But context is king.

Given Liverpool’s injuries, recent form, Arsenal’s imperious league campaign, it made perfect sense why Slot opted for a defensive game-plan. Yet, the way he went about it was quite bizarre and something that we don’t routinely see, especially from a ‘big side’. And that’s why football is strangely beautiful. While, tactical homogeneity, especially in the Premier League can at times be an eyesore. In games like this, you ride every challenge.

This piece will be slightly different from the other long-reads, which used examples from a couple of games to highlight, discuss and theorise solutions on macro tactical issues/concepts that Liverpool are facing or attempting to implement. Instead, this piece will minutely analyse the Arsenal clash in a few distinct parts:

Part I — Liverpool’s Press and Defensive Game-Plan
Part II — Arsenal’s Press v Liverpool’s Build-Up Structures
Part III — Liverpool’s 2nd Half Control
Part IV — Miscellaneous Player Notes
Part V — Notes from Fulham Game

Part I

Liverpool’s pressing and settled defensive approach was quite strange. Very rarely these days do you see such strict man-to-man adherence, but that’s what Slot had his players buy into.

The image below highlights what the intended approach was. Liverpool did not initially execute this, but halfway through the first half , it clicked and they stuck with this approach for most of the game.

Wirtz and Szoboszlai were tasked with taking Zubimendi’s central progression out of the game. One of them stayed on Zubimendi, while the other pressed the respective ball-carrying CB. If Arsenal funnelled play to the left, Wirtz would engage Saliba while Szoboszlai marked Zubimendi; if play moved right, Wirtz would track Zubimendi and Szoboszlai would step onto Gabriel.

This meant that Arsenal always had one spare centre-back and hence a lot of the progressive onus was on Gabriel & Saliba, but it seemed that Liverpool were fine with that. Gakpo and Frimpong were tasked with following their respective full-back and Gravenberch and Mac Allister would stay on Rice and Odegaard, occasionally exchanging assignments, depending on the rotation. This was Liverpool’s pressing and settled defensive structure. I would hesitate to even call it a pressing structure at times because Liverpool were happy to concede the first phase, but rather, their goal was to limit any incisive passing into their box.

Initially, Liverpool had issues in executing this scheme. Before, I analyse those issues, let’s theorise Arne Slot’s potential intentions behind such a defensive approach.

1. Limit the influence of Zubimendi and Rice as central progressors and carriers.
2. Control winger-full back dynamics by tracking each run.
3. By utilising a man-oriented approach, Liverpool forced Arsenal to rely on their running power and dynamism to de-mark themselves. This was Arne Slot’s hedge, he backed Liverpool’s defensive ability against Arsenal’s dynamic running. The risk with such an approach was leaving Bukayo Saka 1v1 with Kerkez, however, the Hungarian did quite well throughout the night to contain any danger.

Issues — 
1. Wirtz and Szoboszlai not fully understanding their pressing instructions. At times, both of them would be locked onto the same player or both of them would shadow the space behind them, which is fine when none of Zubimendi or Rice are in the back-line as they are meeting the above intention of blocking Zubimendi and Rice. But, when one of them are in the back-line, the reduced pressure on the ball affords them too much time to pick passes at ease.

2. Arsenal rotated heavily. Zubimendi would move within the backline, pull out of the block, move in the central spaces. Rice and Odegaard would rotate around the central spaces a lot too. With a heavy man-oriented approach, movement can cause chaos. Liverpool were mostly okay in communicating when ‘transferring’ their assignment to another player, but there were times when they did lose their assignment and gave Arsenal a way through. In the image below, the outside triangle has led to Saka being de-marked.

3. The other issue was with one of Gabriel and Saliba constantly being the spare man. They would drive into the space and get closer to the winger and full-back to form an outside triangle. At this stage, it meant that one of Wirtz or Szoboszlai would have to switch onto them and engage. At times, Liverpool didn’t spot this early enough and gave them too much space to find a final line pass. The image below is a good example — one of Szoboszlai or Mac Allister should step up onto Saliba here and Wirtz takes Szoboszlai’s assignment to ensure that Saliba doesn’t have the space to find Timber in behind as he did on this play.

When it Functioned —

Boxed In — 
The obvious issue of having your wingers defending in the box is that when you want to play out and retain the ball, it is very difficult to do so, as everyone is deep and the front-line is underloaded. As such, Liverpool relied on short combinations between their defenders and midfielders to get out, but, in the first half, a lot of these combinations started from Liverpool’s own box, and Arsenal’s incredibly intense counter-press stifled any progression, meaning Liverpool were pinned towards their own box for a lot of the half.

My view is that this is what influenced Arne Slot’s deliberate intention to overload the midfield in the 2nd half and keep possession for much longer. Keeping the ball helped alleviate Liverpool’s defensive burden, if they continued to stay pinned in their own box, it was likely that Arsenal would create a goal-scoring chance at some stage.

Evaluation — 
My ultimate evaluation is that the strategy worked. While Arsenal did have a few moments where they got in behind Liverpool’s defensive line, the impending danger in the first half was as a result of constant possessional control rather than actually threatening Liverpool’s goal consistently. Despite a few miscommunications, Liverpool were very focused, and Slot’s constant instructions from the touchline meant that the scheme was well-executed. They were also physically up for the battle, winning a lot of their assignments, especially Kerkez.

Part II — Arsenal’s Press v Liverpool’s Build-Up Structures

This was a rare off-day for the Arsenal press. While Liverpool were boxed in for a lot of the first half, it wasn’t as a result of Liverpool’s first-phase build-up collapsing; rather, it was Arsenal’s intense counter-press in the few seconds after losing the ball that gave them possessional control.

Liverpool repeatedly exploited Gyokeres’ ineffective shadow marking and Arsenal’s long-pressing distances to bypass Arsenal’s press through quick, precise passing amongst each other.

For me, this was very promising as I have talked at length about Liverpool’s clunky build-up profiles, especially when Konate, Gravenberch and Bradley are involved. For the most part, those three were excellent in the first phase and generated a lot of promising situations. Wirtz dropping into overload the midfield also helped; however, this was seen primarily in the 2nd half. I think the crux of it was Mac Allister taking pivot responsibilities, allowing Gravenberch to be higher and closer to Bradley or to jump in the back-line and act as another short-passing option to help alleviate the load off Van Dijk. I think Mac Allister had one of his best games of the season and controlled the pace of play superbly.

There were two main approaches that Liverpool took (and forced Arsenal to take in their pressing) in the first half.

1. Gravenberch in the backline. As a result, Arsenal didn’t put an extra body forward; rather, they relied on Trossard and Saka to screen the passes from Konate to Bradley and VVD to Kerkez by stepping up effectively. Odegaard stayed on Mac Allister and Gyokeres shadow-pressed Gravenberch when he was in the backline.

Arsenal were caused issues due to Trossard and Gyokeres’ execution. They were ineffective in screening their respective passes, meaning Bradley was found with space, Hincapie would make the jump, and his jump would be too long to make as Frimpong had him pinned further down the field — meaning Rice would have to jump to cover the space and also monitor Gravenberch as he moved further central. This would leave Szoboszlai as the spare man. Arsenal were not proactive enough in seeing this problem. If they were, Gabriel could’ve stepped up on Szoboszlai, Hincapie could’ve been quicker to react or Zubimendi could’ve stepped onto Szoboszlai with Timber then shadowing Wirtz and Gakpo as they were on the other side of the field.

2. Double-Pivot of Gravenberch and Mac Allister

Arsenal would use the front three in the same way here — Saka shadowed the pass into Kerkez, stepped up onto VVD and Trossard vice-versa on Bradley and Konate. Gyokeres shadowed the pass into each of the CBs. They would then be man-oriented on each of the double pivot by using Rice and Odegaard, Rice and Odegaard would jump to squeeze if the ball went out to the full-backs. The issue was once again the distances, particularly on Liverpool’s right-hand side. As Wirtz had pinned Zubimendi, Szoboszlai was the spare man, Gabriel was willing to step up onto him, but Trossard’s ineffective screening, Rice’s large distance to cover to squeeze Bradley and Hincapie’s jump being too long due to being pinned by Frimpong meant that Bradley could connect with the spare man.

This play below where Wirtz drops closer to Bradley (and Gabriel jumps) is a great example -

2nd Half — 
In the 2nd half, Arsenal changed the approach to the double pivot and put Gyokeres and Trossard on screening duties for the CB and full-back, respectively. They put Saka on one of the pivots, allowing Rice to tackle the spare man. The issue was once again the distances — once the shadow-press was broken, Arsenal’s distances were too large to squeeze Liverpool or step-up onto the full-backs/midfielders (if Odegaard/Saka went to squeeze, the double pivot was left open) This, alongside, Gravenberch’s great ball-carrying, meant Liverpool were able to break Arsenal’s press on numerous occasions throughout the game. These large distances have to also be credited to Liverpool — their effective pinning in the final line meant that Arsenal’s full-backs could never be synchronised to the required intensity and timing of the press.

Part III — Liverpool’s 2nd-Half Control

Liverpool came out with a clear intent to combine in close distances and overload the midfield. They often created a box on each side of the field to combine in short distances and ensure that Arsenal’s settled defence could never really step out and press them, as they were outnumbered.

While Arsenal’s block is as sturdy as anyone’s in the world, Liverpool’s close-combination play was significantly better than it was in the games against Wolves, Leeds and Fulham. They played with pace, moved the ball left to right, and kept the touches minimal. I think the situation was slightly different, though — Liverpool were not under as much pressure to break past Arsenal’s block, and hence playing more securely was acceptable to them. As such, they naturally retained the ball. In the games against Wolves, Leeds and Fulham, they were under more pressure to drive the game to these teams, and as a result, a lot of their play was clunky as they took more touches and risks, but didn’t have the required close-combination synergy to make those risks work.

Ryan Gravenberch was huge in this aspect. As discussed earlier, he was vital to escaping Arsenal’s press and taking the ball into a position of security where Liverpool could reset and continue to circulate the ball.

Counter-Press — 
The often overlooked aspect of overloading the midfield is that if Liverpool lose the ball, the close distances of all their players within the midfield place them within proximity of Arsenal’s backline and pivot, allowing them to effectively counter-press as they look to play out. This is similar to the first half, where Arsenal had lots of numbers near the Liverpool box; this allowed them to counter-press (the phase of pressing immediately after losing the ball) with intensity.

Arsenal found it very difficult to play out on the ground, as such, they rushed and resorted to aerial balls towards Liverpool’s backline. Disappointingly, for Arsenal, Gyokeres was not involved enough with Liverpool’s CBs to make their life difficult, and Liverpool would regain the ball, reset and continue circulating.

Duels — 
The other part of regaining the ball is winning 50–50 duels. This has to be mentality. Liverpool has looked physically off the pace at various moments throughout the season. Especially, a player like Alexis Mac Allister. It’s almost as if all the players came to show Arsenal who the current Premier League champions are — a point to prove. Liverpool won 22 duels compared to Arsenal’s 15 in the 2nd half, 18 on the ground compared to Arsenal’s 13. The intensity that Wirtz, Mac Allister, Szoboszlai and Gravenberch brought was immense.

Part IV — Miscellaneous Player Notes

Kerkez — 
Kerkez’s physical resilience is overlooked. Yes, he is rash, and at times he needlessly foregoes defensive basics at the expense of physically imposing himself. But against Saka, despite Saka having a few promising moments early on, he held his own physically. Part of it probably comes down to defending being his primary responsibility in this game, rather than also having a huge attacking onus like he would in games against Wolves, Leeds & Fulham. I’m sure that allowed him to zone in on the task at hand.

Wirtz — 
Touch efficiency. I’ve talked about this with Wirtz before. But when you overload the midfield, and Wirtz is the player causing the overload, it is nearly impossible to press that team. His one or two touch passing safely and constantly circulates the ball, ensuring that the block can never really get up to suffocate the player as the ball is already circulated by the time they press up onto Wirtz. You can tell he is growing in confidence and now feels he is the creative engine of this team. As Liverpool, hopefully, start imposing their patterns onto games more, and their attackers return, I’m hopeful we will see some vintage Wirtz plays.

Szoboszlai — 
Physical engine. Nothing new there. Something he can work on, though, is his shot placement and accuracy. His shot power is unparalleled; however, quite often it is straight at the keeper or down the centre of the goal.

Frimpong — 
In the last few articles, I’ve praised Frimpong’s final third accuracy relative to Kerkez, and best believe, that fell off a cliff against Arsenal. Most of Liverpool’s promising situations required Frimpong to make the final ball, and, unfortunately, he didn’t execute most of the time. I will monitor this over the next few games.

It could just be an off game — very likely. But another theory is that against settled low-blocks, he picks more accurate passes as he has time to play the cross. Against Arsenal, a lot of his moments were in a transitional game state or runs in-behind that he may struggle with due to the frantic pace of play. This may simply be conjecture, but it’s worth monitoring.

Part V — Fulham Notes

I wanted to dedicate this piece to the Arsenal game, as there were new tactical issues relative to Liverpool’s recent run of games. A lot of the issues Liverpool faced v Fulham have been covered in my Burnley low-block article, Liverpool’s change of system article and the issues of Wolves & Leeds.

Something I did want to reiterate, though, is Liverpool’s issues in the mid-block. They become too man-oriented (this was a deliberate instruction against Arsenal and hence could really not even be called a mid-block). But, in other games, they definitely intend to maintain a zonal block but become too drawn to a particular player’s movement rather than shadowing the space behind, which leaves space in the middle for the opposition to slice through. à la— Wilson’s goal.

Also, rotations for the sake of rotating are pointless. Especially when players rotate into each other’s zones and are virtually on top of each other. Creating close-combination boxes and using minimal touches to circulate the ball amongst each other like they did v Arsenal should be the template.

****
Ultimately, Liverpool’s performance v Arsenal was not vintage Liverpool. But, I liked it for the build-up improvements, for the clear execution of game-plan, the physicality and mentality at show. It gives me hope for classic UCL knockout ties. Obviously, once, we get our attackers back, I would love to see Liverpool impose themselves more in the final third.

I’ll leave you with this:
“What happens when people open their hearts?”
“They get better.” — Haruki Murakami, ‘Norwegian Wood’

Happy New Year, all. Wishing everyone the best for 2026. For Liverpool, it was not a happy New Year. The pace of play and urgency issues that we talked about in the Spurs game, resurfaced at a more extreme level in both the nervy win against Wolves and the frustrating 0–0 draw against Leeds. This piece will look to dissect what Liverpool intends to achieve through their in-possession set-up and dynamics, and whether those intentions are adequate to break sturdy blocks such as those that Wolves and Leeds presented. I will also explore issues of execution and analyse the various out-of-possession schemes within these games. A glossary of terms is included at the bottom of the piece for any new tactical readers.

Wolves -

Left-Hand Side Overload — 
Liverpool’s intention in this game, and usually against most low-blocking sides, is simple. Overload the left-hand side, create an outside triangle or box of some sort and look to stretch the block to find the space on the inside. This is a fine intention and a strategy that I have previously said to be a very potent one against sides that offer deep resistance.

Below is a nice image from the Wolves game that captures that dynamic. Jones, Kerkez, Wirtz and Gravenberch form a nice box with VVD behind if the play needs to be reset. The shape and intention are nice with Kerkez pinning the wide defender, Wirtz ensuring the CB behind him is attending to him, opening space for Ekitike to run into behind him. However, having players between the lines is not merely enough. There must be intent to play. That’s where Liverpool lacks.

The pace of play in this whole Wolves game was far too slow. We will discuss this at length later. Let’s talk about this set-up. To take advantage of such a set-up, you need vertical line-breaking passers; Wirtz and Kerkez are in advanced positions and are vertical relative to Jones and Gravenberch. To access Ekitike’s potential slanted run, ideally, Wirtz’s body should be facing towards Ekitike or he should be capable of opening in that direction after a first touch. Instead, Wirtz is completely closed off towards the goal and is capable of receiving, but then will have to turn. To be fair, he is good enough to do that. The issue is finding him. Jones is capable of doing so, but his passing lane to Wirtz is blocked. So, the onus falls on Ryan Gravenberch. This is an issue with Gravenberch’s play that I have talked about before. Vertical line-breaking passing at pace. This play can only be executed at pace, because if it is done at a leisurely speed, Wolves will have enough time to react to Liverpool. Ultimately, none of the required actions to execute this dynamic occurred and the play reset.

Another great example is this play below — 
Wirtz’s off-ball movement out wide opens up space for Gravenberch to pass to Kerkez inside, which he executes well. Kerkez passes back to Konate instead of laying it off to Ekitike and potentially making a more advanced run instead for a ‘give and go’ movement or trying the riskier pass to Jones, making a slanted run towards the near post.

Predictability & Pace of Play — 
While I am aware that I am cherry picking plays, for me, these plays are indicative of the larger macro-problem that Liverpool has in their in-possession dynamics.

Liverpool are far too predictable in attacking play — they aim to use the outside triangles (good), but don’t move it quickly enough, play mostly down the left, and, seem to be hesitant to pass vertically through the lines. When they do break the lines, they often don’t have the technical execution to make the ball stick/progress the play or they hesitate (the Kerkez play above).

Frimpong had multiple accurate crosses in this game, usually, first time at high speed, however, Liverpool continued to circulate their play down the left-hand side. This is a basic error and perhaps indicative of a larger mindset that is to be safe rather than sorry.

Arne Slot himself acknowledged post the Leeds game that to break down a low-block, you must play at pace and generate 1v1 situations — while this is a simplified way of looking at it, there is truth in what he says. If you play at pace, you cause a few issues:

1. The opposition’s transition from attack to a settled block can be taken advantage of, meaning you are playing against a defensive structure that is not yet organised.

2. If the defensive structure is organised in a sturdy low-block, playing with pace, movement and short distances, is a way to create chaos within the defensive structure and move them around. When you force the defenders to defend at a pace which is high for them, it is natural for them to forget their organised principles, but rather just react to the movements in front of them — when you force the opposition to react to individual movements, that’s when you have successfully by-passed their blocking intention and rather turned them into a man-oriented defensive structure, which goes against the very aim of a low-block.

In short, Liverpool just did not play quickly enough to maximise any good dynamics or intentions they did create against Wolves.

The Goals — 
The irony is that the two goals they scored should’ve shown them the way on how to further dominate and hurt Wolves.

1st Goal — 
Frimpong’s directness is admirable. For this goal, he drives at the defenders and beats his man with two explosive touches, executes a ‘collapse the defence’ play as he is smart to look up and see that the space is behind the defensive line, Gravenberch finds himself in space and calmly slots the ball in.

2nd Goal — 
Once again, a goal due to a more direct intention and faster pace of play. Liverpool counter-press with intensity, win the ball back, get the ball to Ekitike, who separates himself quickly, takes on his man and drives, Wirtz occupies a nice progressive position, Ekitike threads the needle nicely, and Wirtz calmly finishes it to get his first Liverpool goal.

Leeds -

Few days later, Liverpool welcomed Leeds to Anfield in a game that followed a very similar tactical blueprint. Leeds sat back in a 5–4–1, providing Liverpool a great opportunity to implement any improvements from the Wolves game.

Improvements — 
Credit to Liverpool. I thought in the first 30 minutes, there were some great patterns of play, and, generally, the pace of play was much quicker and there seemed to be intent behind every touch.

Liverpool set up in a 4–3–3 of sorts, with a flat midfield 3, Jones providing support on the left-hand-side, Gravenberch with height on the right-hand side and Szoboszlai drifting in and around the central half-spaces. The slight change that Slot may have got wrong, but, was perhaps also forced due to fixture congestion was Robertson instead of Kerkez as that did upset the left-hand side dynamic that Wirtz, Kerkez and Jones had functioning. To make up for it, Ekitike drifted closer to the left half-space to connect with Wirtz and Jones.

All in all, what Liverpool did well in the first portion of the game was to stretch Leeds’ block wide at pace, to leave open passing lanes inside.

This play is a good example -

Jones draws two Leeds players with him, Wirtz is on the outside of Jones’ run, Ekitike drops deeper into the 2nd line of Leeds’ block — as a result, the block has lost its structure. Wirtz plays the inside diagonal and Leeds are opened up as a result of the pace of play, off-ball movements and direct play.

Another sequence that I particularly enjoyed was this one below. To be able to play with the high speed and tempo that this piece has gone on about, the distances must be short, the amount of touches must be kept to a minimal amount and diagonal passes are usually the most effective type of pass. This play ticks all those boxes. A diagonal pass achieves elements of what both a vertical and horizontal pass aim to achieve. A horizontal pass is used to move the block side by side and is usually a less riskier pass, while, a vertical pass is used to centrally progress the ball, usually, between the lines. A diagonal pass provides the vertical element as a player can still receive the ball between the lines and have their body in a position where they can drive or see the field in front of them. It is a pass that is integral for a progressive team in modern football. For tactical theory fans — please read Spielverlagerung’s long-read on ‘Diagonality’.

I felt that it was also a deliberate intention for Van Dijk to play his diagonal switch to the right-hand side after overloading the left. It is a commonly used tactic to overload one side and then switch to the other, as the opposition has moved towards one side, so if the ball is switched to the opposite side effectively, the winger on the opposite side is usually isolated, which Liverpool achieved with Frimpong on numerous occasions.

Frimpong’s crossing was not as accurate as it was against Wolves, but, he should’ve had an assist if not for Ekitike’s unfortunate positioning for the open header. I’m a big fan of how touch-efficient Frimpong is — being a direct player, he is always looking to generate separation and he understands his pace is his greatest strength, so within 2–3 touches he usually gets past his man.

The Issues Return — 
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the lovely football only lasted about 30 minutes. From then, what worked for Liverpool, strangely disappeared and the level fell off a cliff.

Outside to Inside — 
The strategy to get the ball out wide quickly to stretch the block and then play inside essentially disappeared after a few incisions in the first 30 minutes. Liverpool resorted back to the safety of the horizontal pass and tried to create through an outside triangle with Robertson, Wirtz and Jones, but, it was not effective as the pace was once again too slow — Robertson was not as dynamic as Kerkez, Wirtz’s level was sub-par and even Jones didn’t have the most productive game.

Bradley and Frimpong — 
I was quite excited to see the Connor Bradley and Jeremy Frimpong dynamic at work. Frimpong loves to be isolated out wide to get past his man or to stutter-step and cross. Bradley also loves his runs down the wing/half-space, but usually, requires players to interact with and run off. Supported by Gravenberch/Szoboszlai, I thought this idea made sense. Unfortunately, Bradley and Frimpong could never get on the same wave-length. Bradley had an incredibly rough game. Lots of misplaced and overhit passes and the dynamic between the two never really took off as the basics weren’t executed.

Liverpool tested Leeds’ last-line with crosses and balls into the box on a handful of occasions in the first half. Two of them, created very good chances, with Ekitike arguably earning a penalty, nevertheless, he set up a good chance for Wirtz. The other one was Ekitike’s misplaced header off a Frimpong cross. The Leeds final line looked suspect in dealing with the balls Liverpool were playing into the box. Unfortunately, this was not sustained in the 2nd half, simply, because Liverpool stopped generating the separation out wide for Frimpong, the quality dropped and favourable positions to play the ball into the box were gone.

For me, it is further evidence of the wider and grander issue of the lack of variety in Liverpool’s play. It is very left hand side and outside triangle dominant, which is fine, Klopp’s Liverpool relied on outside triangles heavily, but the dynamism of those outside triangles cannot be replicated in this team. Klopp also had a player called Roberto Firmino, who opened up many passing angles with his off-ball movements and, that team’s identity was it’s chance creation off its press, which is not Slot’s pressing identity — his press is intended to limit chances.

Basics — 
Liverpool’s stale possession dynamics are definitely coaching issues. But, the reality is, a portion of the disappointing performance v Leeds can be put down to poor quality. The sloppy mistakes were frequent, and, it is impossible to execute any variation of fluid football without quality passing.

Coaching Takeaways — 
Firstly, I’m fairly confident that the coaching staff in its messaging to the players will re-iterate that there were positives to takeaway from the Leeds game. That level of messaging is crucial to drill into the players mentally on what types of sequences should be emulated going forward. More reps on the training ground (when the fixture load eases) will be helpful too.

Florian Wirtz. This is an incredibly high-quality player. Liverpool’s up-tick in form has coincided with the majority of their play going through Florian Wirtz. But, I can’t help but feel that his skillset is still not being maximised. For me, Wirtz’s body manipulation, touch-efficiency and half-space creativity stand-out. He rarely takes more touches than needed and at Leverkusen he played final-third passes that weren’t normal. The last few games he has drifted wider, with license to go narrow based on the dynamics around him, but I feel Wirtz is a player that has to rotate into the left half-space from central positions, rather, than the other way. I want to see Slot try take the risk once.

Width. To stretch a low-block, width is critical. When Liverpool got it right with Frimpong, they looked most dangerous. Whether, Frimpong is actually suitable to be a winger is another conversation. They need similar width on the left-hand side and with Kerkez still not at his effective best, it may be time to turn back to a winger. Cody Gakpo is great at running onto chances in the final third, but, I have question marks on whether he is the winger to help unlock low-blocks. He has a limited set of moves, and, often alienates players who make runs off his zone. I was impressed by Rio Ngumoha’s cameo off the bench, and, I understand, the game-state and starting games are different ordeals, but I would like to see more minutes going forward.

OOP — Press

Liverpool initially started with a very passive press, which made no sense. Ekitike was tasked with shadowing the pass into the CCB and Szoboszlai was putting pressure on both the LCB and the pivot player behind him. While, Wirtz had to shadow the outball to the RCB and also the pass in-behind to the other pivot. It was 3v5 bloodbath. The only way such a strategy would’ve worked is if the pressing was incredibly intense and suffocating, which it was not.

At around 17 minutes, Liverpool made a change. They went to a hybrid press which engaged Gravenberch and Frimpong higher up the pitch to squeeze Leeds man-to-man on their left-hand side.

Ekitike once again shadows the pass to the split CB on Leeds’ right-hand side, Wirtz shadows the pass to the RCB, while Szoboszlai and Gravenberch shadow one pivot player each, Frimpong is shadowing the pass from the LCB to the LWB and jumps on the LWB if the pass is made, with Bradley also tasked to make the jump. Konate jumps onto Aaronson who often rotated a bit deeper as a second-striker.

Glossary of Terms — 
1. Hybrid Pressing — A very prevalent type of pressing structure in modern football where the press fluctuates between zonal and man-marking phases. This is a very good piece — https://medium.com/@jonmackenzie/what-is-hybrid-pressing-and-why-is-everyone-using-it-94d23a15cf94

2. Low-Block — Out-of-Possession strategy where teams focus on sitting back to protect the defensive third of the pitch.

3. Half-Space

I’ll leave you with these:
“We do not pass to move the ball. We pass to move the opposition” — Pep Guardiola

“This is the job that keeps on giving.” — Noah Wyle, The Pitt

Speaking of reflecting, in this piece, I’d like to reflect on Liverpool’s recent run of results. Rather than focusing on the actual results, namely four wins and two draws, I want to focus on the change in system that Arne Slot has implemented. I want to pinpoint the rationale behind the change, the resultant advantages it provides, and, like every system, evaluate its trade-offs.

The Change —

Shift your mind back to the disastrous showing against PSV Eindhoven. That’s the last game that Liverpool played with two outright wingers. There have been a few forced reasons for that — Gakpo’s injury, Salah’s outburst and departure to AFCON. However, against West Ham, it was a conscious decision from Arne Slot to play Wirtz in the 10 position with Szoboszlai next to him, taking up narrow positions, which made Gakpo tuck in as almost a second striker behind Isak, allowing Kerkez to hold the width. That was the half-buy-in.

The full buy-in to this heavy midfield system, a 4–2–3–1 narrow formation for all the formation junkies, was seen against Brighton. All five of Gravenberch, Jones, Szoboszlai, Mac Allister and Wirtz started. Perhaps forced, as a result, of Gakpo’s injury and Salah’s peace talks only having occurred a day before the game.

Rationale -

1. Build-up

On this blog, we have talked at length about Liverpool’s build-up issues. I will try to keep this summation concise. Last season, Liverpool were heavily reliant on third-man combinations to isolate Salah against his full-back. There were shades of De Zerbi’s artificial transitions. Bait the press, unlock a third-man combination, usually an outside triangle, or have a player called Trent-Alexander Arnold and magically go over the block.

This season, Liverpool doesn’t have Trent Alexander-Arnold, teams are not pressing as high against them, and the teams that are have figured out Liverpool’s weaknesses. Namely, these include the right-hand side of their build-up and forcing Liverpool’s pivot to make vertical-line breaking passes, compared to last season, where Van Dijk would break the lines and the pivot would receive in space. One of the tenets of Arne Slot’s system is to pass from the back to generate advantages for the wingers. Liverpool have been unable to generate those advantages consistently this season.

Coming to the change of system, Arne Slot has started five midfielders in each of the last two games. Why? To attempt to solve the exact build-up issues illustrated above.

Let’s use the image below as an example -

Tottenham are pressing man-to-man from the goal-kick — Liverpool’s +1 can be created through using Alisson wisely. I find this set-up to be fascinating. Involved within the first phase are Ryan Gravenberch, Curtis Jones, Dominik Szoboszlai and Alexis Mac Allister. For a team that scored numerous goals through direct play and larger distances, this is a drastic shift in identity. But it makes complete sense, and, as a football nuffy, I enjoy this.

Arne Slot has turned to his most secure passers in Curtis Jones and Dominik Szoboszlai to help with the first phase. He has placed Ryan Gravenberch outside the block (image above), providing him with space to drive and turn with the ball, as is his strength. At times, Gravenberch and Mac Allister also played in a traditional double-pivot with Jones in the back-three.

In my view, it has worked. Liverpool have played some of their most fluid football in the last few months in the Brighton game. The Spurs game was not as fluid, but it was partially by design, which we will talk about. Let’s take it with a grain of salt, though. Spurs engaged man-to-man off goal kicks, but for most of the game dropped off into a heavily flawed 4–4–2 block with the goal of their front-line pressers (Xavi Simons and Kolo Muani) to shadow the passes into the double-pivot which Liverpool by-passed by placing Jones at LCB/LB in build-up to allow for a direct pass into Wirtz OR by making Gravenberch drop out of the block and force an extra Spurs body forward.

2. Controlled Football

Before the West Ham game, Liverpool had conceded 10 goals in three games. They had also only kept 3 clean sheets the entire season. In my piece decoding the Forest and PSV losses, I attributed a large portion of the goals conceded to individual mistakes rather than deeper systemic issues; it would be ignorant to brush past the fact that Liverpool were often ill-exposed after losing the ball.

My theory is that Slot has brought composure and calmness to the team through the additional midfielders at the expense of direct wingers. The style of play is slower (which I will discuss later), the passes are shorter, there is increased synergy and chemistry between the players — especially, the likes of Jones and Wirtz, Wirtz and Kerkez. All in all, Liverpool is controlling the game, or as Curtis Jones would say, not playing basketball anymore.

3. Utilisation of Full-Backs

The beautiful thing about tactics is that each decision has its own trade-off. The very flaws in the build-up in the Manchester City game were a result of Kerkez and Bradley finding themselves making passes at sub-optimal angles in the first phase. As discussed above, midfielders are now carrying the load in the first phase. So, where do the full-backs go? Where they should be. Connor Bradley and Milos Kerkez (‘The fullbacks’) are the width-holders. Kerkez’s best moments in a Bournemouth shirt came from down the touch-line, fizzing balls into his front-line. He ranked in the 94th percentile for crosses into the penalty area per 90 last season. This season, he ranks in the 66th percentile. Arne Slot has attempted to change that.

Against Spurs, Kerkez had numerous crossing opportunities. He had 81 touches of the ball, almost double the amount that Alexis Mac Allister had. Kerkez made 8 crosses, 0 of which can be classified as a ‘successful cross’ into the penalty area. (See FotMob — Match Report) Kerkez is getting into the situations he likes to be in; his execution needs to improve.

Looking at the situation below, Kerkez is in a perfect position for a cutback to Ekitike, who makes a very smart run away from the defensive line. However, Kerkez’s natural tendency is to fizz the ball into an area in the box, he needs to learn to look up in these situations and pass where there are options.

Similarly, Connor Bradley loves driving down the touch-line; the overload of midfielders will ensure he has players to connect with for give-and-go passes. Similarly, Frimpong suits this role.

4. Out-Of-Possession Work

Throughout Arne Slot’s tenure as Liverpool manager, his out-of-possession schemes have been widely criticised. I’ll be the first to admit that, for all the media uproar on how Hughes tried to hire someone who replicated Klopp stylistically, pressing to win the ball and suffocating opposition is certainly not a similarity between these two managers. Don’t be mistaken, Arne Slot teams do press — they press with a different intention.

I am an avid listener of press conferences. One of Arne Slot’s most commonly used lines is regarding ‘chance limitation’. Slot, unlike Klopp, doesn’t necessarily press to win the ball (it is not a ‘gegenpressing’ system); he presses to ‘limit opposition chances’. Now, yes, it is a valid point to say that if you win the ball, by extension, you limit opposition chances. What I mean to say is that Slot aims to stifle the key zones that oppositions can create chances from, while preserving the energy of his front line by compromising on the gegenpressing intensity that Klopp demanded.

However, this was done very successfully last season. The 4–2–4, while not a hugely effective first-phase pressing scheme, allowed Liverpool to synchronise their jumps, use their front four to back-press, and ultimately get bodies behind the ball to support the +1 they kept in their back-line. Oppositions didn’t score much; Liverpool kept clean sheets.

This season, Liverpool have conceded much more, and haven’t had effective pressing or counter-pressing mechanisms, nor have they had the solidity in their back-line. The change in system has allowed Slot to return to his prized 4–2–4, a more cautious iteration of last year’s version. The added midfielders have increased the work-rate within the team, and, ultimately, Liverpool gets more numbers behind the ball. The added players in central zones have improved the counter-pressing nets that Liverpool creates upon losing the ball. Is it perfect? No. But it is solid and has momentarily sealed the leak.

Concerns —

1. Mid-Block

Liverpool’s passive mid-block against settled-possession structures worries me. This is not a concern directly related to the change in system; it has been a long-standing concern.

These are some words I penned on X (Twitter) after the Inter Milan game:
The very name mid-block points to a zonal type of defensive structure where players work together to cover the spaces in the final line. As such, it requires constant coordination to cover the gaps, but also active pressure on the ball to prevent short-distance passing.

For me, Liverpool’s mid-block lacks both the synchronisation and pressure required to make a team uncomfortable with a mid-block. The tendencies are too man-oriented, where the midfielders react to individual movements. This is antithetical to the very purpose of a zonal block.

I think part of it also comes from the way the coach educates a team on defending in a mid-block. If it is made an enjoyable task — i.e, working together and making a team’s life very hard and suffocating, a team’s block can really be quick. That’s what I see in Arsenal.

One very random giveaway of an ill-functioning defensive block is when players are facing in opposite directions. Numerous times against Inter Milan, I saw Szoboszlai facing towards the goal and Gravenberch facing towards the ball. There is no way you can synchronise your movement that way.

Very good example. Jones and Szoboszlai are facing the other direction from Gravenberch. There is no zonal block here. It is impossible to synchronise.

2. Pace of Play

While the change of system has helped alleviate Liverpool’s build-up issues and players are getting into their ideal zones. An issue I have with it is how slow Liverpool plays. Teams are conceding the first phase to Liverpool and sitting in a block and asking them to break them down. There are numerous methods to break down a block, but some of the basics include stretching the block wide and then playing inside and playing with pace to disorganise the block. Liverpool are making progress in the first aspect through their rotations — a lot of their intentions v Spurs were commendable, playing centrally to then unlock the wider space or play in Ekitike/Isak in-behind after breaking the lines.

The issue lies in their pace of play — they don’t do it quickly enough to worry the opposition. It becomes even more of a potent concern when Liverpool go down, because then the game state forces them to play quicker, often leading them to rushing play, losing balls, and conceding further chances towards their own goal. That is the next step of evolution I am eager to observe.

In terms of tangible coaching strategies, it is a matter of drilling the message into the players, getting more reps in training/games in their respective zones and respective connections. With time, it should click, considering the quality of the players.

Curtis Jones

A player at the forefront of Liverpool’s resurgence and success under the new system has been Curtis Jones. Anyone who has watched him over the years can attest to the fact that he is a supremely talented footballer. He spots line-breaking passes that other midfielders don’t, he is great at creating angles with his body, and his press-resistance is top-notch.

My issue with Jones has always been his decision-making and consistency. In the past, I have seen him dribble out of situations he doesn’t need to, play passes he doesn’t need to, or I have seen him play a blinder of a game and then play with zero intensity the very next game. This run of form, in which he has been superb game after game, is incredibly pleasing.

He has brought the progressive passing that Liverpool have required in the first phase. His ability to find Wirtz between the lines has been critical to the German international’s run of splendid form. An underrated aspect of Jones’ game is his confidence in his abilities. At a time when Liverpool were making uncharacteristic mistakes, they needed a player with top confidence and minimal baggage to help them get out of the rut.

My only gripe with Jones is something that Slot has mentioned before — he has the habit of taking too many touches or complicating the situation.

Below is a micro-example that illustrates that very point — Jones should play Mac Allister through after his first touch, but instead takes two more touches, the passing lane is closed, and he is forced to turn back.

Evaluation of Spurs Game —

My Twitter timeline was flooded with negativity post the Spurs game. For me, considering the context of the season, that game was a ‘result’ game rather than a performance game. Regardless of Spurs’ struggles, playing Spurs away can be a daunting task, especially for a team like Liverpool that has suffered for the majority of the season. The result was paramount. I also don’t think the performance was as bad as it was made out to be — there were some nice fluid moments, there were also some incredibly dull moments and stoppage time was torture to watch. Games like Wolves and Leeds will be a good litmus test to assess the actual fluidity of this team. That being said, it’s injury season.

I’ll leave you with this:
So, before you dismiss something as boring or irrelevant, remember, if you truly want to understand the present or yourself, you must begin in the past. You see, history is not simply the study of the past. It is an explanation of the present. — Paul Giamatti, The Holdovers

It’s strange. As bad as it is supporting a team that loses more often than it wins, it also offers a new experience as a fan. Perhaps, also a reality check. You start noticing little tactical changes and improvements made on a week-by-week basis. You begin appreciating every win a bit more. That being said, losing 6 out of 7 Premier League games, conceding 10 goals over 3 games and losing at Anfield in consecutive games with a 3-goal margin is historically bad Liverpool form, and frankly, unacceptable, especially if current squad quality (depth is another issue) is considered. Arne Slot is aware of that, and it’s about time the results change.

Liam Rosenior — one of my favourite coaches to follow right now — said in a podcast with The Athletic that he assesses his team based on the performance rather than the result. It is only fitting to do the same with Liverpool, despite their 3–0 and 4–1 losses to Nottingham Forest and PSV Eindhoven, respectively.

Nottingham Forest Game —

Setup & First 30 Minutes — 
The injury to Connor Bradley forced Arne Slot’s hand by lining up with Dominik Szoboszlai at right-back, Curtis Jones as a right interior midfielder, and Mohammed Salah at RW to create a 3-man triangle. This was a deliberate attempt to stretch the Nottingham Forest block on the outside rather than playing through it vertically.

It was perhaps also an attempt at bringing fluidity into Liverpool’s build-up, considering how stagnant and easily stoppable it was against Manchester City. To contextualise, Manchester City used Haaland to cut off the pass to Virgil Van Dijk, forcing Liverpool to play through Konate and Bradley. The usual sequence (as seen below) would be Konate → Bradley → down the line to Salah. The distances were too long and the angles too tight to make the ball stick. Liverpool must get back to basics — play between the lines, use movement to generate space and find the spare man. The Forest game didn’t illustrate any fixes in that regard, as Forest did not offer a press, and the first phase was conceded.

Coming back to the outside triangle, as discussed in the Burnley piece, one of the ways to break a sturdy block is to stretch it. Use overlapping runs on the outside to draw out a player; similarly, have a player in the half space at the same time. Players at the edge of the box also help in ‘collapsing the defence’ (an NBA term which I find to be really applicable in football). That’s what the Szoboszlai, Jones and Salah dynamic was able to offer — it helped shift bodies towards Jones and Szoboszlai, leaving Salah in 1v1 situations, something that he doesn’t always find himself in, as he will often be shadowed by at least 2 players. In the first 20 minutes, he was deadly. Salah could’ve easily had 2–3 assists. I still think his 1v1 play this season has been subpar — he is taking heavy touches, taking too long on the ball, overstriding, and often showing too much of the ball, leading to a lot of dispossessions.

Liverpool also tried to replicate a similar dynamic on the left-hand side with Kerkez providing overlapping and underlapping runs (depending on where the space is). Often, Gakpo would turn to his trademark cut inside move, but the times when he found Kerkez, the dynamic seemed to function. Mac Allister was in proximity to them to provide support.

Issues -
While Liverpool were able to generate advantages through their outside-triangle, my view is that the playstyle is too width-oriented. Alexander Isak is often left isolated and without the ball. The wingers are not dynamic enough (especially Gakpo) to carry the load of a width-dominant system.

In the image below, Szoboszlai has plenty of space in front of him to drive into. He can also play a pass to Mac Allister or Isak as they run closer to him. Instead, he takes a touch on his outside and looks to utilise the width.

Predictability of Play — PSV Eindhoven
Against PSV, with Jones at right-back and Szoboszlai in the midfield, Liverpool made a deliberate attempt to revert to build-up principles from last year. Play slower, bait the press, shorten the distances, use counter-movements — the goal was to build through the centre to then isolate the wingers. It was much better. The first 45 minutes were again, in my view, a solid half of football (barring Virgil Van Dijk’s inexplicable corner moment).

If I were to be critical, my issue is like the one I had v Forest. If the goal is to play through the centre, to then isolate the wingers, it is once again too predictable a style of play. It worked splendidly last season as Liverpool had 3 very able wingers, one of whom had a historically good season. This season, Liverpool has one less winger. Gakpo has always had predictability issues with his patented cut inside move. Salah has been nowhere near his peak level this season. The wingers don’t seem to have the dynamism. So then, the issue becomes, how does Liverpool maximise the amount of ball possession they have? To me, the answer lies with Florian Wirtz and Isak. Using the half-spaces and the space in-behind in the centre is the next step for evolution. Right now, any evolution seems ambitious. I would like to see the basics out-of-possession and defensively executed, if that means sacrificing in-possession ambition.

Out-of-Possession Approach — PSV Eindhoven
Liverpool had a simpler out-of-possession system. In their press, they went man to man, the issue was at times the intensity of the press, especially with Ekitike nursing a back spasm at the start of the 2nd half. In the 2nd half, PSV also excelled at playing to the spare man. Below is a great example, Mac Allister engages with the goal-keeper (meaning there is a spare man), Kerkez can’t step up onto the left-back as he is pinned by the winger. The goalkeeper finds the spare man very well.

In settled possession, Liverpool resorted to a mid-block. The 2nd goal is a great illustration of the lack of organisation and focus. Salah is too easily dribbled past, and then there are no bodies behind him to cover the space, leaving plenty of time for a great pass in behind to Til.

Solutions -
1. My view is that Liverpool must stick to the man-to-man approach for the time being. It takes the complexity of a hybrid system or a zonal system out of the players’ minds. Right now, with the constant brain fades and muddled decision-making, you want to make the players’ lives as easy as possible. A man-to-man system is susceptible to two main issues: the first is that it thrives on individual matchups, so if a player loses an individual matchup, the structure can be compromised. Secondly, with the use of the goalkeeper in the first phase, there is often a spare man to be found. The second issue is one that Slot must be aware of — Liverpool must look to close off the pass to the spare man by blocking passing lanes or pressing to one particular side.

2. The mid-block approach that Arne Slot turns to in settled-possession must be more active and intense. The players must step out quicker by anticipating the trigger to begin the press. Further, there must also be constant movement to block passing lanes and shadow spaces behind jockeying players. I.e — Someone should’ve been shadowing the space behind Salah for that 2nd PSV goal.

The radical solution is that Slot turns to a low-block approach in settled possession. He used this against Real Madrid, for the reason that Madrid thrives by making runs in behind, which is often accessible through a mid-block due to the space behind the block. This is something that I don’t see him doing as it invites defensive pressure, but it has the possibility to tap into ideas of team unity — forcing everyone to work together and come behind the ball, rather than leaving the back 4 to deal with most of the space.

Defensive Mistakes — Forest & Eindhoven
My view is that it is unfair to attribute a large portion of the Forest and Eindhoven losses to Arne Slot. As flagged above, there are issues with his out-of-possession and in-possession strategies. But Liverpool have not conceded 7 goals in the last two matches because of those issues. Liverpool is making rookie defensive mistakes and brain fades that are hard to justify. Set-piece defending has been a major issue this season. Liverpool has a set-piece coach.

Take the PSV Eindhoven game as a case study:

Goal 1 — It is hard to justify what Virgil Van Dijk is doing here. A blatantly careless handball.

Goal 2 — This is perhaps the only goal that you can point to a coaching issue. The structure gets compromised far too easily. But, even then, Milos Kerkez should not be losing his man on an angled run that he had a lot of time to adjust to.

Goal 3 — Ibrahima Konate is going through a rut. For the sake of the team, Gomez needs a game or two to disrupt the rhythm. This goal was down to a complete misjudgement of a ball from him, having an airswing, allowing PSV to go through.

Goal 4 — Gakpo makes a hospital pass to Mac Allister. Mac Allister then loses his man, forcing VVD out of position (even then, I don’t know if VVD should be this out of position). Liverpool are then sliced apart.

These are careless goals. Arne Slot shouldn’t have to coach professional footballers on how to track runs, make simple passes or control the ball.

General Evaluation — Slot & Future
The pertinent question is whether Arne Slot should be sacked.

My concise view is that no, he shouldn’t be sacked. Post international break, I believe he has been severely let down by the players. Liverpool’s build-up has seen slight improvements since the Manchester City game; the football has been more fluid. Out-of-possession Slot has swayed from some of his principles, namely his funky zonal 4–2–4 and the front-line press of two that started the season. Injuries have come at an unfortunate time, too.

I don’t want to get into this issue in grand detail, but clearly, there is a mentality, confidence, and concentration issue with the players. It is hard to pinpoint a tangible reason for it, but the tragedy in the summer will certainly be playing into it. As Slot has said, Liverpool can never use that as an excuse, and that is true; it is unfair to do so.

The harsh truth is that Arne Slot has lost 9 out of his last 12 matches as Liverpool manager, and that is unacceptable. Going against popular belief, I don’t think he has lost the dressing room — I think the dressing room has lost its own footballing instincts. I think the team is playing dysfunctionally because senior players have lost form, new signings have not found form (this I will attribute to Slot, as to me it seems like there is no clear idea on how to get a player like Isak involved), and the constant run of bad results is causing mistakes out of pressure. But if Slot keeps losing games, he will be out of a job. Liverpool’s next three fixtures in the league are West Ham (A), Sunderland (H), and Leeds (A). Realistically, Liverpool should win all three. If Slot loses v West Ham or loses 2/3 of those fixtures, Liverpool will likely be bringing in a new manager.

Let’s see, plenty to ponder. It’s been a bad time, but to keep perspective, my view is that the squad is still incredibly talented, with a few profiles needed to take it to a higher level. But, even without those profiles, it is far too good a squad to maintain such a horrible run of form.

I’ll leave you with this:
I’ve failed over and over in my life and that is why I succeed — Michael Jordan

I will structure this portion of the piece by looking at 3 main categories of solutions that I find to be effective against low defensive structures. First, I will examine what pace of play is most effective. Second, what sort of rotations are effective in stretching a block or allowing a team to play through a block? Thirdly, I will look at some novel solutions that can be peppered into a team’s strategy to add variance to their play. I will speak about all of this using Liverpool’s performance v Burnley as a reference point — analysing where it went well and where the Reds lacked cutting edge.

Part 1: Pace of Play —

To clarify, the concept of ‘pace of play’ is a combination of how quickly a player releases a ball (I.e, how much time/touches after receiving the ball to play another pass) but also, how fast the pass is made — referring to the speed of the actual pass.

For Liverpool, in that first half, both were shockingly slow. I saw a clip of Hugo Ekitike urging the pace of play to increase. I’m not sure what minute that clip was from, but that is probably the best summation of the first half.

My view is that against a low block, the pace of play must be varied. At times, you have to play quicker, and at times, you have to slow it down and recycle the ball. It is about understanding when.

One of the main situations where there is merit to play quickly is when there is an open player in space. If you play the ball quickly to that player, they can then use the space in front of them to run at the block. The other scenario is when there is a transitional moment and you know the opposition are going to work their socks off to get back into a settled shape — you have to maximise that situation, because such situations of a team being out of shape are a rarity.

Equally, it is necessary to play at a slower pace. Recycling the ball between your midfielders, wider players (wingers and fullbacks) and also the centre-backs at a slower pace is a great test of the positional discipline of the defensive team. Positional discipline is often associated with attacking play, but it is equally important when executing a low block system. Players can’t lunge out of order, nor can they leave space behind them or players untracked. The players must have immense spatial awareness to ensure all passing lanes that can compromise the structural integrity of the block are, well, blocked.

Naturally, under Arne Slot, Liverpool is becoming quite good at the slower-paced play. That slower pace play was not effective because of the congested rotations that they made, which I will get to. However, for a team that prides itself on verticality, directness and transitional moments, the pace of play was absurdly shocking. There were numerous occasions when there was an easy out-ball to Salah or there was a speed-up opportunity (where the speed of the ball goes from slow to quick) to a player between the lines, but Liverpool didn’t take it. It allowed Burnley to grow into the game and gain security within their block.

Part II: Rotations —

A rotation is simply put, a series of movements between players away from their original position or within the ‘boundaries’ of their original position (I.e, A striker pulling into the left central half space from the centre). For me, an effective rotation allows a player to connect with another player from their team, or for the rotating player to find themselves in space. Any other rotation is probably needless movement, unless it opens up space for another player.

1st Half:
One of the central issues in Liverpool’s play (alongside their lack of urgent pace of play) was a series of ineffective rotations, which meant that their players were not able to receive the ball in good positions or, let alone, receive the ball in a progressive position at all.

The image below is a good example of an ineffective rotation — Wirtz has pulled to around the left half-space, and Ekitike has also pulled towards the ball. Note the distance between the two — they are almost on top of each other. It would be foolish to assume that if Wirtz got the ball, Ekitike would just stay there. Nevertheless, it is an ineffective rotation; it does not provide a passing option of value to Gakpo, as even if he passes to Wirtz, there is no route beyond him.

Take the image below as another example. Gravenberch, Mac Allister and Wirtz are clearly interchanging the spaces they occupy in the middle of the park with each other. As of this moment, they are all in ‘no man’s land’. There is no effective passing option available to VVD and Konate; there is not enough urgency in pulling out and showing for the ball, merely allowing Burnley to reset back into their block.

This image presents a slightly different issue. The rotation made by Ekitike here to drop closer to the edge of the left-hand side of the box to show for the ball from Gakpo would normally be a good idea, but with a 3rd player at the edge of the box, it once again makes it almost impossible for him to receive the ball. Instead,he should look to the space on the outside of the three defenders.

2nd Half:
In the 2nd half, both pace and passing combinations improved. I want to stress that the two parts of this article are interrelated — an effective rotation is often effective because of the pace at which the rotation occurs and the pace at which the players combine with the ball when rotating.

Liverpool played more urgently and with greater pace in the 2nd half, which made their rotations look better, but also, the introduction of Connor Bradley led to a better dynamic on the right-hand side with Szoboszlai, himself and Salah. That is another undervalued aspect of football. Players just play better around certain players. They may understand each other better; a certain player’s movement may suit the other player, as it may open up desired spaces for them. That’s why I think the Szobo-Bradley-Salah RHS triangle succeeds.

Exhibit 1 (Image below) — Bradley rotates into the half space — pulling a defender with him, but also collapsing the block due to the pace at which Liverpool made this play. Collapsing the block is a term I’ve borrowed from the NBA jargon of ‘collapsing the defence’. In this scenario, I look at the unevenness of the last line (defenders are not in a straight line), and also, the lack of compactness between the last line and 2nd line. Because of these reasons, Szoboszlai is open at the edge of the box.

The play in the GIF below is one that I really like and is a testament to the great footballing IQ of Wirtz. He rotates from midfield into the half space to show for a pass to Salah. Salah connects with him, Wirtz drags two players with him and then instantly realises that because he has attracted two players, the space at the edge of the box is free for Conor Bradley, and he quickly passes to him.

A classic right-hand side triangle play between Szobo-Salah and Bradley. Salah collects the ball with back to goal, lays it off to Szoboszlai, who plays a through ball to Conor Bradley, who does Conor Bradley things by driving at a rapid pace at the Burnley defence, turning this play into a fierce transitional moment. Another very key component — having players who are adept at driving at defences, which will open up space, but also the directness of their actions will usually generate transitional moments as organisation is hard to maintain amidst chaos.

Part 3 — Novel Solutions

I’ll keep this part brief and less analytical.

Novel Solution 1 — 
Pep Guardiola has previously spoken about the need to use the space in front of low blocks more effectively. (Sorry, I struggled to find a link to where he said this — but just trust me bro). As low blocks retreat deep towards their own goal, they cede territory to the opposition in front of them. Use it. Take long shots. You never know.

Novel Solution 2 — 
Liverpool tried this solution with poor execution. Crosses. Crossing allows the attacking team to essentially cross over the block and forego the issue of playing through the block. It is a great strategy to add variance to play.

To conclude, Liverpool’s win v Atletico Madrid and Everton were of promise. The first two goals v Atletico are a great example of utilising some of the proposed solutions above. The infamous Atleti wall was caught by surprise.

The attacking players seemed to gel more, and seeing the likes of Wirtz and Isak combine was thrilling. The central issue remains defensive intensity and concentration, as we discussed in the Bournemouth game. As Slot said, the team needs to understand that moments can change the momentum of a game. I’ll be back after Palace (I actually will).

Enjoy.

It is only fitting to start with Diogo Jota. The heartwarming (and breaking) rendition of You Never Walk Alone at the start of the game audibly drew a ‘God, I love this football club’ out of me. The line that stood with me was Arne Slot saying that when it was 2–2, he wished he had Jota to turn to. Salah crying in front of the Kop as the background resonates with ‘Oh, his name is Diogo’ will certainly stick with me. This is a team that has been pushed to the brink of high-performance amidst harrowing grief. For Jota, Ekitike’s tumbling run past a few defenders was the perfect tribute, and so was Salah chasing down a ball that he had no right to chase down. Diogo Jota — a striker who scored goals that didn’t make sense. An artist in that sense. I penned a detailed tribute to him a few weeks ago.

I will now turn to the tactical takeaways from an enthralling Premier League opener against a side who I love watching, courtesy of Andoni Iraola.

Out-Of-Possession:
An underrated aspect of this game for me was the out-of-possession (OOP) battle between both teams.

Bournemouth started with a two-man shadow facing the centre-backs, aiming to guard the passes to the Liverpool pivot. The goal of this minimal front-line pressure was to keep a +1 in the back line against Liverpool’s imperious final line quality and also have men on Wirtz and Szoboszlai, respectively. This is one element that I believe is critical in out-of-possession analysis — what is the scheme aiming to achieve? An OOP setup will have its flaws, but coaches may choose to persist with it because they believe in the upside.

The issue with Bournemouth’s two-man front line pressure was that it was incredibly easy to use the back three to find Mac Allister as the spare man. At times, Alisson found him directly off a vertical pass.

Within the first five minutes, Iraola realised this issue and intensified his front-line pressure to three players. (Image seen below).

Liverpool coped with this quite proficiently, too. They used Alisson to bait the front-line into engaging with him, before he passed it to one of the centre-backs, who then played a diagonal into Mac Allister. The other options would be Wirtz and Szoboszlai, who would drop into the wider half spaces or Kerkez playing it down the line to Gakpo or a dropping Ekitike. Bournemouth often had issues in understanding who had to step-up to handle these rotations and their midfield marking was not very synchronised for most of the game.

Liverpool’s OOP — 
Before we discuss the changes to Liverpool’s OOP system, let’s contextualise Arne Slot’s basic out-of-possession principles. Last season, the main goal was to stop the opponent from building out centrally; as such, Slot deployed a front-line press with 4 players. The goal was to force the opposition wide, in which the midfielders would jump and the front four would back-press. I like to call this the ‘squeeze’.

Against Bournemouth, Salah and Ekitike were a split-pressing pair. Their job was to make the pass out wide/central as difficult as possible and try to disturb the passing lanes. Gakpo was deeper on the Bournemouth right-back, allowing Kerkez to stay focused on Semenyo. Wirtz and Szoboszlai picked up the double pivot.

I liked this set-up a lot more than the 4–2–4 press from last season. The half-space was the big issue with the 4–2–4. Maresca tormented Slot with his usage of his full-backs last season. This new setup allowed for numbers in midfield, which meant dealing with any half-space rotations was less difficult. This system also allows effective fluctuation between man-to-man and zonal pressure, depending on where the ball is.

The example below is the ‘squeeze’, which carries into this season. Nice. Ball forced out-wide to the left-back, Salah backpresses, Szoboszlai steps up, while also trying to shut the passing lane to the pivot. Working together in a zone.

All in all, last match was not the greatest litmus test for Liverpool’s pressing abilities. Bournemouth preferred to play direct to Evanilson or Semenyo, going over the press.

But I really loved the pressing IQ of Florian Wirtz and Hugo Ekitike. Especially, Ekitike. He was so adept at shutting down passing lanes, giving the centre-backs different looks by positioning his body at different angles. Wirtz was never caught lacking, but his engine was what stood out to me. Back-tracking, rotating, pressing, did it all.

Ekitike’s Goal — 
Speaking of Hugo Ekitike, I am going to try my utmost best to resist making any declarative statements about how good he is. All I will say is, I love how well-rounded a footballer he is. Various passing angles. Creates from different spaces in midfield. Makes clever runs. Seems to possess a goal-scoring instinct and can also thrive from wide. On top of the OOP intensity, he brings.

His goal is lovely for so many reasons. First of all, note where Ekitike receives the ball initially. (Image 1 below) He is in zones where you would traditionally see a left #8 operating. What impact does this have? It allows Wirtz to rotate into a higher central zone and Gakpo to make a more inwards run too. That causes Adams to follow Wirtz, and Diakite has already followed Ekitike. This means that the central zone in front of the box is practically vacant.

Then (as seen in Image 2 below), Wirtz slightly shows for the ball. Iraola shouts “Antoine, Antoine!” urging him (Semenyo) to close the passing lane to Wirtz. Diakite, worried by the open lane to Wirtz, and, perhaps unaware of the space for Ekitike behind him, drops off Ekitike a bit and almost aims to shadow both Wirtz and Ekitike’s passing lanes, obviously failing as there is too much space to deal with.

Mac Allister stays as composed as ever and sees the vacant space for Ekitike. Let’s summarise how this space was created. 1. Ekitike drops deep into midfield, causing Diakite to follow him. 2. This allows Wirtz to run around the centre and into the left half-space, causing a midfielder (Adams to follow him). 3. Wirtz then shows for the ball, causing Diakite to engage towards him as well. 4. This leaves plenty of space for Ekitike in behind as now both Diakite and Adams are more worried about the left half-space rather than the centre.

Ultimately, Ekitike, has a lucky rebound on his way to goal but calmly slots it home.

Rest-Defence — 
Now, the juicy part. For the past 7 days, most Liverpool-related analysis I have consumed has been related to rest-defence. While rest-defence is becoming a fairly mainstream analytical concept, I will still lay out the basic principles for those who are unaware of its meaning.

I remember listening to Jon Mackenzie explain it on a podcast with the boys from Devils in the Details a couple of seasons ago as they discussed Erik Ten Hag’s rest-defensive structure. I will choose to relay the explanation he gave. Jon correctly described it as the structure of your defensive players when the ‘rest’ of your team is attacking. I.e , What positions are your defenders and holding midfielders taking up to stop the danger of a transition if your attackers lose the ball? Or if you flip it — What is the rest of your team doing when you have the ball in the opposition’s final third?

It is a relative concept. Although full-backs have heavily attacking involvement these days, they should still be ready to help defensively with their respective wingers. For example, Andy Robertson should not exceed Semenyo’s position.

Liverpool’s Rest-Defensive Structure —

In principle, Liverpool’s rest-defence structure is fairly simple. Their two centre-backs navigate the central and half spaces in transition. Their goal is not to let any players behind them and to stay closely attached to central forwards or step up onto wingers running down the half-space. The full-backs should be attached to their respective winger. If they are heavily involved in the attack, the midfielders should adjust accordingly.

The single 6 should act as the ‘mop’. Stay outside the box, in front of the centre-backs, ready to jump in for a regain.

Bournemouth’s 1st Goal — 
I don’t think this goal can be attributed to poor rest defensive structure or inadequate counter-pressing mechanisms. Szoboszlai loses the ball in a situation where there is an overload on the right of him (2v1) and all his midfielders are on his left. Bournemouth regain the ball and play it down the right.

Despite this, Liverpool has a 3v3 (seen below). Robertson is tight to Semenyo. The issue wasn’t the structure; it was simply that Semenyo is much quicker than Robertson, and he also made a very nice angled run. Van Dijk also can’t do much as he is tasked with Evanilson.

2nd Goal — 
This goal slightly worries me. Robertson is higher than Semenyo (his assignment). All 3 midfielders are within the box, meaning there is no mop. Therefore, it is VVD & Konate vs the rest.

On a macro level, this season, Liverpool has players who can combine in various ways. We are seeing a lot of one-touch passing, but also passes that threaten the final line (as Slot pointed out). All in all, there is a higher level of dynamism. As such, the question I will always be referring to when analysing the goals Liverpool concede is — where did they lose the ball? Should they have had a structure to deal with a loss of possession? Or was it simply because the players made a bad decision and therefore lost the ball in a fatal situation?

I think that is the more fitting analysis. Rather than blaming the rest-defensive structure (which does have a few issues), the more worrying part is the trade-off that their attacking dynamism has with their defensive solidity.

Arne Slot’s Interview — 
If you don’t believe me, listen to the man himself.

1. More players who are looking for a riskier final pass → Trade-off: Games can be more prone to transitions due to ball losses in the final third → Upside: More goals, more chances, more relentless pressure (more of the ball). Slot’s ideal vision.

2. Ryan Gravenberch’s importance in “these moments”. Slot here is referring to the transitional moments as seen in the 2nd goal. What would Gravenberch contribute? The mop. He would’ve been behind the ball when it was lost, rather than in the box and would’ve likely been able to contest a duel, track a run or take a foul.

3. Better balance in risk v reward. This is what I was mentioning earlier. Liverpool’s dynamism, shorter, quicker passing combinations must be relative to where they are on the pitch. There are certain zones where experimentation should perhaps be banned. Losing the ball in those areas could prove fatal to Liverpool’s chances of keeping clean sheets and winning games.

4. Slot’s analysis of Bournemouth’s 2nd goal. Mentions Bournemouth’s running intensity, how their players outran Liverpool’s. Also, briefly mentions how Robertson is probably too high and there is one too many midfielders near the attacking box.

St James Park — 
Thinking about this game gives me goosebumps and shivers. Excitement and nervousness. The atmosphere is going to be raucous. In possession-wise, I think we are better suited to dealing with Newcastle’s intensity. It is difficult to retain intensity against a structure that can generate so many different spaces, which is what Wirtz and Ekitike have allowed Liverpool to do.

On the other hand, the transition and second balls do worry me.

Milos Kerkez is also a player I will continue to keep my eye on.

Specifically,
1. His positioning in the defensive line. How many runs behind him does the opposition make? I feel at times he is too square on and Bournemouth made a lot of runs in behind him.

2. Defensive IQ. Knowing when to go to ground and when not.

Till next week, have a good one. I’ll leave you with this.

You learn something from everyone, even the bad coaches because they tell you something and you think, ‘I’ll never do that in the future.’ — Luis Enrique

Awful. The emotional cycle, I call it. You have the same thoughts over and over again, with no constructive answer to any of them. Try to move on with your day, which you inevitably do, because that’s life. When it isn’t your family member or your close friend, why should you grieve? I find that question to be very strange. Yes, Jota didn’t know me personally, nor did I know him personally. But I knew of him in a very close proximity. I watched him at work for over five years. I watched him in front of a camera for over 5 years. I like to call it a ‘football family’. The Liverpool players and staff are a part of an immediate family line, while the Liverpool fans are part of the extended family. So, of course, it hurts when a member of your extended family passes.

Coming to Jota. I’ve reflected on how to best describe him as a player. Football artistry or beauty is always associated with those with incredibly silky touches, ball movement, footwork, perfectly weighted and efficient passes, finesse fashion. Think Messi, Yamal, Henry, Pirlo, Zidane. So is it outrageous that I’m about to propose Diogo Jota as a ‘football artist’? I think there was a beautiful, chaotic efficiency with the way the Portuguese star played. Think of an NBA player navigating through double or triple screens, driving to the paint, before pulling up for a mid-range. It doesn’t always look pretty, but that final action is so ruthlessly efficient. That’s Jota. The way he got inside the box, often dribbling past numerous defenders, fans staring in disbelief at how the defender hasn’t got the ball or how Jota still has enough balance to keep running, that was the chaos. The finish was ruthless, efficient, pure. Beautiful chaotic efficiency.

I think inevitability is a very positive emotion to associate with a sports player. I’m an avid sports fan, and a few of my favourite players provide me with emotions of inevitability. Virat Kohli in his peak, it was inevitable he was going to score a century. Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, it is inevitable he will drop 30+ points, it is inevitable he will score multiple mid-ranges a game. Diogo Jota, at times, gave you that feeling of inevitability. Whenever he was in a decent goal-scoring position, the shot would inevitably be on target. Most of the time, it was inevitable that the ball would be in the back of the net.

Now, coming to Diogo. The person. As I said, I don’t know him. But it feels like I do. From the various content he has done for Liverpool or Wolves or the media, there was always a sense of ‘Ah, what a good bloke’. He was always smiling, trying to make someone laugh, making a joke, at times a purposely awful joke. Aren’t those the best jokes? You could feel the vibrant energy seeping through the screen. He felt relatable. Maybe, because he was. Just another human whose dream was to play football. He wasn’t the generational prodigy that the footballing gods blessed. But he worked for his dream. Got to the limelight and maximised his skillset. Isn’t that everyone’s dream? To just try their best, with the best intentions and maximise their potential. Leave no regrets. That’s one thing I’m fairly confident Diogo Jota would have been able to say — that he has no regrets in his career. It was cut devastatingly short, but he always left it all out there. No wonder Klopp signed him. Mentality monster.

To his family, close friends and anyone who knew him personally, no words will be enough. Even time, as they say, the best healing force, may not be enough. But, I hope, in time, the memories of an incredibly vibrant human are the prominent memories.

I’ll leave you with this:

Life is only precious because it ends, kid. — The Son of Neptune, Rick Riordan.

Yes, Diogo and Andre, you will never walk alone. Rest in Peace. #20.

What Gareth Southgate has tried to do is, ironically, what fans have asked him to do for years — play the best players instead of sticking to his usuals in Kalvin Phillips and Jordan Henderson. To be fair, he has done that, he has attempted to fit Phil Foden and Jude Bellingham within his system together and also given Trent Alexander-Arnold a birth in midfield, a role they have been planning for ‘over a year’. He has created roles for his system. Should an international manager who has very little on-pitch training time with players be moulding player roles to fit his system, or should the manager be catering the system towards the roles his best players are best suited to and fill in the blanks around them?

Being Southgate is not easy though, and to his credit, I think what he has tried to start this tournament was worth a shot.

Convolution of Player Profiles:
England line-up in a 4–2–3–1 system with Declan Rice and Trent-Alexander Arnold forming a double-pivot with Foden, Bellingham and Saka ahead of them.

In build-up, it can resemble a similar shape (seen below). However, Jude Bellingham and Phil Foden have the freedom to drop deep and connect with the players to shorten the distances and create more available passing options which helps in circulating the ball more fluidly. Often, Harry Kane will also drop into midfield.

The positions of Kyle Walker and Kieran Trippier can vary. In possession, especially in the first phase, Kyle Walker is quite conservative and is often still deeper within his half. This is one of the first issues of incompatibility. Bukayo Saka loves a full-back who overlaps or underlaps with him. Ahem, Ben White. He also loves a full-back who feeds him down the line so Saka can run at the defenders on their inside or outside. Kyle Walker does not consistently provide any of these.

Yes, he is rapid and often has dashes of speed shown by his surging vertical runs, but it is not consistent enough for Saka to form an imperious connection with him. Most of Saka’s positive moments in the first two games have come from midfield distribution either by Trent, Rice, Bellingham or even Kane when he drops deeper and pings his diagonal.

Kieran Trippier does push up a little higher and wider in the build-up, but his issue is fairly obvious. He is a left-back with a right foot. In a game of margins, the angles do him dirty. To connect with Phil Foden in an incisive manner becomes tough. For me, that entails playing passes down the line, playing passes in the half-space, in behind, or in between the lines as Foden runs towards the central pockets. Trippier can play some of these angles with his right foot, but because of the time lag it takes to set up the angle on his right foot, the pass is fairly predictable and ultimately the secure passing option is taken.

Trent-Alexander Arnold:
These issues are a prelude to the rest of the issues. Trent needs runners for his diagonal pass, which neither Foden nor Tripper can provide. His diagonal pass is most effective when wider and outside the block. This is something that Jurgen Klopp discovered after his initial Pep Ljinders-driven experiment of moving Alexander-Arnold into midfield in settled possession (RB out of possession). At times at Liverpool you would even see the extreme of Trent tucking as a third player in the back-line in the build-up to get a complete view of the pitch — quarter-back ‘esque’ proving to be an effective tactic to disrupt man-to-man presses.

Under Southgate, Trent is usually right in the middle of the pitch, making shorter passing choices in front of him. Psychologically, curtailing his creativity probably leads to some of the rasher passing choices he made in the Denmark game.

The below image is a great example of the type of profile Trent needs to thrive, especially, if his role is limited to only the centre of the pitch. Runners. Gordon, Bowen, Saka and Watkins.

At full-back or in a hybrid role between inverting and running down the flank in a right-sided triangle (Salah, Szoboszlai and Trent) he can provide other options, whether they are overlaps, underlaps, early deep crosses or crosses from the flank.

Bellingham & Foden:
Initially, the rationale behind keeping Bellingham in the centre of the pitch seemed a no-brainer. It is where he thrived with his surging runs into the box at Madrid, it is where he was out-of-possession at Madrid, especially in the latter stages of the Champions League where his attacking prowess became a little more curtailed. It seemed the perfect foil to Harry Kane who loves to drop deeper into midfield leaving space for Bellingham to run into when he drops deeper.

The trade-off to this call was that Phil Foden who has thrived in the central pockets all season, earning him Premier League Player of the Season was thwarted on the left-hand side with a sub-optimal relationship with his full-back.

The below play is a good example of the connections between Bellingham & Foden that either occur in transitional moments or when England are settled enough in possession to be able to rotate fluidly. This is when Foden’s most incisive moments have also come (rattling the woodwork) from a central rotation.

Before the tournament, I was of the view that Bellingham has been one of the best in Europe at his central role, so why change it? Now, the time has come to change it. If Southgate is to persist with the same system, which in all likelihood, he will, it is worth trying Bellingham in the left space as his ability to control the ball deeper and glide past defenders is a superior quality to Foden, encouraging more involvement even from the left-hand side. However, Bellingham can also use the left half-space to make his surging runs, something that Foden doesn’t prefer, but rather prefers to be on the ball in and around the central pocket to create.

Harry Kane:
Harry Kane criticism is a bit lazy. The deficiencies in his profile have been known for years — when he was at Tottenham, in other major tournaments and even at times for Bayern Munich. He needs players that can connect with him either in behind, down the wing or in short proximity. He is not as one-dimensional as a trademark centre-forward who is in and around the box to be on the end of final balls. He loves to get involved and connect passes from deeper positions to start attacks before he runs into his finishing position.

As with Trent, he requires runners who are willing to connect with him. Bellingham is the prime option for that with his surging box runs, but this tournament that run has not come often, especially when Kane has dropped deeper.

Case Study — Saka & Kane

Out-Of-Possession Issues:
England has had their creativity and stagnancy issues in possession, but, they have created chances. Out-of-possession (OOP) it has been two alarming performances where sides that should really not be dominating periods of the game consistently have been doing so, finding easily accessible solutions to England’s ‘half’ press and settled defensive structure.

OOP, England attempted to use their front four to try to mark and press the double-pivot and the back 3 build-up of Denmark. Why? The goal is to push the ball out wide to the spare-full back (avoiding playing through the press), and then, when the ball goes out wide to the spare full-back, they look to close him down, limit his passing options and either regain the ball or ensure Denmark reset their play.

However, the fundamental issue is that England doesn’t seem committed enough to the cause. Ralf Ragnick said it best, there is no point pressing without a full team-wide intention to press.

England’s passes per defensive action (PPDA), an indicator of a team’s ability to regain the ball (lower PPDA’s usually associated with a more intense press) ranks as the third-worst in the tournament, allowing close to 23 passes per defensive action. When they aren’t aggressive enough, there is space left behind and a loose runner, making it easy to find a solution in the first phase. To an extent, it seems Southgate is aware of this and perhaps why he is so reliant and adamant that they can’t replace what Phillips and Rice brought together as a double-pivot combination, in which, they essentially mopped up all the space behind the forward press and dealt with any issues.

Below, is a good example of England’s OOP breaking down. As a whole, the approach seemed more reactive to where the pass was played, rather than a strategy to nullify attacking patterns.

A key trend in muddled OOP performances is when teams are caught between mid-block principles and pressing principles, often due to players being too eager to regain the ball (perhaps, due to not having the ideal control over a match) or reacting to incorrect triggers.

The series of images below is a vivid illustration. Kane, Foden and Rice are looking to close their man aggressively. Rice and Foden essentially step up onto the same man. While, Trent is in behind closing the space in his double-pivot role, Saka and Bellingham are not engaged, another ineffective sign of a block. What occurs is that Rice’s over-commitment leaves a massive space behind, allowing a pass into the last line.

If Bellingham was engaged, he could’ve closed the option on number 21 and Rice would’ve perhaps been incentivised to continue to sweep the space behind with Trent. It would’ve left the two full-backs on each touchline available for a pass but that is a space that England are willing to concede as they can shift to close that space down while staying in their block. This pass here essentially breaks half their block.

Ultimately, the issue is that, particularly after taking the lead, England cannot exercise control over a game and maximise their attacking rotations without dominating consistent periods of the game. Their failure to control sides against the ball is a significant contributor.

Against Serbia, Pickford played the ball long almost twice as often as he did in the first half, indicative of the lack of passing options and control of the ball England had in their lifeless second-half performance.

The game-state contributes to this. England have started games on a relatively bright note, but after, leading have fallen quite deep and struggled to gain any control.

What Next?

This is a line-up that intrigues me. Can become a 4–2–3–1 out-of-possession, but in-possession, with Shaw’s return he can take up a higher and wider position on the left, allowing Foden to drift into the central spaces alongside Bellingham. Kane can drop deep and have enough players to connect with, while Bellingham can continue to thrive in his central profile.

Trent-Alexander-Arnold can return to a more natural and suited position at right-back and he and Bukayo Saka can build on a connection that seems promising. Adam Wharton is in the line-up to circulate possession, considering how good he is at ensuring the first pass is forward.

If Shaw isn’t fit for the foreseeable future, it will be interesting to see what Southgate does — does he shift Bellingham to the left? Does he remove Foden altogether and opt for runners in Gordon? It seems pretty likely that he will turn away from Trent Alexander-Arnold in midfield.

England has the squad depth to tinker with their tactics and find solutions to their problems, but once again it will come down to the flexibility that the manager is willing to show.

Enjoy this tournament madness folks!

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It was a week of typical Jurgen Klopp brilliance. A timely reminder of his greatness and a festive lesson to Liverpool fans — gratitude. It had all the colours.

The typical Klopp headline-grabbing press conference in the lead-in to a big clash: “If you are not in the right shape, give your ticket to somebody else… We need Anfield on Saturday”. Genius.

The power of intangibles such as crowd atmosphere is constantly undervalued in understanding football games. Why can a team like Manchester City, who have won practically everything, not find great success at Anfield? To put this down to tactics is clearly not correct. The tactics have worked effectively everywhere else. The players are humans. Humans feel emotions and at Anfield, perhaps the opposition feels such intense emotions that puts them off their game. On the flip side, Liverpool feels such intense emotions that play right into their ‘intensity’ brand of football.

Klopp knew he needed the crowd on Saturday. Not because he thought his Liverpool were inferior to Arsenal, but because, his Liverpool could become superior to Arsenal on that given night despite their tactical deficiencies.

Motivation is part of coaching, but let’s focus on Klopp’s actual coaching brilliance.

Liverpool’s First Phase:

To understand the magnitude of the challenge that faced Liverpool in its first-phase build-up, let’s unravel the context.

Liverpool’s build-up has struggled in balancing directness with safe ball-progression, while, facing troubles in executing the ideal rotations to prevent their double-pivot being isolated from their interiors and forwards. Against Chelsea, they had 37% possession, Klopp described them as “being in a rush” and this was the peak of their hyper-directness. In the following games, Liverpool began to reveal their fluidity, especially down the right-hand side with Dominik Szoboszlai, Trent Alexander-Arnold and Mohamed Salah.

The role of Trent Alexander-Arnold was one that the coaching team continued to experiment with. He would still mostly be within the double-pivot to form a box midfield, but at times he would find himself in the right half-space just outside the block, maximising his ability to receive facing towards the opposition goal. An idea that started to emerge particularly after the last international break was TAA’s position in between Van Dijk and Konate — as a third CB in the build-up allowing him to have full field vision for any long balls but more importantly, allowing him to dictate the build-up play.

The major issue that still plagued Liverpool was fluency in the build-up, particularly under pressure. The disastrous first half for Liverpool and Wataru Endo against Crystal Palace is a prime example. In the Manchester City game, Liverpool had 10 high turnovers against City’s aggressive pressing scheme.

Arsenal’s Press:

The challenge becomes even tougher when you are facing Arsenal, who perhaps just had one of their most imperious pressing and out-of-possession performances against Brighton. De Zerbian build-up principles have taken the Premier League by storm over the last season and a half. Brighton has one of the highest buildup pass completion rates in the Premier League at close to 90%. Arteta says who cares? 11 turnovers, a man-to-man press that was a treat to the eyes. The concept of switching and covering was as nuanced as a well-drilled NBA side. It was beautiful.

markstats on Twitter: "Arsenal's high press totally dismantled the 'best buildup in the world' pic.twitter.com/OuClFqjKAx / Twitter"

Arsenal's high press totally dismantled the 'best buildup in the world' pic.twitter.com/OuClFqjKAx

So, What Happened?

As I said earlier, Klopp coached brilliantly.

The main issue Liverpool would’ve faced is the isolation of Wataru Endo in the build-up, especially if Arsenal were to persist with an aggressive man-to-man press (turns out they didn’t). Here (image below), Dominik Szoboszlai drops into a double pivot alongside Wataru Endo providing both the ball-playing centre-backs with a passing option, but also, allowing Trent Alexander-Arnold to push higher up the field.

The main principle that characterised Liverpool’s build-up was to rotate into spare space. Numerous times, Van Dijk or Trent would be gesturing for Endo, Jones or Konate to come closer or to drop into the vacant space. As a result, the structure did have semblances of fluidity.

The below image captures the essence of Liverpool’s build-up. In the preceding seconds, Trent gestures for Jones to tuck in closer to the centre, noting the space behind the Arsenal front-pressing line. Trent is in a half-space position outside the block (another one of his various positions). A box midfield is formed and Konate is the spare man. His ball-playing abilities in this match were pivotal to Liverpool’s build-up looking more coherent. In this instance, he spots the timidity in Arsenal’s press and plays the line-breaking pass to Jones who can carry the ball forward.

Principle — Rotate into space, find the space and progress the ball forward.

It would’ve been interesting to see how Liverpool would’ve coped if Arsenal’s press was as aggressive as it was against Brighton.

Trent-Alexander Arnold:

This topic doesn’t deserve too much time. There isn’t a debate anymore. Trent Alexander Arnold is a world-class playmaker, a world-class deep playmaker, and a world-class passer of the football.

The main positive that has come from Trent’s play this season has been his tactical versatility, in-game IQ and an enhancement in the execution of his world-class abilities.

Liverpool’s goal which was set up by one of the best passes of the season, from Trent Alexander-Arnold sums it up perfectly.

Here, Trent notes that the double pivot is marked, as such, he gestures with his arm for Konate to move into the RCB role so Trent can jump in between both the centre-backs.

Now, the Liverpool star has a full vision of the field. He spots Salah calling in for a run behind Zinchenko. Executes the pass perfectly and the Egyptian King is up to his usual brilliance. A goal of individual brilliance. Perfectly sums up Trent Alexander Arnold’s ability and Liverpool’s ability to always stay in games through their elite individual talent.

The next evolution in Trent’s game is perhaps more nuanced build-up control. Currently, the essence of his game is to attempt to control the build-up and always be on the lookout for highly direct, line-breaking passes from the various positions he finds himself in. In the final phase, he likes to be in and around the box to give himself the best chance to contribute towards goal-scoring opportunities.

He was the most incisive player on the pitch but also lost the ball the most times.

markstats on Twitter: "Trent Alexander-Arnold, tonight's most threatening player on the pitch, also leading in unsuccessful passes. High risk - high reward, epitomizing the essence of this Liverpool pic.twitter.com/dS3xOGYqM4 / Twitter"

Trent Alexander-Arnold, tonight's most threatening player on the pitch, also leading in unsuccessful passes. High risk - high reward, epitomizing the essence of this Liverpool pic.twitter.com/dS3xOGYqM4

His defensive ability in 1v1 situations cannot be understated. At times, his body positioning can still be awkward but against Arsenal he came away with 6 recoveries and was a pivotal part of Martinelli not being able to enjoy success (obviously, Konate was the main reason).

The Press Narrative:

One of the other satisfying takeaways for Liverpool in this match and generally from the whole of December is that traits of their peak pressing and counter-pressing intensity are being seen again. The first 15–20 minutes of the 2nd half, was typical Klopp football. Soak it in. The likes of Curtis Jones and Dominik Szoboszlai were brilliant OOP and Liverpool’s very own new duel-winner, Wataru Endo stepped up with one of his most impressive performances in a Liverpool shirt.

The narrative leading into this match was about Arsenal’s world-class out-of-possession hybrid press set-up, usually alternating from a man-to-man high press into a mid-block. Surprisingly, the pressing set-up was relatively timid especially compared to how they played against Brighton.

Tactics are all about trade-offs. The trade-off of persisting with the aggressive man-to-man press would be that it would’ve left a lot of isolated 1v1 situations and players with the technical calibre of Jones, Szoboszlai and Salah could’ve profited off those situations and got into space after getting past their man, leaving Arsenal vulnerable to quick attacks.

Arteta may have thought this was too big of a risk to take and his press was significantly less aggressive. The goal seemed to be to use the front line to screen passes into the interiors, however, when Arsenal were caught in the flux between pressing and shadow marking, the ball-playing skills of Konate and VVD caught them out. The best stat to indicate this was that Arsenal’s defensive action height was 41.7m, the lowest for them this season. They allowed Liverpool to make 12 deep entries, the 2nd highest they have conceded this season.

markstats on Twitter: "After an impressive pressing display against Brighton, Arsenal followed up with their most timid out-of-possession game this season pic.twitter.com/OJiWTioj4o / Twitter"

After an impressive pressing display against Brighton, Arsenal followed up with their most timid out-of-possession game this season pic.twitter.com/OJiWTioj4o

Mid-Season Reflections:

For Liverpool to end the halfway point of the Premier League season and 2023 in first place is remarkable. With the tactical deficiencies they have shown at various points in this season, the lack of an elite defensive midfield profile at the start of the season, and questions over defensive depth — they shouldn’t be at the top.

But as good coaches and good teams do, they made the most of their resources. Mac Allister and Endo have filled the defensive midfield role, Endo especially has been a revelation and has grown into this team very nicely.

The emergence of Jarell Quansah and the resurgence of Joe Gomez has been extremely promising. Jurgen Klopp continued to back his guns with the 2 man rest- defence, to be frank, it does leave Liverpool exposed but perhaps with the current profiles and the use of an unconventional box midfield, Liverpool no longer require that left-footed centre-back.

The January transfer window will be an interesting one. The mind still says that a defensive midfield profile is needed, a traditional winger to bolster the attack would be further beneficial. But, knowing the FSG strategy and Liverpool’s current results, the move will only be made if it is a clear fit.

If Liverpool does go on to win this title, it may perhaps be one of the great achievements of Klopp’s illustrious career.

Have a fruitful 2024, folks!

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High Press:

Pochettino’s style is synonymous with a high-pressing structure. With Chelsea, the opposition’s back-line is pressed by Chelsea’s four attackers (4–2–3–1). They will wait for a pressing trigger before picking a player up — however, the task is to not simply crowd the player that they are marking. If the player they are marking is in possession of the ball, the attackers are entrusted with effective shadow-marking, in which they must tilt their body position to limit the spare passing option. It can be analogised to a makeshift hybrid press*, but the fundamental goal is to ensure that the press isn’t broken by players that drop deep.

Against Brighton, the Argentinian manager stuck with his aggressive press (image below), something Brighton, in fact, wants the opposition to do as they are able to play through the press with spare players in vertical spaces — however, Chelsea were brave enough to have their midfielders within the double pivot follow spare players deep into the opposition half, while, at times that wasn’t necessary as the spare player was inaccessible due to effective shadow marking from the Chelsea front-line.

The image above shows three of Chelsea’s four attacking outlets pressing Brighton’s back-line and pivots, there is however a spare centre-back as the right midfielder is occupied with the right-back in the top right of the image. However, Nkunku’s body positioning and shadow-marking ensures that option is inaccessible. How does Brighton counter this? Rotations and constant movement — the goal is to always have an option to break the press. De Zerbi primarily prefers vertical passing options, in an attempt to break ‘through’ the press. The result is that Gallagher has to follow a Brighton midfielder deep into his own half — an aggressive option due to the gaps it leaves behind. Full-backs will also rotate between wide and compact positions based on the situation of the game. This ensures that Chilwell will have to man-mark one of the Brighton full-backs, and in this scenario, he is hyper-aware of the run from the midfielder and is trying to cut off that pass too. This isn’t a fool-proof solution in dealing with spare players and constant rotations, however, it is an organised way to make Brighton’s build-up phase as chaotic and rushed as possible.

If the press is broken, which is a strong possibility in the early weeks of Pochettino’s tenure as players adapt to the pace of the game, the necessary triggers and the positions they must take, then Chelsea are set up with a back three, at times a back four depending on the opposition system and if the full-back must be occupied higher up the pitch pressing a spare player. However, the Chelsea manager's goal is to retain control of the ball within the opposition's half, to suffocate their build-up and use a higher line, in the first few weeks, the back-line will be set up in a more cautious way than Pochettino ball in its prime.

The image below is a prime example of the inconsistency in pressing. There are two players converging on the same player (player on the ball), as such, one of them is rushing back to cover the other man, however, he is already covered. Nkunku should be a bit deeper and attempt to block the pass off to number 26, however, his position is too close and his body not tilted enough. The pass is made, the press is broken and Dortmund now have clear space to further their build-up.

Settled-Defence:

When the press is broken and the opposition is in their half of the pitch, Chelsea adopt a 4–2–3–1 out of possession (OOP). It consists of a double pivot, which will be Enzo and either Gallagher or Santos, their role is to occupy the central zones. The left mid and right mid are key defensive cogs within the system — they are compact to ensure there aren’t too many central spaces, however, their body positioning is vital to prevent passes out wide. When passes out wide do occur, their job is to go follow the passes and help out the full-backs who are quite compact. Chelsea’s back four is quite compact, as such, support is needed in wider areas where there is the threat of overlaps.

Rest Defence:

Rest Defence refers to the attacking team’s structure in possession that enables them to react and defend effectively when possession is lost. It is becoming an increasingly prominent and important mechanism of the game, especially in the Premier League as the pack grows closer (other than Manchester City) due to resources, scouting and innovative coaches.

Chelsea’s rest-defence consists of a loosely-held 2–3 shape, in which the double pivot will continue to occupy central zones, in a more progressive position. While the central defenders will man-mark any of the front-line attackers. Against Brighton, Welbeck and Gross were man-marked. Chelsea like to have one of their full-backs providing width, with the other moving into a makeshift back three, however, dependent on the situation, this role may interchange or both may choose to push up.

Build-Up:

The most pivotal idea to Chelsea’s build-up is short passing that plays around opposition defensive structures. During the cooling breaks in the Premier League Summer Series, the tactical instructions of managers could be heard. The Chelsea manager urged numerous times for the ball to be played short rather than long. It makes sense. With the amount of attacking flare and depth Chelsea has — to primarily utilise a target man and forego the first phase build-up would perhaps be a waste.

In the first phase*, Chelsea is able to resist a high press through constant movement and rotations. One of the full-backs will push forward and hug the touch-line, and the other one will become a bit more central and act as another passing option. The attacking full-back also becomes a more progressive passing option.

However, one of the most fascinating things about Chelsea’s first phase build-up is the rotation amongst their pivots. A great example was their first goal against Brighton — both Santos and Gallagher were being man-marked by Brighton’s players, so it became difficult to pass the ball to them and create a move. The way they responded to this was they both rotated their position and switched sides, this bought them a bit of time as Brighton’s players communicated on which player to take. In this small portion of time, slight space opened up in the central zone to which Chukwuemeka came deep as a spare man. From there, Maatsen rotated to the centre to take up the role Chukwuemeka left, while Chukwuemeka surged into the left-half space as a give-and-go play. This is the blue-print behind succeeding with short-passing. He wants to be a very fluid and dynamic attacking system, where roaming is enabled, as long as there is a certain player within the required zone.

Nicholas Jackson:

Nicholas Jackson has been splendid in pre-season. His combinations with the likes of Nkunku have been exhilarating. His attacking profile under Pochettino is quite nuanced — at times he will act like the target man. But his most effective plays come when his back is towards the goal and comes a bit deeper in the build-up, holds the ball and is involved in give-and-go passes with the rest of the rotating attackers. His progressive carries rank in the 90th percentile, while successful take-ons are in the 81st percentile — he is clearly not a poacher but rather an active cog in a flourishing front line.

Christopher Nkunku:

Pochettino was heard instructing Nkunku in the Newcastle friendly that he wants his role to be more of a progressive, build-up midfielder rather than a second striker. It should end all discussion regarding Nkunku as a striking outlet, he will play in the 3-man-attacking midfield line, usually occupying the central or left position, but will constantly rotate between both spaces and at times take the central position when Jackson rotates deep. However, he must be involved. The manager clearly feels it is a waste of his creative flare to have Nkunku primarily occupied with goal-scoring in central zones. Nkunku was involved in 55% of Leipzig’s expected goals last season. Perhaps, he believes it is a waste to not use Nkunku’s nifty dribbling, and speed as a way to drive the short, give-and-go passing system that Chelsea thrives off.

Issues:

The goal Chelsea conceded against Newcastle in pre-season is a vivid example of how raw they are as a team under this new system. They certainly have the talents to make the system work, but relentless consistency may not be possible in the first half of the season. Chelsea has a compact back four in settled defence, meaning there is plenty of width — the former Spurs and PSG manager wants his left and right mid to help out in dealing with the width provided. However, they have quite attacking profiles in those positions, with the likes of Mudryk and Nkunku not always active in tracking back. As such, oppositions nullify the presence of Chelsea’s double-pivot by concentrating their build-up wider and as the full-back reacts and steps up to cover the wider space, having a runner in behind the full-back leading to a goal-scoring opportunity. The key seems to be playing with pace and catching Chelsea before the attacking midfielders are able to settle.

Pochettino is a master ideator. His systems are often dynamic and adapt to the opposition. What can instantly be noted through his pre-season framework is that Chelsea has become more fluid and organised, a stark contrast to last season. Fitness levels have improved and the trajectory is a positive one. Pre-season should only be used as a gauge of systemic ideas and issues, Chelsea’s level of play will be better clarified in their opening fixture against Liverpool.

*Hybrid-Press: Constant flux between a zonal approach and a man-oriented approach. Inter Milan 2022/23!
*First-Phase: Possession in the first third of the pitch, the beginning of the build-up phase.

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Analysing Mauricio Pochettino’s Tactics & Vision at Chelsea: Pre-Season was originally published in On a Hattrick on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.