Percepts and Perceptions Precede Conscious Thought
How so? We have suggested already that Triadic Philosophy commences a process of conscious thinking with percepts in mind. Explicitly we have noted that the good is the sense toward which the entire process of consciousness moves. Goodness is the objective of thought that is aware. Awareness is of the good. Now the good is the sum of what is ethical. Its expression is is both true and beautiful. Indeed beauty and truth meet in goodness.
How do we arrive at such thinking?
By the existential awareness of the efficacy of the ontological values and by the experience to which their expression and enactment lead.
(Note that realism embraces the existential as the completion of the triadic process which begins with Reality passes through Ethics and arrives at Aesthetic which is the theater of expression and action.)
In raw terms, there is an experience that takes place when tolerance is expressed and enacted. It is a transaction between people.
It results in bodily and mental interactions.
We can envision it in dance but more pertinent are actions relative to the movement of refugees and their acceptance via willed tolerance.
There is likewise an awareness that comes forth when acts of helpfulness and enabling take place. Acts of lifting, voices of encouragement, expressions of praise. Tangible acceptance of clear acts of empowerment contribute to the fund of helpfulness.
And when democracy is expanded to include human rights and fairness and justice and freedom for all it is received as tangible goodness because it expresses and manifests the fulfillment of all persons.
It is from the actual experience of rising goodness as these core values are unfolded that we arrive at the presupposition that thought should and does begin with an awareness of the goodness that is its reason for being.
Peirce: CP 2.27 Cross-Ref:††
… there is no necessity for a series of arguments representing a course of thought to have a first argument, before which there was no argument in the thought, in the only sense in which there was any argument at all, in the process of thinking. For there is no fact in our possession to forbid our supposing that the thinking-process was one continuous (though undoubtedly varied) process. At any rate, it is only the self defence of the process that is clearly broken up into arguments. It is more than doubtful whether what we can state as an argument or inference represents any part of the thinking except in the logical relation of the truth of the premiss to the truth of the conclusion. And, moreover, the argument so considered consists in the statements in words. How nearly they represent anything really in the thought is very doubtful, and is quite immaterial. The real thinking-process presumably begins at the very percepts. But a percept cannot be represented in words, and consequently, the first part of the thinking cannot be represented by any logical form of argument. Our logical account of the matter has to start from a perceptual fact, or proposition resulting from thought about a percept — thinking in its own movement presumably of the same nature as that which we represent by arguments and inferences, but not so representable in consequence of a defect in that method of representation.