The Excessive Capabilities of the Canadian Prime Minister

Justin Trudeau, 23rd Prime Minister of Canada

Canada’s Prime Minister could be described as an individual with too much power. The PM’s spectrum of power has led some to claim that the Canadian government is an autocracy. Canada’s PM is unique because he possesses more responsibility than other leaders of parliamentary governments, which distinguishes him as a more powerful PM. The abundance of power and lack of oversight on Canada’s PM grants him autocratic status. Canada’s PM is much more similar to a presidential character in his possession of power but he lacks the countermeasures and checks that are prevalent in a presidential system. The Prime Minister has minimal obligations towards Ministers or MPs, he or she is beholden to one except a few close advisors and supporters. a The Executive has a preposterous amount of power which is why certain reforms need to be set in place to revert the system back to a Primus Inter Pares position. Certain reforms need to be applied to reestablish the position of the cabinet. The five possible reforms that can effectively constrain the PM’s sources of power are proportional representation for the House of Commons, an elected senate, strengthen parliamentary caucuses, a fixed time table for elections and a Civil Service Commission to appoint senior officials. [“Prime Minister and Cabinet Reform in Canada: An Autocracy in Need of Reform?”, Herman Bakvis]

The Prime Minister of Canada has an obscene amount of power that grants him/her capabilities that are unique for a PM which is why one of the reforms to be set in place is proportional representation (PR) for the House of Commons (HOC). PR for the HOC would make the Parliament more reflective of voters that elect MP’s of different parties, women and minorities. The HOC is comprised of members belonging to various parties so granting PR would help depreciate the single party dominant government and shift slightly towards a coalition government. A coalition government would hinder the PM’s power as it would introduce narrative from various parties and grant them greater credibility. PR for the HOC would also promote MP’s of different parties that aren’t beholden to the PM. The PM’s power could also be constrained by granting PR for the HOC which would help alter the balance between Executive and Parliament. This would reduce Parliamentary deficiencies and increase checks with the Executive. So PR for the HOC would improve representation in Parliament that is more reflective, increase likelihood of coalition government, provide checks with the Executive and reduce Parliamentary deficiencies. All of which would greatly constrain the Canadian Prime Minister’s power. [71, Herman Bakvis]

One of the Canadian Prime Minister’s sources of power that can effectively be constrained is appointment of officials to the senate by replacing it with an elected senate. An electoral system would make the senate less beholden to the PM as it would consist of members aligned to various parties. Switching to an elected senate could also provoke existing issues with the senate and lead them to being addressed. A senate elected on the basis of proportional representation would allow it to serve as a partisan counterweight to the PM. The senate serving as a partisan counterweight to the PM would reduce the likelihood of legislation proposed by the PM from passing, especially controversial legislation. Implementing an elected senate would also help dissolve the single party dominant system which would shift the senate towards coalition. A coalition senate would serve as an effective counterweight to the PM and would help to constrain his powers. The implementation of an elected senate would constrain the PM’s powers by establishing a senate which is less beholden to the PM, allowing the senate to serve a partisan counterweight and dissolving the single party dominant senate. [72, Herman Bakvis]

Strengthening the Parliamentary caucuses is another reform that can effectively constrain the PM’s power. Strengthening Parliamentary caucuses would grant members greater control to combat controversial or non-controversial legislation. An example of this would be when the Chretien government with the help of the liberal party caucus derailed a proposed merger among major banks. An effective way of strengthening Parliamentary caucuses to constrain the PM’s power would be to allows government caucuses to elect officials to cabinet committees. This would in return provide representative of different cabinet committees the ability to participate in the discussion and formulation of government policy in a significant way. An example of this would be that a significant proportion of the caucus would have the ability to impact policy at an important stage. They would also have the ability to elect Parliamentary committees which would reduce the number of MP’s that are conformists to their party. This would help tilt the balance in favor of the caucuses and effectively constrain the Canadian Prime Minister’s power. [73, Herman Bakvis]

The Canadian Prime Minister has full control of the Order-in-Council which is responsible for appointing senior officials to the Canadian Parliament. The Order-in-Council is responsible for appointing all deputy and associate deputy ministers which evidently make them all beholden to the PM. This is why a reform to allow the Public Service Commission (PSC) to appoint senior officials should be implemented. The PSC could appoint senior officials that would be more responsive to the cabinet and less beholden to the PM. The PM should also be revoked of the capability to appoint senior officials that have authority to intervene on the PM as it would create a conflict of interest. These senior officials could range from judges to federal ethics counsellors. Allowing the PM to appoint important officials makes them beholden to him/her which is why they need to be selected on arm’s-length to challenge the PM’s authority. Appointing officials on arm’s-length would grant their decisions greater credibility and legitimacy. The ability of the Canadian Prime Minister to appoint senior officials should be revoked as it would make the officials beholden to him/her leaving a gap for challenge over PM’s authority. [74, Herman Bakvis]

The ability to call for an election when desired is one of the primary sources of power the Canadian Prime Minister possesses and needs to be dissolved. The Canadian Prime Minister has the capability to call for an election whenever he/she desires within a five-year term which allows the PM to manipulate the election to his/her favor. The PM could delay the election under a struggling government and call for an early election under a thriving government to increase his/her chances of getting re-elected. This is why a fixed timetable needs to be implemented as it would help constrain the PM’s power to manipulate the election. A fixed election timetable would also dissolve the PM’s ability to call for an early election to threaten his/her party into getting what they want. Implementing a fixed election timetable which takes place every four years would also restrict the PM’s capability to call an early election to prevent his party from losing confidence in the House of Commons. Introducing a fixed election timetable would help restrain the Canadian Prime Minister to use his power to manipulate the election system. [75, Herman Bakvis]

“A parliamentary democracy is a system in which the executive, consisting of a prime minister and a cabinet, is dependent on the parliament for its continuing survival” (Eoin O’Malley). This definition of a parliamentary democracy currently rejects Canada due to the abundance of power which the Canadian Prime Minister has been supplied. However, there are certain reforms that can be implemented to revert the Executive back to an Primus Inter Pares status. Those reforms are proportional representation for the House of Commons, an elected senate, strengthen parliamentary caucuses, a fixed time table for elections and a Civil Service Commission to appoint senior officials. Therefore, if these reforms are implemented the Canadian Prime Minister’s power can be effectively constrained and prevent the Canadian government from turning into an autocracy.

Works Cited

Bakvis, Herman. “Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canada: An Autocracy in Need of Reform?” Journal of Canadian Studies (2001): Pages: 60, 62, 71–76. O’Malley, Eoin. “The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey” International Political Science Review (2007)

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