Postcard from Poland: A Short Guide to Rebuilding the Country After Populism
By Lukasz Kaźmierczak
He’s back. On 13 December, a day which marks the imposition of martial law by the Polish communist leadership in 1981, Donald Tusk was sworn in for the third time as Polish Prime Minister, making him the first person to return to office in the country’s post-communist history. Although the general election that proved victorious for Mr Tusk occurred two months earlier, on 15 October, the previous governing camp led by Jarosław Kaczyński in collaboration with Andrzej Duda — the incumbent right-wing President — used all constitutional mechanisms to make the transition as arduous as possible. To celebrate the victorious date that defeated the apathy towards liberal democrats around the world, Mr Tusk dubbed his governing alliance consisting of three electoral blocs “The October 15 Coalition”. Symbolically, Kaczyński’s allies rebaptised rit into “The December 13 Coalition”, to associate the new government with the ancien régime. Since 2005, Poland has witnessed an arm wrestle between the two gentlemen, where nobody can be convinced that “white is white and black is black.” What does it take to bring a country at odds with democratic principles and drifting away from its international partners back to the table? I am delighted to offer you a short guide.
Priority One: Fixing Public Institutions
Forests have been cut to provide paper for books and articles related to democratic backsliding in Europe. On the other hand, only a handful of countries have entered the path of restoring the democratic order. Poland is one of the first countries to begin to heal from populism. Unfortunately, recent developments in the country, which was classified as a ‘mildly authoritarian’ regime under the Law and Justice (PiS) government by Levitsky and Ziblatt, exemplify that the process is excruciating. Mr Tusk’s Cabinet started its tenure with a bid to restore the “impartiality and reliability” of the public media institutions, which under the PiS rule were packed with party cronies who ceaselessly aired right-wing propaganda. A week into office, the new Culture Minister changed the management boards of the national broadcaster and the public radio in a move that was questionable from a legal perspective. This sparked dissatisfaction within the circles of the former government, prompting right-wing politicians to occupy the broadcaster’s headquarters and organise the “March of Free Poles.” Evidently, both sides are determined to either ‘fix’ public institutions reformed by populists or preserve the status quo. However, an opinion poll indicated that almost 53% of constituents supported the methods of the new government, while 15% were undecided. Thus, liberal democrats returning to office have to show decisiveness and act quickly to build on the momentum they were elected on.
The clash over the public media was only the first battle in the long war to revive the rule of law. After eight years of meddling with the judiciary, Poland suffers from a ‘legal dualism’ where there is no agreement on the composition of the Supreme Court and the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal. The latter institution, whose President was described by Mr Kaczyński as his ‘social discovery’, now rushes to offer a shield to all PiS nominees still present in public institutions such as the central bank or the prosecution service. For their part, politicians from the ruling coalition disregard the Tribunal’s decisions. Perhaps the best example of the existing tensions between the two camps are the events that took place on 9 January, when two former members of the PiS government were detained in the Presidential Palace. Back in 2015, the President pardoned Mr Kamiński and Mr Wąsik, who were accused of forging official documents and overstepping their mandate while leading the Polish anti-corruption agency to discredit their political rivals. However, the Supreme Court ruled late last year that the pardon was issued too early as the politicians had not appealed the initial judgement. Consequently, at the request of the Minister of Interior, the police detained them and they were sentenced to two years in prison, in line with the initial court’s judgement. The decision was disputed by Mr Kaczyński’s allies, who described Mr Kamiński and Mr Wąsik as “political prisoners.” Nonetheless, roughly 50% of the electorate agrees that the decision was legal. Again, the incident and the public response show that voters dissatisfied with the populists want to see liberal democrats act even on controversial issues.
EU officials and legal scholars should closely monitor the situation in Poland to develop a playbook that will guide decision-makers in other countries seeking to combat illiberalism and to prevent the destabilisation of legal systems in the future.
Priority Two: Restoring the International Image
The Brusseloise establishment warmly welcomed Mr Tusk’s return as a pleasant anomaly to the continent’s political scene, which is currently tormented by the wave of populism and expected rightward shift in the upcoming elections. Two weeks before his restoration as the Prime Minister, Politico named him “the most powerful person in Europe” for his ability to break the streak of populist victories across the bloc and the prospect of bringing Warsaw back to the table. Arguably, he is the most seasoned politician in the European Council, having served as its President and steering the biggest pan-European political family, the European People’s Party, before returning to his native country. His steady leadership is praised in Brussels and was crucial in the negotiations to divide the bloc’s top jobs after the last European elections in 2019. This might prove essential again as Charles Michel, his successor at the helm of the European Council, will step down ahead of his term’s expiration to seek a seat in the European Parliament in June. In the event that his replacement is not found before the end of June, the task of carving up the EU’s leadership for the next five years will fall to Europe’s top troublemaker, Mr Viktor Orbán. You’re right on time, Mr Tusk, to palliate the upcoming hardships!
On the other hand, the Brussels bubble should not become complacent about Mr Tusk’s return. While his approach to European affairs will definitely be a U-turn following his predecessors, he will not be a ‘yes-man’ for European policymakers. In some policy areas, such as migration, it will be the style not the substance that will change. Furthermore, Mr Tusk opposes recent proposals for changes in EU treaties put forward by the European Parliament due to fierce domestic opposition on the issue. In November, when the chamber voted on the treaty changes, Mr Tusk publicly asked European lawmakers from his party to reject them, even though the official line of the EPP, their European political family, was to vote in favour of that. As he argued during the press conference:
“One of the reasons why the UK left the EU was this naive, sometimes even unbearable euro-enthusiasm, which was transformed into projects that changed the character of the EU. No groups on the Polish political scene will allow themselves to be involved in any decisions, manoeuvres or processes that would limit Polish independence, sovereignty and interests.”
Mr Tusk is a Eurorealist aware of the EU’s past mistakes related to irresponsible approaches toward energy, migration, and, most notably, relations with Russia driven primarily by the bloc’s heavyweights from Berlin and Paris. Therefore, he will firmly stand by his convictions and will be primarily concerned with making sure that the bloc delivers, rather than with grandiose visions for its future. Healing from populism is a gradual process. Hence, you can expect that the country’s general approach to foreign policy will not backtrack overnight.
Conclusion
The aforementioned fundamental priorities leave little space for bringing a tangible policy change. Apart from Mr Bodnar, a heavyweight who served as Poland’s Ombudsman and was chosen by the PM to restore the rule of law as the Justice Minister (Priority One), and Mr Sikorski, the longest-serving Polish Foreign Minister who returned to office after a stint as an influential Member of the European Parliament (Priority Two), the new government does not feature leaders capable of delivering profound reforms. Rather than governing, their primary task will be to administer. Mr Tusk, as a tenured politician, is aware that matters such as his retirement reform from ten years ago usually spark dissatisfaction and reduce the support for the government. Hence, before the momentum of the new coalition vanishes, the principal objective of the former EU Council President is to achieve as much as he can in the two described areas. Once he believes his task is done, rumour has it he might step down to give the field to a younger generation of decision-makers. Overall, cleaning up after populism demotes public debate on pertinent policy issues such as healthcare, education, and the cost-of-living crisis. For now, the electorate is more interested in following public drama related to fundamental constitutional issues rather than substantive policy changes as it evokes more emotions. The question is, how long will this last?
Lukasz Kaźmierczak has been a member of European Horizons since 2020. He joined the UCL chapter, where he read Politics and International Relations. After obtaining a Bachelor’s degree, he is pursuing a Master’s degree in European Affairs, specialising in digitisation and new technologies at Sciences Po Paris. His areas of interest include digital and climate policies, European integration, international trade and transatlantic partnership.
