Logic Will Tell Us What Goodness Is
Peirce provides us with a generous narrative of what differentiates logic from what he calls speculative grammar. Triadic Philosophy, with its penchant for simplification, denotes logic as reasonable and tending toward the good.
Which means that the twin universals truth and beauty are included in the mix. Everything else is to some extent speculation.
And anything that logic cannot presently penetrate is mystery.
There are momentous leaps in Triadic Philosophy.
The leap to Reality is all is seismic.
Likewise the proposition that Logic is goodness.
Validating these is a justification of Triadic Philosophy. When accepted, we will supersede binary thinking. We will have a better basis for planetary survival and development.
Here is a good motto derived from Peirce:
Let this course be pursued, and no theories will stand long but those which are true.
Triadic Philosophy believes reason can be applied to harm.
Reason (logic) can determine what is more or less likely to be harmful. Harm is understood in terms of explicit levels of harmfulness, culminating in the abridgment of freedom and the taking of life. I see this as vastly more important than what is presented now as AI and Big Data.
Peirce: CP 2.97 Cross-Ref:††
97. When Kepler had found that the elliptic orbit placed the planet Mars in the right longitudes, he proceeded to test the hypothesis in two ways. In the first place it had always been comparatively easy to find hypotheses approximately representing the longitudes, although not to the point of accuracy of Tycho Brahe’s observations. But when these hypotheses were applied to the latitudes, it had always been found that additional hypotheses, of librations, or tiltings of the orbit of a complicated kind, having little verisimilitude, were required to come near to a representation of the latitudes. Kepler undertook the calculation of the latitudes from his elliptic theory without knowing whether the calculation would agree with the observation or not; but it was found that it did so most admirably. He then went back to the longitudes, and applied another test, of the success of which he could know nothing beforehand. What he had so far found was that the planet was at the time of observation always in the direction in which it ought to be. But was it at the right distance? This could not be quite positively ascertained. But he could take two times at which Mars had been observed, and, at which according to the elliptic theory (which in this respect could hardly be in error) it was at the same point of its orbit, but at which it was certain that the earth was at widely different points in its orbit. The orbit of the earth is so nearly circular that there could be no doubt where it was at these times. These two places and the place of Mars (supposed the same at the two times) gave a triangle of which two angles and the intermediate side (the distance between the two positions of the earth) were known (the mean distance of the sun from the earth being taken as unit of distance). From that he could calculate the distance of Mars from the sun, with no assumption except that Mars was really at the same point of his orbit, about which there could (for a reason too long to set forth here) hardly be the least doubt, whether the elliptic orbit were correct or not. By trying this at times when Mars was at the two extremes of his orbit, and when he was at intermediate places, Kepler could get a test of the severest character as to whether the elliptic theory really flattened the orbit by the right amount or not. In the cases of the few, but well situated, pairs of observations which could be found that were suitable to this test, the accord of observation and theory was all that could be desired, and clinched the argument in the mind of every thinking person. It will be observed that the argument was very different from what it would have been if Kepler had merely taken all the observations of longitude, latitude, and parallax and had constructed from them a theory that would suit them all. That might evince no more than Kepler’s extraordinary ingenuity. Nor was the last test the same that it would have been if Kepler, looking over the observations, and hunting for features of them that should suit the theory, had found this. That might only show that out of many features of the observations, some suited the theory. But his course was very different. He did not select this test because it would give a favorable result. He did not know that it would do so. He selected it because it was the test which Reason demanded should be applied. Let this course be pursued, and no theories will stand long but those which are true. But the discussion of the strength of the argument belongs to Critical Logic, and not to Speculative Grammar.