A Commentary on European Arms Production
By Benjamin Bardos, Core Writers’ Group
Europe has delivered and pledged to deliver an unprecedented amount of arms support to Ukraine — but how will Europe rearm itself? The arms aid effort to Ukraine has been on a logistical scale unseen since WW2; however, spending in the defense sector is nowhere close. This simple mathematical imbalance leads us to the question of how Europe intends to arm Ukraine, whilst simultaneously rearming itself.
At the forefront of this resolve towards rearmament is the European Defense Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). Its central mandate is to address medium-term critical and urgent shortfalls in military capabilities. Its role is separate from the European Peace Facility (EPF) and should not be confused. The EDIRPA which currently has 500 million EUR — but is expected to grow significantly — has become central to a proposed EU-led initiative to grow arms production and investment.
At the same time, the EDIRPA has become the focus of a crucial debate surrounding European arms production: whether the funds should only be available to only European EU states or secondary states as well. This is a key question since the EU has sizable arms production companies like Rheinmetall (GER), Leonardo (ITA), Saab (SWE), and Airbus (FRA) which are still heavily dependent on secondary nations for arms procurement — primarily the UK and the US.
This becomes a vital consideration when looking at which states can ramp up production to facilitate rapid rearmament and replenishment amidst the support to Ukraine. According to a 2021 study, the largest of the EU’s defense companies account for 12.5% of all global weapons sales. In comparison, the U.K. accounts for 6.8%, and the U.S. accounts for 51%. Therefore, whether the EU funding made available for this replenishment of stockpiles and capabilities has to stay within Europe or can be jointly coordinated with secondary nations will play a significant role in its success.
This all comes amidst serious concerns about European munitions stockpiles as large-volume shipments to Ukraine were not matched with a proportionate replenishment effort. Key areas that are of concern were the 155mm artillery rounds, HIMARS missiles, and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles.
Therefore, the surrounding political debate of what avenue of approach the EU will take toward rearmament is of paramount importance. Rather unfortunately there are no easy answers as it will determine the future of the European security dynamic. However, going along a pro-EU option in which funding through the EDIRPA is limited to EU members risks isolating the UK. Meanwhile, the US is soon to have upcoming elections in 2024, and whether the EU decides to embrace the US closer as a security partner will surely have implications.
On the contrary, a pro-secondary state access approach to the EDIRPA could risk alienating the French who currently hold the largest share in European arms production, some 25%. There is some history to the French perspective, most recently with the wave of F-35 purchases where France called upon its European neighbors to “buy European”.
Regardless of the political ramifications of either option, there is one option that is far more dangerous in its consequences than any — indecision. A failure to swiftly agree on an approach could delay funding to deals that would reinvigorate the military industry. Ultimately it would push Europe to an even greater extent of strategic insecurity as dwindling stockpiles would threaten combat effectiveness.
Moreover, without Europe having a reliable armaments supply chain, Ukraine cannot rely on a steady stream of equipment and munitions necessary to be combat effective. The U.S. alone cannot undertake the sole responsibility for supporting Ukraine due to the political unfeasibility of doing so. Instead, both the U.S. and Ukraine need a capable and resourceful ally.
Additionally, while not at the top of headlines, the issue of semiconductors has quite considerable effects on the rearmament process. Weapons platforms and individual systems now more than ever rely on guided munitions and advanced systems. This means that with the persisting supply chain issues surrounding semiconductors rearming will be more time-consuming. This means that to secure modern arms, the industrial base must be strengthened and made more resilient.
Ultimately, the current situation cannot be a zero-sum dilemma in which individual competing national interests are given priority. Instead in this time of great disorder, transnational objectives have to prevail as inaction and political stubbornness in the trans-Atlantic security theater is simply a luxury neither Europe nor the US can afford. Cooperation and compromise have to be at the forefront of all security considerations across the trans-Atlantic.
Benjamin Bardos is a member of the European Horizons Core Writers’ Team. He is a Tilburg University student reading Global Law, specifically involved with research in the fields of defense policy, military law, and macro-economics.
