Reasoning is inherent in us
I have already concluded that a theory of reasoning requires reasoning as a precedent to creating such a theory and therefore that reasoning is itself a function of consciousness.
Now if you suggest that we might consciously arrive at a way of reasoning which might be called a theory, I would say perhaps so. And that such a way, or theory, would be a product of reasoning.
And that such reasoning would contain abductions and inferences and deductions, representing guesswork, indexing and suggesting hypothetical expressions and even actions.
All this could emerge in endless ways from reasoning.
Triadic Philosophy has a Theory of Reasoning which starts with summoning up the mind or becoming conscious. The aim is the reduction of harm.
It involves starting with a notion or thought or word — a starting point. It moves to an index of values. These values are qualities of expression and action — tolerance, helpfulness and democracy.
It moves to consideration non-idolatry, truth and beauty.
It may even commune with whatever your a higher self as a partner in dialog.
The result is a possible expression and a possible act.
Is this process guaranteed to be something that will reduce harm and thereby help move cosmos in the direction of goodness? Such an assumption is clearly grasping beyond mortal ken. We can only hope that out of fallibility an exercise such as this reflects our better angels. We make no claims although we do hope that the products of what we say and do are measurable, real and actual. In that sense they CAN be evidences.
What of causing harm of which we are unaware?
How do we protect against this?
Tolerance makes us supple and able to dance around a hostile urge. Helpfulness enables us to modify our thrusts. Democracy reminds us there are myriad ways of looking at the same thing.
And so forth.
We may conclude that reasoning produces theories which are themselves improved if they nod to the better values.
Peirce: CP 2.133 Cross-Ref:††
133. In the tenth place, you would appear to be of opinion that by improving your theory of reasoning your practice of reasoning will be improved; much as if a man subject to palpitations of the heart should expect to be cured by reading a book on physiology. Is this a sound view or not?