Trump, NATO, and the Future of EU Defence
By Fernando Gómez-Acebo, Elton Högklint, Erika Vodvárková
“No, I would not protect you. In fact I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay.”
Those were the words of ex-president and current presidential candidate Donald Trump to NATO members who have yet to meet the 2% military spending guideline. This is no novel sentiment, as Trump has a long history of antagonism against NATO, even going as far as expressing a desire to withdraw the United States from it. Regardless of whether or not he will be able to deliver on his threats if elected, his words signify a paradigm shift in transatlantic security cooperation — a relatively bipartisan matter in US domestic politics ever since the Second World War. But NATO policy is just one example in a long line of direct and indirect threats by Trump against the EU and its security, and with early national polling currently showing a tight race with Trump slightly ahead of Biden, the EU has good reason to be concerned.
However, even if Biden were to defeat Trump, it is still not certain that the EU would have a reliable and robust partner. If Biden were to win, the US Congress would likely be highly divided due to the close race. While Biden has shown himself to be an effective bipartisan legislator, it is undeniable that partisan tension is still slowing down critical European aid packages. Moreover, the United States’ shifting focus from Russia towards China has further contributed to mutual frustrations. Furthermore, Biden’s age and lack of a clear popular successor pose further uncertainties regarding future US-EU relations.
In this article, we will be recommending three ways in which the EU can increase its capabilities to meet important security demands in light of uncertain relations with the US.
Bolstering the European Military Industry
While the major players in the EU are staunch supporters of Ukraine and have committed plenty of military resources to the war, the EU military reserves are thin, to the point that some countries have come close to depleting their military stock in aid packages. The willingness to aid is there; most countries in the EU have spent and will spend millions of Euros to finance aid. The limiting factor is therefore not money, but time.
Unlike the US, the EU does not have a centralised private military industry that manufactures and supplies to all member states and that can meet the demands of an active war. This is due to three reasons. First, the defence budget of EU countries is much lower than that of the US, both in magnitude and proportion. Lack of demand disincentivized expanding production. Second, EU military companies work at a national level, in the sense that they operate within one nation for which they supply most of their products. As each country supports their own military, smaller national companies rose to fulfil local demand instead of aiming for a wider market. Smaller companies produce at smaller scales; which takes us to our third point: EU military companies are not vertically integrated. American companies such as Lockheed Martin support great demand over a large territory, which incentivised them to expand and take hold of chains of production and distribution in order to cheapen their products and outflank the competition. As a result, American companies have greater capacity to control their own supply chains and change their output with much more flexibility than EU companies. For instance, EU defence manufacturers often depend on specialised components from non-EU countries like the United States for critical technologies, including advanced electronics and propulsion systems. Additionally, the fragmentation of the EU defence market means that companies frequently have to navigate a mosaic of national regulations and standards, further complicating their supply chain management.
An increase in centralised military spending and a deepening of economic and military ties amongst EU members would create fertile soil for larger, more centralised companies to thrive. Furthermore, as most national governments in the EU have stakes in their military companies and exert some sort of control over them, these incumbent companies could be regulated with tighter controls than American ones, preventing them from gaining too much autonomy while remaining a useful tool for the EU as a whole.
Enhancing EU Strategic Autonomy
Beyond military resources, the EU needs to be able to act decisively in order to be an effective world power. However, at the moment all binding decisions related to military and foreign policy are made on the basis of unanimity. Given the diversity of member states within the EU, this severely impedes the ability of the bloc to act in a decisive and coordinated fashion. In a geopolitical environment characterised by uncertainty and time sensitivity, the capacity of the EU to improve its decision-making procedures is of critical importance. However, at the moment individual states regularly obstruct important foreign policy packages, such as Hungary’s continual attempts to block Ukrainian aid and Russian sanctions.
To overcome this impediment we propose the implementation of qualified majority voting in important EU defence institutions and functions such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Agency (EDA) as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP). Implementing qualified majority voting for military and foreign policy decisions in the Council of the European Union would dramatically improve the decisiveness of all the aforementioned institutions and functions, whilst maintaining a high degree of popular representation. Furthermore, initiatives like the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) need to experience an enhancement in purpose and mandate. For example, the recommendations from CARD should be elevated from military collaboration opportunities to military development directives. While progressing towards these long-term structural reforms, the EU should also also utilise tools such as coalitions of the willing and differentiated integration to improve foreign policy decisiveness in the meantime.
Searching for New Allies
Given the concerns surrounding American reliability and the enduring Russian threat, Europe finds itself compelled to cultivate stronger alliances with individual states, beyond the confines of traditional NATO membership.
Canada emerges as a potential candidate for such an endeavour, being a longstanding and dependable member of NATO, and possessing particularly significant access to the North Sea. In recent years the Arctic has risen in strategic significance, largely attributable to two key factors: its increased accessibility brought about by climate change and, especially, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Arctic is not only extremely rich in resources but has also historically served as a buffer zone between Russia and North America. Consequently, the region is rising in popularity as both an economic and military leverage, posing a sovereignty threat to Canada. In response, Canada is fortifying its surveillance technology and border control in the Arctic, while emphasising the importance of cooperative security with international allies. Their mutual vulnerability to Russia, along with shared political values and pre-existing alliances, are likely to push Europe and Canada toward an even stronger partnership in the years to come.
Nevertheless, there might be one more silver lining to declining American support for NATO. As the dust of increasing US unreliability settles in, NATO members might become more inclined towards the contribution of other countries such as Sweden, whose accession process was significantly delayed by Turkey and continues to be blocked by Hungary. This potential decline in American support may lead to more solidarity between European states, strengthening the Alliance’s European front. Additionally, cognizant of their increased vulnerability due to the declining reliability of the United States, neutral states such as Austria are likely to strengthen their NATO cooperation or potentially even evaluate their stance on membership altogether.
Conclusion
Donald Trump’s recent remarks regarding burden-sharing as a precondition for the United States’ compliance with Article 5 further invigorated the debate about European security, initially sparked by Russian aggression two years ago. For European leaders, it serves as a stark indication that the US is poised to become an unreliable partner in the future, whether through intentional action or partisan obstruction.
To mitigate such a threat, European leaders should consider increasing the centralization of military expenditure within the EU, instituting qualified majority voting for more decisive decision-making in key institutions and functions, and bolstering defence alliances outside of the NATO framework.
Fernando Gómez-Acebo, Elton Högklint,and Erika Vodvárková are 2023–24 European Horizons Transatlantic Fellows based in Amsterdam.
