desires to increase its presence in South and Southeast Asian waters as a way of guaranteeing its interests in the region, one region which is heavily increasing its relevance on the world stage. Two: the EU wants to assert its independence and autonomous strategy, specifically away from the one of the US. This has shown its consequences when potential partners like Australia prefer to side completely with Washington, considering it a more present actor in the region. However, at the same time, this independence from the two big powers might bring in the future closer ties with countries that also find themselves in search of that middle position that avoids a Cold War situation in South and Southeast Asia.
One point that will certainly severely affect the position of the EU is the foreign policy that France establishes for itself in the region. Owning the islands of New Caledonia and French Polynesia, it is certainly the only country in the EU that actively holds possessions in the region, with all its consequences. That is why this issue might increase its importance with the beginning of the French Presidency of the Council beginning in 2022.
However, things cannot end there. Other EU countries like Germany, Spain or the Netherlands, (these last two with historical ties to the region) need also to help strengthen the presence of the EU in the region together with the whole of the EU. Since security and defence is a competence that still mainly belongs to the member states the best way of establishing a coherent policy is that the EU (either directly or through its member states) creates a coherent policy strategy involving maritime security in South and Southeast Asia.
