Triadic Philosophy and Scientific Method
The axioms of reason are insufficient proof of reason’s veracity. So suggests C. S. Peirce and Triadic Philosophy agrees. Triadic Philosophy believes its premises are reasonable and true but it presents an explicit pragmaticist process which it proposes to the world.
The original pragmatic maxim is as follows:
Triadic Philosophy takes this revolutionary doctrine and proposes that a conception is precisely what occurs when we think consciously. What comes up, feeling, thought, idea — whatever we name — is the Sign (the First element of the triad which Triadic Philosophy calls
The Second element of the triad is an Index which Triadic Philosophy denotes as
Ethics consists of four core values: The three active values are
The root and underlying value is
which mandates among other things scientific method as the means of determining truth to the extent it is possible.
The Third and final stage in the triad is a
or what Triadic Philosophy denotes as
meaning the universal sphere of
This conscious process of thinking is proposed as the basis of arriving at expressions and actions which have, as the results of the consideration, practical bearings.
They are not an idea. They are launching pads for actual events that will have tangible effects.
It is the contention of Triadic Philosophy that, to the extent that thought, expression and action are driven by the result of the encounter between ANY sign and Ethics, as stated above, the result will be measurable events that have a positive impact.
There is more to the practice of Triadic Philosophy.
But it is also its contention that anyone can learn this practice and that it will improve the life of anyone.
Acts and expressions can be evaluated and measured in terms of their impact and effects.
There are many ways this can play out, but its essence is the reliance on triadic thinking as outlined here.
The following suggests in a sort of shorthand the meditational and spiritual thrust of Triadic Philosophy.
Peirce: CP 2.28 Cross-Ref:††
28. Descartes and others have endeavored to bolster up the light of reason by make-believe arguments from the “veracity of God,” and the like. They had better not have pretended to call that in question which they intended to prove, since the proofs, themselves, call for the same light to make them evident. Besides, reason left to itself at least believes in its own pronouncements, while it refuses to sanction the pretensions to infallibility made in its behalf on the ground of sundry “veracities.” The celebrated criterion of clearness and distinctness, proposed by Descartes,†1 and amended to little purpose by Leibniz,†2 was, as Hamilton says, “nothing new,” since it was no more than an utterly unsuccessful attempt to define the old “self-evidence” of the axioms of reason.