Pax Evropaea In Spe
By Felipe Oscar Bonilla Branner, Victoria Engsig Christoffersen, Daniel Zeigermann Friis, August Østergaard Nilsson
In the United States, the Republican reluctance that has begun to spread towards both military and economic support for Ukraine is an expression — not just of naïve Trumpist geopolitics — but of something more fundamental happening in American foreign policy. The same can be said of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The embarrassing withdrawal and the Republican resistance towards military support for Ukraine bears witness to a fundamental shift in American foreign policy towards a new form of American isolationism. This shift has been underway for a long time but is especially apparent in the aforementioned examples.
The American shift extends back to the end of the Cold War, with the United States gradually closing itself off in terms of foreign policy. We are now in what Harvard Professor, Joseph Nye, describes as “Kindleberger’s Trap”. This term refers to the power vacuum that arises when the leading superpower does not take responsibility for the stability and development of the international community. The USA, or factions inside of it, has — despite the country’s role as the world’s leading superpower per se — chosen to abdicate from the previous self-appointed role as the world’s protector; evidenced by recent events including Donald Trump’s discourse around NATO countries that have not met their commitments to spend at least 2% of GDP on their defense budgets and Republican reluctance to militarily support Ukraine. No longer can countries in the West rely on the United States as the watchdog, steadfastly upholding democratic principles and the liberal world order.
In addition, the foreign policy still emanating from Washington has shifted its focus. Another renowned Harvard professor, Graham Allison, has referred to a “Thucydides’ Trap” to explain this reorientation. The theory is based on an example from 400 BC, where Sparta initiated the Peloponnesian War by challenging Athens, which had become too powerful for the liking of the reigning superpower, Sparta. The same can be said today with China. The United States cannot passively watch as China grows larger and both directly and indirectly threatens the established dominance of power. Every choice, as is well known in the best Kierkegaardian manner, also involves a rejection. In this case, the rejection is of a strong European alliance, as Europe plays a limited role in this geopolitical chess game.
This dynamic must be considered a significant problem for Europe. In European security policy, Europe has long been highly dependent on the United States, especially through NATO. The reality today, however, is different with Europe’s former protector now preferring to stay on its side of the Atlantic. This means that Europe cannot rely on the partnership as much as it has since the Second World War, creating a profound security threat.
Furthermore, a more fundamental responsibility rests on Europe’s shoulders. The United States’ foreign policy retreat creates a kind of power vacuum that will, whether we like it or not, be filled sooner or later. Europe must ask itself whether they want this vacuum filled by wholly or semi-autocratic dictatorships with no respect for people, let alone their rights, or if they have the courage to stand guard over the values and the ideas at the core of European politics and democracy.
For the EU, however, it seems almost like a chronic ailment — always attempting to find a security and foreign policy line. This sometimes results in unequivocal statements about strategic autonomy and closer cooperation in defense, but unfortunately, the reality is that the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is an arbitrary entity without any real freedom of action. The Council, dominated by member states, is responsible for shaping the common policy, which means it occurs in a context focused solely on nation-states and their interests. This is especially emphasized by the fact that absolute unanimity must underlie all foreign policy actions. This unanimity principle and these inherently anti-centralist ideals mean that the EU is almost always fragmented and rarely carries much weight when attempting to present its initiatives on the international stage. The decisive and swift response when it comes to the war in Ukraine has been a notable exception. However, with figures such as Viktor Orban in Hungary in power, even this unanimity seems to be smoldering. Europe simply cannot afford to base its Common Foreign and Security Policy on the random whims and fancies of pro-Russian European states with authoritarian leaders behind the wheel.
There is a need for a strengthening of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy. The unanimity principle must be abolished if Europe is to have even the slightest hope of conducting a somewhat sustainable foreign policy. An excellent solution would be to make it dependent on a qualified majority (two-thirds) in both the Parliament and the Council, allowing national as well as ideological interests to be heard, while achieving much greater flexibility and freedom of action. Imagine the influence Europe could assert regarding its interests in multilateral forums if a union with over 450 million people and the world’s second-largest economy could stand united. Europe would thus once again be a dominant geopolitical actor on the world stage.
Felipe Oscar Bonilla Branner is co-President of EuH UCPH and undergraduate political science student at UCPH.
Victoria Engsig Christoffersen is a member of EuH UCPH and undergraduate political science student at UCPH.
Daniel Zeigermann Friis is a member of EuH UCPH and undergraduate political science student at UCPH.
August Østergaard Nilsson is co-President of EuH UCPH and undergraduate political science student at UCPH.
All writers are 2023–24 European Horizons Transatlantic Fellows.
