We can all reason more or less

Reasoning is figuring things out with an eye to what’s true. Peirce takes us on a great journey to get to this point. We have already suggested that we can make good guesses. Gathering them into what he calls abductions.

We can arrive at inferences. Looking at what is guessed and coming up with a narrower assumption, something that might prove to be the case. We can infer.

Finally we may be ready for some deducing.

Arriving at deductions.

I say deductions in the plural because they may not be final. They are hypotheses that warrant, we assume, careful examination.

When we take the celebrated JFK assassination, our abductions are substantial.

We shall put Carlos Marcello over here and the CIA not far off and some twenty more alluring names and groups and entities.

Out of these abductions, we shall suggest a narrower notion of evidence such as actual records of events, leading us to an induction.

A shot and a shooter. A locus from which a shot was fired.

From this induction we may hypothesize that Lee Harvey Oswald may well be a lone assassin.

May. If true, is.

Enter an entirely new line of thought.

I leave you to suggest what that line might be.

But into the abduction pile we might throw what doesn’t fit the hypothesis above,

the interests of the various survivors including some who are known to us by the initials of their names

and the question of what within reality — within everything — is true.

Because we can all reason, we can multiply the likely conclusions.

We are left with a large penumbra of mystery and a small area of certainty.

That certainty relates to the pertinence of certain simple but salient values. It is for example reasonable to act to prevent harm. It is reasonable to be aware of threats.

It would have been reasonable to do a bit of intelligence regarding the attitudes toward JFK before he emerged in Dallas.

There are no ifs in history of course. But all one needs to do is read history to be painfully aware of the premises on which much history is written. I am now working my way through much such literature, to substantial chagrin.

Anyway have a nice day.

Guess well.

Edit carefully.

Deduce with gusto.

Peirce: CP 2.131 Cross-Ref:††

131. In the seventh place, I am quite sure that you are already in possession of a logic, or theory of reasoning; and I wish to call your particular attention to the circumstance that in the eighth place, it would seem that though you entertain this theory of reasoning, you also entertain the opinion that your theory is wrong. How can you opine that your opinion is wrong?