Suspension

Triadic Philosophy Says A Hypothesis Has Good as Its Aim

Triadic Philosophy believes a hypothesis should be aim at accomplishing good.

A hypothesis should seek to determine what will work best.

A hypothesis involves more than “scientific” proof that something works. If a gun can fire 1000 bullets in so much time, we might factor into such calculations the degree of harm intended.

We cannot exempt science, commerce and invention from ethical scrutiny. This is unacceptable.

The poster child for such an argument is the Theory of Relativity and its practical aftermath. Its good consists mainly in convincing us that there are better ways to survive than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and meltdowns.

Without the will to pursue a form of thinking that subjects consideration to degrees of tolerance and helpfulness and adherence to the key norms of democracy, without seeing things in the broad context of beauty and truth and creating expressions and actions that represent our efforts, we are engaging in a sort of ethical agnosticism.

It is hard, very hard, to arrive at clear decisions regarding what will increase or diminish harm. It is hard to determine what will do real good.

But this clear difficulty is not even on most tables. Triadic Philosophy believes it should inform all thought. Triadic Philosophy is at the beginning of what must evolve.

Peirce: CP 2.115 Cross-Ref:††

115. I examine the question from this point of view. It certainly seems as if the mere hypothesis of such a thing as a symbol sufficed to demonstrate such a life-history. Still, a fallacy is to be suspected. How can a mere hypothesis prove so much as this seems to prove, if it proves anything? I call in the data of experience, not exactly the every-minute experience which has hitherto been enough, but the experience of most men, together with the history of thought. The conclusion seems the same. Yet still, the evidence is unsatisfactory. The truth is that the hypothesis involves the idea of a different mode of being from that of existential fact. This mode of being seems to claim immediate recognition as evident in the mere idea of it. One asks whether there is not a fallacy in using the ordinary processes of logic either to support it or to refute it.