Scientific and Religious Morality
René Guénon — The superstition of life (4)
“One of the most noticeable symptoms of the preponderance acquired by sentimentality is what we call ‘moralism,’ which is the clearly marked tendency to refer everything to concerns of a moral order, or at least to subordinate everything else to them, especially what is considered as corning within the domain of intelligence.
Morality in itself is something essentially sentimental; it represents as relative and contingent a point of view as possible and one moreover which has never been held except by the West; but ‘moralism,’ in the already defined sense of the word, is an exaggeration of this point of view, and only came into being quite recently.
A moral code -whatever foundation is given it, and whatever importance is attributed to it- is not and cannot be anything more than a rule of action. For men who are no longer interested in anything but action, it is clear that morality must figure very largely indeed, and they attach themselves to it all the more because considerations of this order may be made to pass for thought in a period of intellectual decadence; it is this that explains the birth of ‘moralism.’
Something of the kind had already come to light towards the end of the Greek civilization, but without growing -as far as one can tell- to the proportions which it has taken on in our time; in fact, from Kant onwards, almost all modern philosophy has been saturated with ‘moralism,’ which amounts to saying that it gives precedence to the practical over the speculative, the former being moreover considered from a special angle; this tendency reached its full development with the philosophies of life and of action.
On the other hand, the obsession which haunts even the most avowed materialists of what are called ‘scientific morals’ represents exactly the same tendency; it may be called scientific or philosophical according to individual tastes, but it is never any more than an expression of sentimentality, and this expression does not even vary to any appreciable extent.
For men who are no longer interested in anything but action, it is clear that morality must figure very largely
The place of religion is taken by religiosity, or in other words by a mere sentimental aspiration, more or less vague and inconsistent
It is not only among the ‘scientists’ and among the philosophers that the encroachment of ‘moralism’ may be noticed; notice must also be taken, in this respect, of the degeneration of the religious idea, such as it is found to be in the innumerable sects that have sprung from Protestantism. These are the only forms of religion which are specifically modern, and they are characterized by a progressive reduction of the doctrinal element in the interests of the moral or sentimental element; this phenomenon is a particular instance of the general diminishing of intellectuality, and it is no mere chance that the epoch of the Reformation coincides with that of the Renaissance, that is, precisely with the beginning of the modern period.
In certain branches of contemporary Protestantism the doctrine has dwindled into nothing at all, and, as the worship -in a parallel way- has also been reduced to practically nothing, the moral element is ultimately all that is left: ‘Liberal Protestantism’ is no more than a ‘moralism’ with a religious label.
As a name for things of this kind, we willingly use the word ‘pseudo-religion’; and we apply also this same word to all the ‘Neo-Spiritualist’ sects, which are born and prosper above all in the protestant countries, because ‘Neo-Spiritualism’ and ‘Liberal Protestantism’ spring from the same tendencies and from the same state of mind.
The place of religion -owing to the suppression of the intellectual element (or its absence in the case of new creations)- is taken by religiosity, or in other words by a mere sentimental aspiration, more or less vague and inconsistent; and this religiosity is to religion just about what the shadow is to the body.”
René Guénon — East and West 1924
