Why Germany Went to War in 1914
An Insight into Modern International Politics, Nationalism, and Military Culture
The First World War can be difficult to understand in terms of motivations. By contrast, the beginnings of the Second World War are almost childishly simple to understand, with Nazism still characterising villains in popular media today. It is widely accepted that Nazi Germany caused the war. Yet the First World War is still often under debate as to who deserves the majority of the blame for its outbreak.
Furthermore, the debate is between professional historians. Resources for general learning, such as NatGeo’s children’s page for the war cite Germany marching into Belgium, and Britain’s promise to protect Belgium, as being the reason war broke out. History points to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand leading to war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, while avoiding specific detail.
While not wrong per se, these are overly simplistic. For example, NatGeo does not list why Germany marched into Belgium, one reason being fear of France marching towards the Meuse.¹ Nor does it follow the thread of why France would mobilise their forces. And History likewise skips much detail on why Germany would agree to support Austria-Hungary.
This is a feature that dominates much of the topic and causes much confusion. There is very little discussion as to why Germany would want, or even if they would want to go to war in 1914. The reason it is so difficult to pinpoint a cause of the war is that there is always another link in the chain, another thread to follow, another reason to ask ‘why?’
I do not claim in this article to thoroughly explain every reason why Germany went to war in 1914, to do so would require an entire book. I do however hope to bring up some points that you may not have previously considered and encourage you to critically examine and challenge your perception of why WW1 began.
The Death of Franz Ferdinand
The first point of discussion is the one that most people are familiar with: The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. When evidence was uncovered indicating that the Serbian government was involved, the Habsburg empire was furious. A friend of Ferdinand’s, Kaiser Wilhelm II supported the Austrians, saying the Serbians “must be swept up, and right soon.”² He promised to support Austria in whatever they may do next to subjugate the Serbians.³ While this was likely to involve military conflict, it did not explicitly state war.
Therein lies the key: Wilhelm did not expect there to be a large-scale war as a result of this support. At worst, he thought the conflict would be localised between Austria and Serbia. The intent was to prevent Russia from entering a war by having the massive German army there, as Russia would not fight both the Habsburg Empire and the German Empire.⁴
As we know, he was wrong and this was indeed a blunder, but it is important to consider that this political mishap was not malicious in nature, rather an attempt to support a close ally.
Wilhelm and the Possibility of War
When war broke out, it was not entirely unanticipated. By the time war had been declared Wilhelm had spent much time in the presence of advisors who saw war in Europe as a grim inevitability. The reason for this being in 1907 and 1908, Wilhelm and his circle were targeted by journalist Maximillion Harden.
Harden wrote that the peaceful and pacifist tendencies they displayed, as well as how close they all were personally, was suspect. He essentially accused Wilhelm’s clique of homosexuality, at the time a severe claim, and that this was weakening German integrity. Image-obsessed Wilhelm could not have this, and instead of letting the rumour die out, he demanded it settled in court immediately.
He dismissed all those accused, including asking Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow to resign and dismissing one of his most trusted advisors, Philipp zu Eulenburg. While the Kaiser retained some of his dignity, he lost many of his most important political tools. Being an inexperienced ruler, he sought the comfort of advisors and found many willing candidates within military circles.⁵ Many of these have been accused of actively pointing Wilhelm in the direction of war in concern for Germany’s survival in the modern world.
Knowing this, Wilhelm may well have been groomed to accept a European war. While he may not have actively wanted to spark it with his support of Austria in 1914, it is likely he knew of the possibility of a great war looming over the continent.
German Pride
As I noted in a previous article, Germany was going through many great changes in the early 20th century. The people developed a sense of national pride, often full-blown nationalism. The Kaiser was well-liked for the most part. He was young, energetic, confident (if somewhat insecure) and very interested in the modern world and its technology. He captured the imagination of the German people, ‘embodying the German spirit’ as Katja Hoyer eloquently puts it.⁶
There was also the growth of Aryanism that accompanied a desire for a ‘place in the sun.’ Many Germans felt that they were restricted on the continent, being very nearly land-locked and there was jealousy of the British and French empires. The following imperial expansion developed confidence in German Kultur and the feeling of German superiority over other races. Books such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century made way for racism and antisemitism - those not German were a danger to the Reich.
The industrialisation of Germany also led to it being an economic and military powerhouse. By 1900, Germany had the biggest industrial economy and the strongest military in Europe, both in terms of training and numbers. Coupled with the previously mentioned colonial expansion, the military in Germany was highly romanticised, sometimes with wild effects. After all, the military is what united Germany, and with political tensions and pressure from other European powers, many felt they had to rely on their strength to defend their country and maintain Germany’s newly found status as a European power.
Arms Race and Anglo-German Relations
Arguably Germany’s biggest rival in a military aspect was Great Britain. Well known for her navy and expansive empire, many Germans, including Kaiser Wilhelm himself longed to possess a similar power. Admiral Tirpitz had naval bills passed using arguments of needing to be able to both protect German colonial interests and facilitate more overseas trade.
The bills would call for the construction of 2 flagships, 36 battleships, 11 large and 34 small cruisers. By 1908, The German navy would only be second to the Royal navy, which would begin to alarm Britain.⁷ This would be a big factor in the deterioration of relations with Britain as Britain worked to keep their navy ahead of their German rivals.
By this point, relations with Britain were already ropey. In 1875, the German press published articles suggesting a preventative war with France. Only four years after Germany had defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War, and two years after Germany pulled their occupation troops out of France, the reason to talk of war again was concern over French rearmament and the potential of French revanchism. Termed the War-in-Sight crisis, the threat of war forced many nations to choose sides. Britain took the stance that should Germany attack France again then they will not stand idly by this time around.⁸
The War-in-Sight crisis was the first of a series of crises, such as the Bosnian crisis and the Morrocan crisis that would further strain tensions between the major European powers. The Kruger telegram was another example of diplomatic attempts to improve relations with Britain, which failed rather spectacularly. After the Jameson Raid blunder wherein British forces were defeated in South Africa, Kaiser Wilhelm sent a telegram to congratulate Kruger on repelling British troops. As one can imagine, this was not received well by most Brits.
Events such as this would eventually lead to two opposing alliances, the Triple Entente (comprising France, Britain, and Russia) and the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.) The original intent of these alliances was to keep the peace between countries and at times they exhibited cooperation. But eventually, suspicion reigned supreme, and each country decided now was the time to boost their military power to gain an edge over their rivals.
Overall, Germany’s relationship with Britain from 1871–1914 had its ups and downs, but the two empires could never quite come to an understanding that would prevent war, leading them to more easily come to blows at the outbreak of war.
Relations with France
From Germany’s modern inception, relations with France were fiery. Concerning French revanchism, German fears were not entirely unfounded. The rise in popularity of Georges Boulanger led to the rise of a desire for revenge around 1886-87.⁹ This was often characterised by a desire to regain the annexed lands of Alsace-Lorraine, a point of contention for France so hot that when war broke out on the 28th of July 1914, ten days later they would announce an invasion of Alsace.
Germans were aware of this, and it should be remembered that when Germany united in 1871, less than sixty years earlier Europe was threatened by France under Napoleon. While Napoleon was eventually defeated, the military victories displayed by France throughout the conflicts, having defeated Prussia, Russia, and Austria were not easily forgotten. Germany had every reason to remain cautious of its continental neighbour.
And cautious they were. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was fearful of a recreation of the alliance between Austria, Russia, and France that Prussia faced in the Seven Years War. The saving grace back then was Prussia’s alliance with Great Britain, a concept that seemed much less likely this time around. Instead, Bismarck turned to a combination of forging German alliances and agreements with their rivals while also sowing distrust among them, making their cooperation against Germany less likely.¹⁰
Actual opinion in France fluctuated over time. While there were those who devoutly followed Boulanger’s revanchism, there were others who wished to avoid another war altogether. Popular opinion seemed to maintain that while a vengeful war was not the correct course, neither was simply putting aside differences with Germany. Attempts at colonial cooperation with Germany in the mid-1880s were not well received and Jules Ferry, the man who attempted to orchestrate this cooperation, could not maintain popularity with the French public afterwards.¹¹
There did not appear to be a lot of animosity between the two countries, despite resentment in France, until 1905. The First Morrocan Crisis consisted of Kaiser Wilhelm II declaring his support of the Morrocan Sultan who wished for control instead of the increase in French control that recent secret treaties with Spain and Great Britain would allow for. Essentially, Kaiser Wilhelm (somewhat unknowingly) challenged French control of the region, which was not received well by France or Britain.
In 1911, the Second Morrocan Crisis saw a German gunboat being sent to Agadir. There, a native uprising against the French was taking place, and while the gunboat was there to ‘protect German interests,’ it was clear that the true purpose was to intimidate the French. This crisis especially nearly led to an outbreak of war on the European continent.
Germans perceived the threat from France as being a vengeful one. While France was not likely to attack Germany on the desire for revenge alone, if Germany made a wrong move then it was not unreasonable to assume that France would attack with full fury. This likely had an influence on the decision to attack France immediately upon the outbreak of war, beyond the key objective of avoiding a two-front war.
Relations with Russia
The Russian empire was, simply put, a behemoth. In the late 1800’s it boasted a population of around 125,000,000 people. By comparison, in 1890 the technologically developing and expanding Britain had a population of about 37,484,800. In terms of armed threat, what Russia mostly lacked in industrialisation and modern developments is more than made up for in numbers. While Germany had the strongest European military around 1900, with 1,900,000 men in the military. It was Russia that held the second spot at 1,400,000 men.
As previously mentioned, Germany became part of the Triple Alliance. The very basic gist of this alliance was that Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy would aid each other should one of them come under attack from either France or Russia. While Russia had spent a lot of time preoccupied with Asia, they began to fear the rapid industrialisation of Germany as well as this alliance, leading them to join the opposing Triple Entente in 1907.
Also fearing the expansion of Austria-Hungary, they agreed to come to Serbia’s aid should they come under threat from the Triple Alliance. One can already see the stage being set for the events beginning seven years later. This was all a symptom of growing tensions between Germany and its surrounding countries.
The rapid growth of the German Empire caused the already long-established empires headed by the rest of Europe to feel threatened. The growth of a new power on the continent was evidently disruptive, in spite of any peaceful intentions, and the conflicting interests of the major nations made it difficult to see a resolution without conflict.
Did People Want a War?
Generally speaking, no. While the military was romanticised, and in the present day there is a tendency to think that people back then were more enthusiastic for conflict, war was still seen in a similar light as it is today. Destructive, costly, and heartbreaking.
William Mulligan notes that the general consensus throughout Europe was that war be avoided in favour of ‘defensive patriotism.’¹² In 1912, with the Balkan war threatening the stability of peace between the major powers, Mulligan further notes that there was cooperation between Great Britain, Germany, and France who all wished to avoid war.¹³
There were those in a much darker frame of mind about the situation. One of these individuals was the Chief of General Staff Colonel-General Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke (‘the Younger’) who believed that if Germany did not strike first and emerge victorious, then it would succumb to the combined power of France and Russia. He wrote ‘We are ready, and the sooner it comes, the better for us.’¹⁴
While more accepting of war, his thoughts were also underlined with pessimism. War was not an appealing prospect for most people at the time, and there is little reason to consider that it was a desire from the onset. To think of Germany as a war-mongering state eager to dominate would be, frankly, narrow-minded. While more power was an appealing prospect, there were few countries that did not wish for more power, and the interests of their own power are often what caused these conflicting interests.
Conclusion
Like much of the time period, the question of why Germany went to war in 1914 is spun in webs of complicated politics, conflict of interests, and the clash of a new and old world. While the British often characterised their entrance to the war as being one of grim necessity, it is not unlikely that Germans did the same. Their strong yet politically fragile country was new in the world, and many felt threatened by the powers around them.
It can be debated whether the various conflicts of interests between the powers, coupled with their inability/unwillingness to back down or concede too much, did mean that war was unavoidable. But whether the war was inevitable or not, the Germans of the time could be forgiven for being anxious about it. This of course does not justify the 40,000,000+ casualty count that the war would produce, but it also does not place blame solely on Germany.
As tempting as it is to simply label the opposing side as the ‘bad guys,’ it would do far more good to examine the political, social, and psychological strains that caused such a catastrophic event from every angle. From this, we can learn warning signs such as the dangers of nationalism, what works and does not work, and hopefully avoid another major European war in favour of cooperation.
Matthew Brundrett studied History with Psychology at Keele University, and has recently completed an MA in Modern History at the University of Sheffield. He is currently continuing his MA research related to the First World War with a view to obtaining a PhD. Matthew can be contacted via matt.brundrett@sky.com or on Twitter @Matt_Brundrett
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Sources
- Lloyd, N., The Western Front, A History of the First World War, (Viking Publications, UK, 2021) p. 1
2. Hoyer, K., Blood and Iron, The Rise and Fall of the German Empire 1871–1918, (History Press, Cornwall, 2021) pp. 189–190
3. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/germany-gives-austria-hungary-blank-check-assurance
4. Hoyer, Blood and Iron…, p. 190
5. Ibid., pp. 181–83
6. ibid., p. 130
7.Chickering, R., Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918, (Cambridge University Press, 2014) p. 2
8. Mulligan, W., The Origins of the First World War, (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, 2017) p. 26
9. Ibid., p. 33
10. Ibid., p. 28
11. Ibid., p. 166
12. Ibid., p. 18
13. Ibid., p. 82
14. Lloyd, N., The Western Front… p. 1
