The Road to the EU’s Strategic Autonomy
Over the decades, the European construction has gradually advanced up to the present time: where we have a solid connection of wills between countries that share a common background. While the European Union’s presence on the global stage is firm, its lack of actorness[i] shows that it is still not a fully-fledged international player: it is anything but hard to see that the cohesion the Union has been able to reach is expressed more on the internal level rather than externally.
Among the weaknesses the actual European Union has, a lack of a coherent common foreign policy is possibly the greatest. Former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens has once described the EU as “an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm.”: despite being one of the most prosperous economies in the world, the Union is still struggling to become a major player in the field of geopolitical challenges.
If we take a glance back to recent international events, everything we find is just a series of missed opportunities for the EU to establish itself as a relevant foreign policy actor.
Then where should we look for the reasons ofthis absence from the world stage? Both on the internal and on the external level: as for the former, the Union still suffers from the decision-making procedures that are adopted in the field of the common external actions; as for the latter, the strategic dependence from NATO, and subsequently from the Atlantic Ally, stops the Union from trying to achieve its own independent position.
Which measures have already been provided in order to gain the strategic autonomy the EU is missing?
A series of missed opportunities
We can consider the “European foreign policy” as an umbrella term that encompasses different outward-oriented policies, which includes: the CFSP-Common Foreign and Security Policy, the CSDP-Common Security and Defence Policy, and the EU External Action. This structure was completed in 2007 with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, we can analyse how the newest -and in theory more cohesive- EU’s approach towards international issues begun to being adopted in the 2000s.
- The new millennium had opened with the infamous War on Terror promoted by George W. Bush after 9/11: the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan saw the support of several European countries, which were anyway acting on their own and not as members of a supranational organization; with the Operation Iraqi Freedom, EU member states put themselves in even more diverging positions.
- Again in 2011, as the Middle East was facing the Arab uprisings, a new great international challenge arose, and again the EU did not cope with it uniformly. The “common” foreign policy appeared here to be just the sum of national interests, individually pursued by the member states.
- Similarly, the Union struggled to tackle continental problems as well. The outbreak of the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in 2013 could have led to a European intervention, as the demonstrations were taking place just across the borders. But eventually, in front of the final annexation of Crimea to Russia, the EU remained passive, incapable of standing up and speak with one voice.
In the light of these events, what can be found are just several examples of the shortcomings of EU’s foreign policy. This allowed, on one hand, the best-performing states to act on their own, and on the other, any other member states to remain unconcerned in the face of these setbacks.
Internal level: the decision-making process
Is it possible to identify the reasons behind EU ineffectiveness in foreign policy?
Certainly, the internal level is a point that needs to be addressed. In fact, the most glaring explanation for this lack in the European building is the nature of foreign policy itself. As the integration process was developing, the states decided to cede national sovereignty in certain policy areas to Union’s competences, in exchange for a greater and stronger European community. With regards to their foreign policies, European countries have not however been willing to give up their autonomy in this sphere, and very jealously they have opted for the intergovernmental method[ii] when it comes to CFSP and CSDP. According to it, the decision-making process is in the hands of the Council of the EU and of the European Council. Both these bodies strongly represent national interests in the supranational arena: it is therefore clear that, since unanimity voting is requested in such policy area, the intergovernmental approach involves difficult mediation between all national interests. In this field, the institutions still maintain a logic of compromise, the same logic that has been fundamental during the integration process to melt all the national specificities of the MSs. Anyway, with all the recent crises and with EU inability to react, these compromises are no longer a strongpoint, but they happened to become the reason of EU paralysis.
In order to overcome the stagnation of our Union, the next step within a process of further integration in foreign policy is to find an institutional model able to balance both the supranational and the intergovernmental aspects of the Union. A first step could then be the introduction of a qualified majority voting-QMV for sanctions and issues related to human rights. This proposal has recently been put forward by both Joseph Borrell[iii], the High Representative, and Ursula Von Der Leyen[iv], the Commission’s President.
External level: strategic dependence
Another key-point to be examined is why the EU does not feel the urge to fix this inefficiency. The weakness of the common foreign policy structure is partially due to the solid membership of most MSs to NATO, who consequentially already feel safely guarded by the American ally. The future of NATO, born at the beginning of the Cold War as a military alliance against the Soviet bloc, is often being discussed, alongside with the prospective belonging of EU countries in the coming years. Something we can say for sure is that, with the rise of other global challengers -such as China and Russia, the Pax Americana had definitely come to an end. As a consequence, it is completely legitimate to consider reforming the way in which European countries have interpreted the concepts of security and defence up until now. After decades of bandwagoning on the US ally, it has emerged that European related problems cannot be solved by American leaded responses. Regarding the defence issue in particular, the problems the EU has to solve are all internal: the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are more concerned about the insecurity that Russian policies might create, while southern members tend to prioritize the risks derived from conflicts in the Middle East and the challenge of mass migration in the Mediterranean. All these requests and national needs have to be supported by European solutions, as they cannot be solved on NATO tables. Talking about a long-term solution, the process of independence reappropriation by EU countries from NATO’s structure should take place gradually. It would only be possible once internal issues have been solved, and after the EU has finally reached a coherent plan in foreign policy and security affairs.
Reaching strategic autonomy?
The term “strategic autonomy” has started being widely used in the last years. The vagueness that characterized this definition has recently brought HR/VP Josep Borrell to a reflection on the topic[v]. As the HR himself said, “strategic autonomy is a process of political survival”, the only way to not condemn Europe to irrelevance on the world stage over the coming years. Under this concept, security and defence are “the most sensitive dimension(s) of the problem”. Nonetheless European actions have to wider their horizons and try to reach independence in other sectors too: especially with the global crisis we are experiencing right now with Covid-19, it has become crystal clear that science, technology, economics, once defined as soft power elements, are gradually “becoming an instrument of hard power”. The effort should then not be limited to the sole field of security, which remains however central.
A certain extent of independence has been promoted by the EU Global Strategy-EUGS[vi], developed by the former HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2016. The plan consisted in an increase of cohesion between the internal and external dimensions of the Union, as well as in an integrated approach to conflict situations. Broadly speaking, the key point was once again the attempt to relaunch European autonomy in foreign policy, establishing its independence from the Atlantic Alliance. Showing the commitment to this declaration, different efforts to implement the Global Strategy have been made.
After the EUGS was announced, the Commission proposed to establish a European Defence Fund[vii] as a way to stimulate the engagement in this field.
Following this path, the Permanent Structured Cooperation-PESCO[viii] has been launched in 2018. Already provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, it has been adopted by the Council through a decision, after a notification of participation by 25 MSs. PESCO aims at deepening the collaboration and cooperation in the field of security and defence amongst the MSs who are able and willing to do so. Taking the form of an enhanced cooperation, PESCO is managed by the Council, and its implementation is again decided by unanimity voting.
Conclusions
Some EU records show that the EU foreign policy has always appeared to be poorly coordinated and poorly thought-out, even if changing attempts had already been made.
On the other hand, recent years have surely demonstrated great progresses in the area of security and defence. Being optimistic, we could say that the basis for an effective European foreign policy have been established. Being realistic, we could say that the willingness to start a process that will lead to European strategic autonomy is present and firm, but as for now the EU cannot be considered a security provider on the international level. The Union has not yet reached a higher level of autonomy in these areas, but it is proving an increasing commitment to the issue.
Could the great post-Covid-19 crisis we are experiencing act as a driving force for a European further development?
References
[i] For the concept of “actorness”, see Jupille, J. and J.A. Caporaso (1998), ‘States, Agency and Rules: the European Union in Global Environmental Politics’, in: Rhodes, Carolyn (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 213–229.
[ii] Community and Intergovernmental Methods at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods.html
[iii] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/640173/EPRS_BRI(2019)640173_EN.pdf p.4
[iv] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000228_EN.html
[v] https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en%20usa%20come%20reference
[vi] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
[vii] https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en
