Let’s talk about North Korea.
April 27th was a historic day for the Korean Peninsula, and one that to my surprise seemed to have far less attention (as measured by Twitter) than I would have expected. It’s not every day that the North Korean dictator pops out of hiding for a little mingling, and it’s certainly not every day that the North and South Korean leaders hold a summit to talk about peace, and denuclearization. But then again, it’s also not the first time that North Korea has agreed to something that they ultimately didn’t follow up on.
The Panmunjom Declaration that was signed on April 27th, 2018 should be a celebrated event, even if it was vague, and has yet to have any tangible and long term effects. At the very least it was a largely symbolic event to show that both North and South Korea are willing to have a conversation to rejuvenate both Koreas.
The declaration, which the full title reads Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, lists about thirteen items that involved reconnecting families, ending propaganda broadcasts, addressing humanitarian issues, officially ending the Korean War, have high level talks regarding denuclearization for all of Korea, among other things. By and large, it was a positive document for both parties to sign.
To add to this, this was only the third such summit to occur. The first occurred in 2000, and only led to reuniting families, and addressing components of the economy. The second summit, which occurred in 2007, followed pressures on North Korea after a successful nuclear test which was in violation of previous agreements. This summit was also spurred on from pressure by China. This summit resulted in mostly a reiteration of the goals set forth in 2000, along with talks of replacing the armistice with a bonafide peace treaty. Both of these summits were held in Pyongyang.
In contrast to those two occurrences, Kim Jung Un met at the DMZ and briefly crossed into the South. More topics were addressed, in particular denuclearization, as well as a stated goal of reaching a peace deal by the end of the year. Sometimes, symbolism is foundation for which diplomacy is born, so I think it’s important that do not diminish the inter-Korean summit. It’s a bid deal.
While there’s a lot to be happy about, there’s more to be skeptical about. I’m personally excited by the event, and the possible outcomes that follow from such talks. Since 2006, North Korea has pledged denuclearization, among other things, only to back out due to perceived transgressions, actual aggressions, new demands, and other escalations.
Having said all of that, I think it’s naive, and folly, to prescribe the current success and pace of inter-Korean talks to Trump at this particular moment in history. Frankly it’s too early. While Trump deserves credit for escalating tensions, it’s false to suggest that that increased tension has led to any positive results. Let’s not forget that historically, North Korea responds to aggressive words and actions with aggressive words and actions.
It’s also wrong to give Trump loads of credit for other reasons, namely because it ignores China’s significant role in bringing North Korea to the table, and Moon Jae-in‘s liberal approach and offers of cultural exchange. Lastly, passing off credit to Trump ignores history, and the timing of everything up to this point. Let me explain.
China’s Role: Enforcing Sanctions
North Korea has had numerous sanctions placed on them, with varying degrees of success since 2006, mostly imposed as a result of nuclear testing. If the purpose of sanctions was to slow down, or to completely thwart efforts in completing a nuclear weapons program — this clearly failed. Part of the problem with sanctions is that it requires enforcement, which is difficult to achieve. More importantly, North Korea has found ways of circumventing those sanctions. (For more great information, please read this from the Council on Foreign Relations for a timeline of sanctions, and this detailed history from Arms Control Association on the chronology of diplomatic efforts.)
But not all countries are equal in their impact on North Korea. China is responsible for 80–90% of North Korea’s trade, which means that enforcement on economic sanctions falls largely on China, and it would appear that this year, China is inclined to do this more intensely. Since the adoption of UNSC sanctions 2371 that impacts exports on textiles, seafood, and coal, and 2375 further reducing oil caps — it would seem that sanctions are having some impact. Since adoption and enforcement, coal imports to North Korea had dropped by 71.6%, and oil 99.6%. Those aren’t insignificant numbers.
South Korean President, Moon Jae-in’s Role, and ‘Soft Power’
Moon Jae-in, unlike his conservative predecessor, has been very vocal about rejuvenated efforts to implement a newer “Sunshine Policy”, and by and large it seems that he’s off to a good start. This began with North Korea’s invitation to the Olympics, along with a united Korean team, and Kim Jong Un’s wife in attendance. At present, it is my opinion that Moon deserves the most significant amount of credit, and praise, for the movement with North Korea. I perceive Moon’s kind words and credit towards Trump as a means to humble him.
To be clear, Moon Jae-in is exerting what we would call soft power. Rather than threatening force and destruction, soft power produces change by creating an appeal towards something. Often times, this might mean more cultural exchanges, or, more specific to the present day, inviting our enemy to an event under one banner.
The Fault Was In Our Stars — The Role of Time
Let’s not forget that on November 29th, 2017, North Korea announced that they had achieved their goal of becoming a nuclear state. This occurred after the October 10th incident in which a tunnel collapsed at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site following their sixth and largest nuclear test.
According to data from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea has tested 117 rockets, on 67 dates, in the last 33 years (1984–2017). While that averages out to about two test dates a year, and three or four rockets tested — the pace accelerated under Obama, and then again under Trump.
Beginning in 2014, North Korea began testing rockets more frequently, the rate of which halved in 2015, and in 2016 the pace again increased. To put this in perspective, between 2014 and 2017 there were 78 rockets tested on 49 dates. Between 1984 and 2013, there were only 39 rockets tested on 18 dates.
Although it would be easy to conflate the spike in 2016 & 17 as a result of Trump’s rhetoric, I believe this to be false. Dating back to September 1999, the National Intelligence Council published a report in which they projected that namely North Korea (along with China, Iran, Russia, and Iraq) would develop ICBMs by 2015. This was reiterated in 2002 by then CIA Director George Tenet in front of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The 1999 report also indicated that North Korea’s development of such weapons would likely be for the purpose of deterrence, and not WMD’s.
The fact that our intelligence experts projected this outcome 18 years ago suggests that Korea isn’t acting out of some fear of Trump, but rather, we should have seen this coming. The fact that rocket tests for ICBM’s doubled in pace in 2014 suggests that our intelligence experts were right on target in their projections, and that North Korea has been fine tuning their tech since then. Alternatively, we could say that they were off by two-years, but that doesn’t change the fact that we saw this coming, and didn’t do enough to curb, or prevent it outright. While Trump’s rhetoric is certainly combative, and not informed by diplomacy — he’s not to blame for the increase in tests.
In my opinion, had Moon not become South Korea’s president, and had China not buckled down on sanctions, it would just be another year in the day of the Korean Peninsula, much like any other year in the last thirty-three.
Personally, I don’t care who the President of the United States is at the time we reach a peace deal. If we can be a part of the negotiations that leads to the official end of the Korean War, and a more unified Korea — then I’m all in. In order for a peace treaty to be signed, the United States will have to be a participant due to playing such a significant role in the Korean War.
To that end, I am concerned that Trump will continue with his brash and often times heavy handed approach. Such an approach is both high-risk, and high-reward, and if he wants to genuinely earn credit for a peace deal, he’ll need to be more diplomatic than he’s presented on this matter up to this point. He’ll need to genuinely exercise ‘soft diplomacy’ much in the same way that Moon Jae-in is. This can’t be understated, in my opinion. While I understand that a peace deal will have some hot topic issues, namely denuclearization, that require a firm goal, threatening to bomb North Korea in absence of agreement will only lead to an escalation.
Conclusion
In determining North Korea’s motives, I don’t think it’s plausible to suggest that they’re now coming to the table due to an inability to produce rockets and nuclear weapons. They went from having no ability in 1984, to full nuclear capabilities in 2017 — despite at least twelve sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council from 2006 to 2017. If North Korea were coming to the table due to inability I would think that they would have done so much sooner than this.
No, what’s plausible is that North Korea played the long game, and showed the world the extent to which they’re willing to go in the name of juche — which means “self-reliance”, which is a core principle to North Korean political culture.
Unlike the last two decades, North Korea had little in the way of bargaining chips in a diplomatic sense, having to rely heavily on China. Now, regardless of accuracy or capability, North Korea reached their goal in complete and total defiance of the entire world. They now have a completed nuclear weapons program, which means that now they have more leverage. How that leverage will be used is to be determined.
