Trump and China: Foreign Policy under a New Administration
As President Trump is sworn in on inauguration day, the Fairbank Center examines what U.S.-China relations may look like under a new administration.
After Trump’s electoral victory in November, the past two months have witnessed a somewhat rocky start to the new administration’s relations with China. As President Trump is sworn into the Highest Office, the administration’s first 100 days will prove crucial to setting the tone for Washington’s relations with Beijing, Taipei, and across the Asia-Pacific.
In November 2016, the Fairbank Center — along with the Asia-related Centers at Harvard University — inaugurated a new series on “Trump and Asia” with a panel discussion featuring Joseph Nye, Ezra Vogel, Lynn Kuok, Sung-yoon Lee and Susan Pharr (you can listen again here, or in the embed below).
Following this inaugural event, the Fairbank Center Blog has launched a “Trump and Asia” series that aims to not only analyze the state of U.S.-Asia relations under the new administration, but also to suggest options for how to navigate these crucial relationships.
So what do we know about U.S.-China relations on day one of Trump’s presidency? As part of our “Trump and Asia” series, our faculty provide their analysis of what we currently know and key challenges for the new administration’s China policy.
Trump’s Foreign Policy Towards China
“There is no indication that January 20 will mark a dramatic change in the working style of the incoming President. I think most of the experts at the Fairbank Center would agree with me that good foreign policy depends on thorough knowledge, sober analysis and reflection, and judicious communication.
We could be wrong, but I doubt it.
This means that if leadership of US foreign policy is driven by emotion, dismissive of expertise, and communicated by twitter, it is almost certain to generate problems in the world’s most important bilateral relationship — where exactly those problems arise remains to be seen.
The White House doesn’t make and implement foreign policy all on its own. Bureaucrats in many parts of the US government and at many different levels talk to their counterparts in China often and work with them substantively.
So for me the crucial questions are first, whether those relationships, both institutional and personal, are flexible and durable enough to deal with the shocks to the system that are sure to come, and second, whether both sides continue to put the necessary work into sustaining the relationship. I hope so.”
— Michael Szonyi, Director of the Fairbank Center
A Strategy of Deliberative Unpredictability
“Some Trump advisers have suggested that Trump’s successively provocative and/or inconsistent statements on China reflect a shrewd strategy of unpredictability. If you keep the adversary from knowing your intentions and bottom lines, then this uncertainty will induce caution in the other side and cause the other side to reveal its strategy first.
Deception and unpredictability may work in zero-sum conflicts such as warfare. But they don’t work so well when negotiating in relationships that also have major cooperative elements (e.g. U.S.-China cooperation on trade, investment, climate change, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation). If you are unpredictable, potential partners will likely see you as unreliable; they will conclude that you won’t keep your agreements and promises. Once you have a reputation for unreliability, why would anyone want to cooperate with you in the future?
In short, deliberate unpredictability as a strategy is inconsistent with maintaining productive relationships in business and in diplomacy. It is also antithetical to crisis management where the credible communication of restraint is essential for de-escalation.”
— Alastair Iain Johnston
Read more from Alastair Iain Johnston on our blog.
A New Ambassador to Beijing
“At this point in the presidential transition it is not clear that [newly appointed ambassador to China] Governor Branstad’s experience and commitment to U.S.-China cooperation will be welcomed by President-elect Trump or by policy makers in his administration.
President-elect Trump’s recent statements regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, and U.S.-China trade suggests that he believes that a more conformational U.S. approach toward China can compel Chinese concessions that will reorder U.S.-China relations and improve U.S. security and economic interests.
If, as suggested by his recent statements, Trump develops a confrontational approach toward China, Chinese leaders will likely respond in kind.”
— Robert S. Ross, Fairbank Center Associate
Read more from Robert S. Ross on our blog.
Trade and Economic Relationships
“The Trump Administration is alarmed that the U.S. has not done more to counter mercantilist Chinese trade practices over the past decade. They are determined to curb problematic Chinese practices, ranging from subsidies to the dumping of excess industrial capacity.
Their preference is to fix the terms of the economic relationship via negotiations, but they will not hesitate to file more WTO cases and resort to unilateral measures if the Chinese are not more forthcoming. They are also determined to stop American multinational corporations from offshoring high-tech manufacturing to China.
In the near-term, however, China is not likely to capitulate to U.S. demands. President Xi cannot afford to look weak against a hawkish American President, especially prior to next fall’s Party Congress. Instead, China will test Trump’s resolve through tit-for-tat actions. China will also take advantage of TPP’s demise to assert its own regional initiatives. Economic and trade tensions are bound to rise in the coming months.”
— Mark Wu, Assistant Professor Law
Taiwan and the “One China” Policy
The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is inherently in conflict with the relationship between the United States and China. In order to maintain a relationship with Taiwan while calming the Mainland, the United States — since 1979 — has maintained regulations between the U.S. and Taiwan, but insured that those contacts are at a lower level than those between China and the US.
Donald Trump’s apparent belief that the United States’ “One China Policy” only favors China, fails to appreciate the considerable benefits it provides for Taiwan.
— Steven Goldstein, Fairbank Center Associate
Listen to Steven Goldstein’s latest podcast on U.S. relations with Taiwan in the embed below:
“Pivot to Asia” in the Age of Trump
The so-called ‘pivot’ was always of limited significance to the region because it was so unclear what it actually consisted of.
What is clear, however, is that no US president can avoid dealing with the central global transformation of our time, which is the transfer of wealth and power from West to East. This is a process that has now been underway for almost a generation, and the election of Trump as president will not change it.
So my guess is that Trump as president will come to spend more time on Asia than on any other continent; not only on China, but on the rest of the region as well.
— Odd Arne Westad, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations
Read more from Odd Arne Westad on the Harvard Ash Center’s blog.
This blog post is part of the Fairbank Center’s new series on “Trump and Asia,” which analyses U.S. relations with China and East Asia in the new administration.
