With Right-Wing Populism Surging in Europe, How Can Fading Trust in the Virtues of Liberal Democracy Be Restored?
By Jan Philipp Huth
For weeks and months leading up to the 2023 parliamentary election, pollsters in Poland had predicted a close race. With mass media under governmental control, and after years of eroding the independence of the judicial branch, the ruling party had considerable advantages on its side. However, after years of escalating political rhetoric, worsening relations with neighbouring countries and cronyism, there was also a momentum for change. In a joint effort, the opposition led by Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition (KO) bundled its forces, agreed on a campaign leader and pinned its hopes on mobilising liberal voters in urban areas. When exit polls turned out to the opposition’s advantage, the sigh of relief in most capitals within the EU (and even on the other side of the Atlantic) was tangible.
It is still too early to predict the longer-term consequences of the defeat of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, and the efforts of party loyalists to call into question the legitimacy of the election evokes unpleasant memories from the past US presidential election. However, if not yet a turning point, the results of the elections in Poland are, at least, a glimmer of hope amidst an upswing of mostly right-wing populist parties within the EU.
In France, Emmanuel Macron defeated Marine Le Pen in the second round of the presidential campaign. However, the constitutional limit of two presidential terms will bar Macron from seeking reelection in 2027. Given the fragmented opposition and rising approval ratings for Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, it is widely expected that she will be running again for the presidency. In Italy, the post-fascist Fratelli d’Italia have emerged as the leading party from past year’s elections (and since then succeeded in forming a surprisingly stable government, given that the average time of governments in Italy remaining in office is little more than a year). Lastly, in Germany, even though next general elections are only scheduled for 2025, the far-right AfD is leading polls for regional elections next year in several eastern German federal states.
Especially the latter must come as a surprise to those who believed in growing wealth and economic stability as a reliable antidote against right-wing populism. Even though, more than thirty years after reunification, eastern German federal states are still lagging behind in terms of average income compared to western Germany, they are visibly catching up. Recent years have seen an impressive list of global high-tech companies massively investing in cutting-edge production facilities in eastern Germany, providing a promising long-term perspective especially for those regions facing profound transformation away from fossil fuel energy production. So why then have populist claims become appealing to a growing number of voters in the past years throughout Europe?
Time and Tide Wait for No Man
One reason may, paradoxically, lie in the success of liberal democracy itself. Since the end of the Second World War, political and economic liberalism and the process of European integration have led to an unprecedented era of peace, long-term economic stability and social progress throughout Europe. In the early 2000s, EU enlargement allowed eastern European countries to catch up after being isolated behind the Iron Curtain for decades. That democratic structures have become a self-evidence to Europeans is, however, a curse and a blessing at the same time, since it obscures their fragility and vulnerability, and thus the constant need to defend them.
At the same time, there are multiple transboundary and interconnected challenges ahead which will, contrary to some moments of crisis in the past, not be surmounted by pouring out money. Demographic change and the already visible shortage of skilled labour will not be mitigated by an ever shrinking workforce doing overtime, contrary to what is implied by some politicians. Coordinated immigration might be part of a solution but would also require profoundly adapting social attitudes. The climate crisis will not be overcome by solely spending money to adapt to higher temperatures and extreme weather events (even though the necessity of adaptation is beyond doubt) but by a large majority, particularly in well-off industrialised nations, fundamentally changing its way of living. Finally, the geopolitical shifts under way -especially the rise of China in economic and military terms- put a definite end to the long-cherished belief that by liberalising global trade, democratisation would inevitably follow suit.
It is a proven phenomenon that widespread anxiety about the future is often accompanied by a surging approval for populist and authoritarian political positions, and after decades of economic growth and security, the looming challenges look even more frightening for many, especially older voters.
Democrats in Europe, Look Upon this Country!
When a group of Eurosceptic German professors founded the AfD about a decade ago, it was smiled at by many. After it became clear that it would establish itself as a political force in the German political landscape, strategies of how to deal with it ranged between ignoring it and taking over its positions and terminology, both in the hope that it would disappear from the political spectre. The current reality is quite the contrary, as approval ratings for the far-right party are at a record-high.
At a closer look, this does not come as a surprise. Ignoring existing (and legitimate) anxieties of how the multiple challenges ahead will be met is as detrimental as downplaying the degree to which tackling the climate crisis, coordinating migration or navigating geopolitical shifts will require social change. Democratic governance is always based on a fundamental, tacit agreement. It requires a constant effort from the citizen to inform oneself, take part in public debate and make political decisions. In exchange, it carries the promise that, by opening up a realm for contestation and public discourse, considerations of the public good are what determines the outcome of debates and the general political course, not retention of power or short-term political interests of those ruling (or aiming to rule).
Falling into the ‘populism trap’ and downplaying or denying the severity of the numerous challenges ahead in a futile and short-sighted attempt to win voters back are tantamount to a revocation of this basic social contract. The opposition’s success in the Polish parliamentary elections makes clear that there are more promising ways for restoring trust in democracy and putting populists and despisers of liberal democracy in their place.
Jan Philipp Huth is a PhD student at European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)/Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, undertaking research in the field of European constitutional and economic law and European legal theory.
