Behind the NATO Veto: Sweden’s Stalling Membership Application
By Dóra Tolnai
Over the past two years, Russia’s war against Ukraine has stirred up European politics and diplomacy, and it has grown into the biggest military conflict on the continent since World War II. Naturally, the military confrontation in the region has largely affected the regional diplomatic and military alliances and led to NATO’s enlargement with Finland joining the alliance in April 2023 and Sweden following suit with accession talks. However, in the global political arena, Sweden’s accession to the alliance is turning out to be more complicated than many might have expected.
Background Information
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a defence alliance between two North American and now twenty-nine European countries forming an intergovernmental organisation. As such, NATO, while having political objectives like the promotion of democracy, ultimately centres around the so-called “security guarantee”. This entails, under Article 5 NATO, that the members agree that an armed attack against any of them is considered an attack against all, and commit to responding with necessary actions, including armed force in line with the UN Charter’s self-defence rights. Not only do these guarantees result in external actors being discouraged from aggression by the fear of collective retaliation of the member states, but by fostering unity and cooperation among member states pursuing the maintenance of a cohesive and effective alliance focused on mutual security and stability significantly limits inner conflicts.
Finland and Sweden have a long history of collaboration with NATO forces, but up until the recent events in Ukraine, they did not consider applying for membership in the alliance. Finland’s swift change of heart about allying itself to NATO has a significant historical background, as less than a century ago, before World War II, they lost significant territory to the Soviet Union in a similar military operation as the current events in Ukraine. Consequently, since the country shares a 1300+ km long border with Russia, the security of which was put under question, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Although Sweden shares no borders with Russia, that does not mean they are not under military threat from them. In the last decade, the Russian military simulated a nuclear attack on Stockholm as well as being suspected to have sent a submarine to the waters surrounding Stockholm. These events led to heightened diplomatic tension between the countries and ultimately the aggression shown in Ukraine prompted Sweden’s accession efforts.
Complications
Finland’s accession went relatively smoothly. The most crucial parts of the NATO joining process involve initial accession talks in Brussels, the signing of accession protocols by the NATO members and then the ratification of these protocols by member states’ governments based on national procedures. While Turkey held out some opposition to Finland’s joining the alliance for similar reasons as their objections to the case of Sweden, in the end, in April 2023 Finland joined NATO, becoming the 31st member of the alliance.
Sweden has been facing difficulties in their accession. Since all NATO members must ratify the candidate’s Accession Protocol, national parliaments’ refusal to do so results in a de facto veto preventing the process from moving forth. Sweden has faced strong objections from the Turkish and Hungarian governments to their application for different reasons.
Turkey’s Complaints
At the heart of Erdoğan’s objection lies in the accusations towards Sweden (and similarly Finland) of being lenient towards terrorist groups, including the Kurdish PKK which Turkey blames for the 2016 Turkish coup attempt. Since these allegations, Sweden has revised its anti-terrorism legislation to address this issue, which was accepted by the Turkish parliament, so they voted to approve the Swedish accession. Additionally, there is speculation that Erdogan’s green light for Sweden’s NATO bid is linked to a deal with the United States whereby the US would consent to sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey if they ratified Sweden’s accession protocol, however, this has been denied by the Turkish President. Turkey giving the go-ahead for Sweden’s NATO membership leaves one obstacle: Hungary.
Hungary’s Objection
All NATO member states seem to agree with Sweden joining the alliance, including Hungary, as Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, reaffirmed on X. Then the question naturally arises why the Parliament has not yet ratified the Accession Protocol. There is no clear official answer. There have been suggestions from government-party politicians that Sweden’s consistent criticism of the state of Hungarian democracy is behind the dragging of the approval. The House Speaker, László Kövér, has publicly expressed his objecting opinion to the Swedish accession and has refused to put the matter on the agenda for the parliament to discuss. When he finally did so on 5 February 2024 the ruling party, which holds a two-third majority in Parliament, refused to show up for the session, further stalling progress contrary to the promises made by Orban.
Since then, an unprecedented political scandal has shaken Hungary: the President and a former Minister of Justice have resigned. This is a result of the turmoil of the past week resulting from a man convicted for covering up the sexual harassment of children in a children’s home receiving a presidential pardon. How is this relevant to Sweden’s accession process? According to Hungarian law, until a new president is elected, the House Speaker steps in to temporarily fulfil the role. Even if the interim Speaker replacing him puts Sweden’s accession vote on the parliamentary agenda, Kövér still has the power to further delay ratification in his provisional position.
What now?
For a new Hungarian President, we must wait until March. This means that despite the rising pressure from Sweden and even the US urging ratification of the Accession Protocol, it is not reasonable to expect swift progress in the matter.
Sweden will sooner or later join NATO, surely leading to complications in Orban’s relationship with his close ally Vladimir Putin, since it is against Russia’s interest for Sweden to join the alliance. Hungary, however, after the dust has settled will run out of excuses to delay the inevitable: the Parliament will ratify the Protocol and NATO will gain its 32nd member.
Dóra Tolnai is a third-year LLB student from Hungary, currently studying International and European law at the University of Groningen. Her focus lies in public policy and EU affairs, with particular interest in the rule of law and environmental policy. She is looking forward to a future dedicated to contributing in these areas.
