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        <title><![CDATA[Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[A publication focussing on Indian foreign policy and culture. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter - Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Global Implications of a Digital India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/global-implications-of-a-digital-india-284947daefbd?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[digital-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[modernization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digitization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 11:27:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-06T11:27:52.111Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Associate editor </em><strong><em>Janhavi Modak</em></strong><em> explores the digitisation policies of India that aim to propel the country into an economic superpower and analyses the effects of this modernisation on India’s diplomatic efforts.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*nR3aXWwsOme3GBaE" /><figcaption>Two girls in a rural village in Rajasthan use an electronic tablet. CREDITS: UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND (UNDP)</figcaption></figure><p>India’s ‘Digital India’ initiative has emerged as a transformative force, leaving an indelible mark on global policy and economic dimensions. The technology-assisted aggregator model, catering to the expansive blue-collar workforce, has not only organised employment opportunities domestically but has fostered economic integration and people-to-people exchanges with neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan. This, coupled with the Neighbourhood First policy, positions India as a regional collaborator with significant implications for the 750 million internet users in the country. The ‘Digital Act 2023’, which replaced the old ‘Technology Act 2000’, has organised its goals under three main initiatives: ‘Make in India’, ‘Skill India’ and ‘Digital India’.</p><p>India’s global positioning has been fortified through these initiatives. The annual 2023 ‘Skill India’ report observes that, since 2015, India has propelled itself from 81st to 40th on the Global Innovation Index. Through its active participation in international trade negotiations and multilateral forums such as COP and BRICS, Mr Modi’s Digital India initiative has contributed to the nation’s enhanced role. The digital ties formed through diplomatic channels have also opened an avenue for India to exert pressure on sponsors of counter-terrorism by utilising its growing geopolitical influence.</p><p>Digital skills, now a cornerstone of India’s economic growth, have become crucial for attracting foreign investment with a significant impact on technological transfer. The digitalization of India’s workforce positions the nation as a contender for the next labour giant: the World Economic Forum has already found that India has surpassed China in the total number of annual digital payments. This shift has implications for happiness, equality, social mobility, and economic markers. Yet, looking ahead, challenges may arise with this growth when navigating the ever-evolving threats of cybercrime, misinformation, and Artificial Intelligence (AI).</p><p>Beyond economic considerations, the expansion of the Indian diaspora presents an opportunity for effective harnessing through digital diplomacy. Social media tools can connect and engage the diaspora, promoting national activities and fostering economic unity. Moreover, internal successes have been able to be highlighted through social media, where India can present solutions not only to national concerns but international concerns. The success of India’s Co-Wine and eVin initiatives is seen as a model for delivering modern solutions to modern health concerns. The UNDP and WHO jointly praised these two technological platforms as a ‘digital public good’ that facilitated the delivery of over 1 billion vaccines in under a year. Utilising a digital platform ultimately increased visibility and accountability; both crucial to a pandemic and government vaccine delivery. This digitalisation not only alleviated a global health crisis but spread through digital tools, presenting India’s digital leadership on an international stage.</p><p>Cloud and digital disruptors, implemented by the Meghraj Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, have also revolutionized knowledge sharing and information flow for a diverse and vast population, despite challenges related to digital literacy. The ministry plays a pivotal role in overseeing and promoting digital advancements, contributing to the growth of the innovative digital ecosystem. Initiatives like the ‘Pradhan Mantri Grameen Digital Saksharta Abhiyan’ (PMGDSA) and the Digital India Act 2023 have significantly improved digital literacy. PMGDSA has aimed to make six crore rural households digitally literate by providing free digital literacy training, that covers online payments, and smartphones and accessing digitalised government resources.</p><p>The latent Indian consumer and outsourcing potential plays a crucial role in shaping India’s foreign policy, with a staggering 750 million internet users and an expected 1.10 billion cellular mobile connections by 2023. The government’s ambitious PM Gatishakti initiative aims to invest $1 trillion in digital platforms across all departments, reflecting India’s commitment to technological advancement and also bridging the digital divide, by creating greater access to government resources and services to the rural and poor. Greater rural digital literacy means that government services can reach them instantly and wages are deposited fairly, with a smaller likelihood of fraud. Despite challenges, India has retained its 40th rank in the Global Innovation Index, which forecasts a future positive trajectory that is expected to push the country’s economy beyond the $2 trillion mark.</p><p>The 2023 IMF report underscores the global impact of India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), with countries replicating its successful digital infrastructure. The DPI, incorporating Unified Payments Service (UPI) and data exchange, has garnered international endorsement. Citizen empowerment through digital literacy and on-demand government services has also been lauded. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into social security measures is suggested to prevent fraud and facilitate direct transfers in various sectors, and this progression will be easier to integrate into an already thriving infrastructure, that India is building. The digital infrastructure’s economic impact is multifaceted, contributing to job creation, economic diversification, and international expansion. The ease of investing in stocks and financial instruments through digital platforms empowers individuals to participate actively in the market, further diversifying the economic landscape.</p><p>To maintain a skilled workforce by 2047, the 100-year mark from Independence, the report emphasizes the need to protect national digital platforms and use big data analytics to inform trade policies, enhancing competitiveness. Preserving policy in ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, at the World Trade Organization and future bilateral agreements is imperative to boost India’s trade competitiveness through a digitally informed foreign trade policy, that contends with the complexities of data flow regulation and mitigating trade/services restrictions. The Online Labour Index shows a new Indian digitally-skilled workforce that contributes to outsourced labour, however, one that will need to be protected by labour regulations. Moreover, data has been coined as the new oil and international protocols are responding daily to rapid technological innovations, the question of how India will legislate access when it comes to data sharing remains a challenge that looms.</p><p>IndiaStack, trademarked as the system implementing the Digital India initiative, has also gained international recognition. The G20 considers it a potential framework for an international AI framework, calling it the potential ‘bedrock for a globally thriving AI ecosystem, highlighting India’s role as a global disruptor in the digital realm. Countries like Singapore are already mimicking IndiaStack’s structure, leading to successful cyber agreements with the European Union and major powers like France.</p><p>Digitalization is not merely a national endeavour for India but a global influence, reshaping the political, social, and economic environment in which diplomacy is conducted. It will inevitably redistribute power in international relations and pose new policy challenges. As India continues to model its future through digital tools, its influence on the world stage is undeniable, presenting both challenges and opportunities for global diplomacy and economic dynamics. The numbers embedded throughout this narrative underscore the scale and impact of India’s digital journey on the global landscape.</p><p>India’s ‘Digital India’ initiative is not just a national strategy but a global beacon in the digital era. The influence of India’s digitalization extends beyond borders, presenting a paradigm shift in diplomacy, economics, and technology. As the nation continues to harness digital tools for progress, the impact on the world stage is undeniable, opening new avenues for collaboration and global leadership in the ever-evolving digital landscape; for an India that can inspire and collaborate. This new digital frontier remains a great testament to the nation’s will and resilience, one that will bring more prosperity to its people and the world.</p><p><strong>Bibliography:</strong></p><p>Alonso, Cristian, et al. “Stacking up the Benefits: Lessons from India’s Digital Journey.” IMF, 31 Mar. 2023.</p><p>ANI.“India Has Built a World-Class Digital Infrastructure: IMF.” <em>The Economic Times</em>, 6 Apr. 2023,</p><p>“India Stack.” Unique ID Authority of India, February 2024</p><p>Global Innovation Index. “Global Innovation Index | Creating Healthy Lives-the Future of Medical Innovation.” Global Innovation Index, 2023</p><p>Kant, Amitabh. “See Why India’s Digital Public Infrastructure Is Now Attracting Worldwide Interest.” World Economic Forum, Aug. 2023.</p><p>Khyati, Anand. “Digital India Bill 2023: Key Provisions and Stakeholder Concerns.” <em>India Briefing News</em>, 3 July 2023.</p><p>Kemp, Simon. “Digital 2023: India — DataReportal — Global Digital Insights.” DataReportal, DataReportal — Global Digital Insights, 13 Feb. 2023.</p><p>“Welcome to Common Services Centres.” CSC E-Governance Services India Limited.</p><p>Sunstone, Pearson. ‘India Skills Report’ 2023.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=284947daefbd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/global-implications-of-a-digital-india-284947daefbd">Global Implications of a Digital India</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Evolution of India’s Israel-Palestine Policy: from ‘Strategic Autonomy’ to ‘Dear Friends’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/the-evolution-of-indias-israel-palestine-policy-from-strategic-autonomy-to-dear-friends-ffe1fc99cbc8?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ffe1fc99cbc8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[narendra-modi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gaza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netanyahu]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine-and-israel]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 09:02:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-06T11:24:46.471Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>As the war in Gaza rages on, vice-president of policy research </em><strong><em>Rwik Chattopadhyay</em></strong><em> examines India’s historical relationships with Israel and Palestine and analyses the significant shift in Indian foreign policy during the last decade.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*qorEKlZQYa3YQt59.jpg" /><figcaption>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomes Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Tel Aviv in 2017. REUTERS/Ammar Awad</figcaption></figure><p>The shift in India’s foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine has been the subject of much debate and analysis in recent weeks. The response of Prime Minister Modi and Minister of External Affairs Jaishankar to the events of 7th October 2023 marks a significant shift from the policies of previous administrations. However, India’s current Middle East policy is also a decades-long evolution of its interests and approaches to foreign policy.</p><p>India had historically maintained a neutral policy in the Israel-Palestine conflict, albeit its decisions had a perceptible partiality towards the latter. As a newly formed nation dealing with the immediate consequences of its partition with Pakistan, India opposed the United Nations’ plan for the division of Palestine. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru saw the conflict as being a result of colonialism and opposed the creation of Israel based on religion, influenced by his own experience of partition. Nehru expressed clear support for a two-state solution, which is still the official position of the Indian government today.</p><p>The non-confrontational stance was in line with India’s commitment to the Non-Alignment Movement during the Cold War. Keen to avoid the ideological conflict between the West and the Soviet Union, India took neutral positions during the Cold War to maintain its independence. The policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ was born during Nehru’s tenure but was followed religiously by previous governments in the post-Cold War. Through the latter half of the 20th century, India made largely symbolic gestures to support Palestine. It became one of the first nations to recognize Palestine as a state in 1988 and opened a representative office on Palestinian territory in 1996, which remains open today. Meanwhile, Israel was not left ignored. Consular relations between the two nations began in 1996 and close partnership in defence and security followed.</p><p>The ascendance of Modi and the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) to government in 2014 signalled a change in Indian foreign policy. The objective changed: to be seen internationally as the global power it was eventually becoming. India wanted to build and maintain open relations without committing itself to ideological standpoints, so national interests and independence in foreign policy could be prioritised. Mr Modi’s approach has been proactive in the Israel-Palestine conflict. He became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel in 2017, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a trip to Delhi in 2018. Palestine was also not ignored: Modi was the first to visit Ramallah, just a month after Netanyahu’s trip. The Indian PM referred to his Israeli counterpart as a “dear friend” in 2019.</p><p>However, India has become significantly closer to Israel than ever before. Agreements between Israel and India on common interests such as defence and trade. Since 2017, India has been the largest buyer of Israeli defence products and its second-largest trading partner in Asia. Multiple MoUs on trade were signed on Netanyahu’s 2018 visit. An indication of the growing friendship between the two nations is Modi’s immediate condemnation of Hamas after the October 7 attacks, the clearest sign of India’s break with non-alignment. In recent days, Israeli businesses have looked to replace Palestinian workers (whose permits were revoked amid the war) with Indian labourers. The close cooperation with Israel on such matters has required India to keep relations with Israel cordial.</p><p>There are also pragmatic and ideological reasons for the two nations’ alliance. India has experienced Islamic extremism in the past, such as the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, a circumstance it shares with Israel, which has Islamic militancy on its borders. Delhi and Tel Aviv share a strong urge to respond to such threats to state security with force and military power. These two nations will inevitably continue to closely cooperate in matters of security and defence. A controversial aspect of this partnership emerged in 2021 when the Pegasus spyware (an intrusive software developed by an Israeli cyber-intelligence firm) was used to target members of Indian civil society. An important link between the two governments is Mr Modi’s BJP and Mr Netanyahu’s Likud, two parties which have similar political ideologies.</p><p>The current position of India is unique as it handles great power competition while maintaining its core interests. A shift towards Israel, even a marginal one, is in the interests of Indian foreign policy. Relations between India and the United States, a reliable ally of Israel and the staunchest supporter of its right to self-defence, have deepened in the last decade. During a time of economic and military competition with its neighbour China, a close relationship with the US is extremely valuable to India. This stance also allows India to preserve Indo-Israel relations, especially when China is beginning to forego its relationship with Israel to undermine US authority on the international stage. Concurrently, the country’s continuation of calling for a two-state solution creates the potential to further deepen its relations with Arab nations such as the UAE (through the I2U2 dialogue) and Saudi Arabia (through the IMEC initiative).</p><p>The ability to maintain such autonomy in its foreign policy is a result of decision making based on national interests rather than moral or ideological views. An illustration of this strategy is India’s refusal to distance itself from Russia for the war in Ukraine. Despite pressure from the US and its allies, it has refused to break longstanding economic and defence ties with Moscow. The capability to direct scant criticism towards Vladimir Putin while maintaining relations with a close ally — with the US respectful of India’s stance — represents a new freedom for the nation. It is a new model of ‘strategic autonomy: India can pursue beneficial relationships with multiple allies without committing to intractable policy positions.</p><p>The status of India as a rising power on the international stage has coincided with intense competition between the USA, China and Russia. Indian foreign policy has inevitably changed to maintain allyship with nations which can provide short and long-term partnerships in economic and defence matters, especially in the context of delicate Indo-Sino relations. The shift to Israel comes as no surprise.</p><p><strong>Bibliography:</strong></p><p>Chatterjee Miller, Manjari. “Modi’s Statement on the Israel Crisis Demonstrates a Transformed India-Israel Bilateral Relationship.” <em>Council on Foreign Relations</em>, 9 Oct. 2023, <a href="http://www.cfr.org/blog/modis-statement-israel-crisis-demonstrates-transformed-india-israel-bilateral-relationship.">www.cfr.org/blog/modis-statement-israel-crisis-demonstrates-transformed-india-israel-bilateral-relationship.</a></p><p>Droin, Mathieu, et al. “France and India: Two Nuances of “Strategic Autonomy.”” <a href="http://Www.csis.org,"><em>Www.csis.org</em>,</a> 13 July 2023, <a href="http://www.csis.org/analysis/france-and-india-two-nuances-strategic-autonomy.">www.csis.org/analysis/france-and-india-two-nuances-strategic-autonomy.</a></p><p>Ellis-Petersen, Hannah. “India Takes Strong Pro-Israel Stance under Modi in a Departure from the Past.” <em>The Guardian</em>, 31 Oct. 2023, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/india-pro-israel-narendra-modi-bjp-government.">www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/india-pro-israel-narendra-modi-bjp-government.</a></p><p>Foundation, Observer Research. “Israel’s Arms Sales to India: Bedrock of a Strategic Partnership — Analysis.” <em>Eurasia Review</em>, 9 Sept. 2019, <a href="http://www.eurasiareview.com/09092019-israels-arms-sales-to-india-bedrock-of-a-strategic-partnership-analysis/.">www.eurasiareview.com/09092019-israels-arms-sales-to-india-bedrock-of-a-strategic-partnership-analysis/.</a></p><p>Hasan, Waquar. “Will Israel Turn to India to Replace Palestinian Workers?” <a href="http://Https://Www.newarab.com/,"><em>Https://Www.newarab.com/</em>,</a> 20 Nov. 2023, <a href="http://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-israel-turn-india-replace-palestinian-workers.">www.newarab.com/analysis/will-israel-turn-india-replace-palestinian-workers.</a></p><p>Lipkind, Simone. “Fickle Friends: Sino-Israeli Ties Buckle amid War with Hamas.” <em>Council on Foreign Relations</em>, 25 Jan. 2024, <a href="http://www.cfr.org/blog/fickle-friends-sino-israeli-ties-buckle-amid-war-hamas?utm_source=twtw&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=TWTW2024Jan26&amp;utm_term=TWTW%20and%20All%20Staff%20as%20of%207-9-20.">www.cfr.org/blog/fickle-friends-sino-israeli-ties-buckle-amid-war-hamas?utm_source=twtw&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=TWTW2024Jan26&amp;utm_term=TWTW%20and%20All%20Staff%20as%20of%207-9-20.</a></p><p>Markey, Daniel. “Amid War in the Middle East, India-Israel Ties Reach New Milestone.” <em>United States Institute of Peace</em>, 7 Nov. 2023, <a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/amid-war-middle-east-india-israel-ties-reach-new-milestone.">www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/amid-war-middle-east-india-israel-ties-reach-new-milestone.</a></p><p>Motwani, Nishank. “Change and Continuity in India’s Relations with Israel and Palestine.” <em>Middle East Institute</em>, 5 Dec. 2023, <a href="http://www.mei.edu/publications/change-and-continuity-indias-relations-israel-and-palestine.">www.mei.edu/publications/change-and-continuity-indias-relations-israel-and-palestine.</a></p><p>“On Foreign Policy, India Is Reliably Unreliable.” <em>The Economist</em>, 24 Nov. 2022, <a href="http://www.economist.com/asia/2022/11/24/on-foreign-policy-india-is-reliably-unreliable.">www.economist.com/asia/2022/11/24/on-foreign-policy-india-is-reliably-unreliable.</a></p><p>Pethiyagoda, Kadira. “Don’t Overestimate India’s New Middle East Strategy.” <em>Foreign Policy</em>, 18 Dec. 2023, foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/12/india-israel-middle-east-modi-multipolar/</p><p>Tellis, Ashley J. “Non-Allied Forever: India’s Grand Strategy according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.” <em>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</em>, 3 Mar. 2021, carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/03/non-allied-forever-india-s-grand-strategy-according-to-subrahmanyam-jaishankar-pub-83974.</p><p>Tharoor, Shashi. “India, Gaza, and the Drift from Non-Alignment | by Shashi Tharoor.” <em>Project Syndicate</em>, 14 Nov. 2023, <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-response-to-israel-hamas-war-foreign-policy-shift-away-from-nonalignment-by-shashi-tharoor-2023-11?barrier=accesspay.">www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-response-to-israel-hamas-war-foreign-policy-shift-away-from-nonalignment-by-shashi-tharoor-2023-11?barrier=accesspay.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffe1fc99cbc8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/the-evolution-of-indias-israel-palestine-policy-from-strategic-autonomy-to-dear-friends-ffe1fc99cbc8">The Evolution of India’s Israel-Palestine Policy: from ‘Strategic Autonomy’ to ‘Dear Friends’</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Developing vs Developed Countries: The Case for Net Zero]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/developing-vs-developed-countries-the-case-for-net-zero-e23f54a9faef?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e23f54a9faef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-forest-service]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[net-zero-emission]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 09:01:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-06T11:14:08.993Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A month after the COP 28 conference in the UAE, associate editor </em><strong><em>Yusra Khan</em></strong><em> explores the concept of Net Zero and the complex challenges that Third-World nations face on the path to decarbonisation.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/0*Gwcb_2rEgNNYK3ML" /><figcaption>World leaders pose for a group photo during the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), held in the United Arab Emirates in 2023. Source: United Nations</figcaption></figure><p>Net zero, in its simplest form, refers to reducing greenhouse gases to as near zero as feasible, with any leftover emissions being taken up from the atmosphere, for example by oceans and forests. This strategy, put forward by the UK government, plans to decarbonize every scope of the country’s economy, from transport to agriculture. This was necessary to meet the target of Net Zero emissions by 2050 along with quite a few other short-term aims and objectives to be achieved with action started as soon as possible.</p><p>Numerous countries have also started to acknowledge the issue at hand, keeping in mind its consequences and hence contributing towards decarbonization, showing extensive support to Net Zero. Science says that to curb the deteriorating climate changes along with preserving a alive and healthy planet for living, strict and urgent actions are needed, like in this case the Net Zero strategy.</p><p>While the efforts may appear diverse and distinct in several aspects, contributions and efforts are mutually respected along worked upon, by both developed and developing countries. More than 70 nations have set their Net Zero objectives with countries including the top three polluters namely China, the USA, and the European Union. To make sure that the pledges have immediate action worked upon themselves, the UN Secretary-General established in March 2022, a High-Level Expert Group which would release recommendations and ensure the execution.</p><p>A principle that is worth mentioning here is the <em>“Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” </em>elucidating the different approaches to the environment of the countries of North and South. According to this concept, the Global South; the Third World Countries (developing countries of the world), have the idea and belief that most of the harmful emissions and ecological degradation are a result of the industrial developments undertaken by the developed countries. It is believed that if they have caused more degradation, they are more responsible for it. Hence, they are the ones who should work towards curbing this issue and take the blame. Moreover, developing nations shouldn’t be bound to the same limitations that apply to industrialized nations because they are in the process of industrialization.</p><p>Whereas the Global North; the First World Countries (developed countries of the world) hold a differing viewpoint that the responsibility of reducing the gases must be collectively taken by both developing and developed nations and that they should work towards it jointly, being equally responsible for ecological conservation. When creating, implementing, and interpreting international environmental law, consideration must be given to the unique concerns of developing nations which was acknowledged in the Rio Declaration at the Earth Summit in 1992. Numerous actions have been taken place for a collective effort toward the reduction of such harmful gas emissions, an example of such is the Kyoto Protocol.</p><p>The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement setting targets for industrialized countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions where however developing countries like India and China were exempted from the requirements of the protocol as it was claimed that per capita emissions are comparatively low by them. Consequently, it is also believed that the largest share of historical and current emissions of greenhouse gases are of developed countries.</p><p>Considering India, its former Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador T S Tirumurti, delivered a cross-regional joint statement on behalf of India on “Global Net Zero” in the context of combatting climate change stating that as reaching Net Zero for developing countries would take longer, it can be achieved only when the developed countries reach Net Zero earlier than 2050.</p><p>Although it might be crucial to work toward achieving the goal of Net Zero, it has caused financial and economic problems for developing countries. This has been pushing the weak and developing economies into debt making it difficult for them to recover. Low-income countries must maintain the necessary focus on basic goals such as improving energy access, providing safe and quality transport services, water, food security, and education, making these their priorities. The World Bank estimates that developing countries need to invest around 4.5 percent of GDP to achieve infrastructure-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to stay on track to limit climate change by no more than 2 degrees Celsius.</p><p>One of the top contributors, China, the world’s top producer of greenhouse gases, is determined to achieve the net-zero goal. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has unveiled several “implementation plans” under the direction of President Xi Jinping to embed the idea of a green transition in the minds of ordinary people. However, the transition is also accompanied by complications like financial institutions need to know their current financed carbon emissions to reach net-zero targets, but only a few businesses reveal their carbon data, and the required carbon accounting tools aren’t always accessible.</p><p>The USA, the second largest emitter, path to net-zero emissions by 2050 entails a comprehensive and rapid effort to decarbonize the economy. Reducing emissions from existing facilities and infrastructure and Decarbonizing transport are major parts of the US’s decarbonization agendas, which also equally stand as obstacles in this journey making the transition difficult and at times disorderly.</p><p>The European Union, the third-largest contributor has recognized the Net Zero agenda with the European Green Deal, the EU’s major climate policy proposal unveiled in 2019 stating that emissions will be cut by almost half by 2050, with net zero emissions. But the EU has never before decreased carbon emissions at such a rate, demanding a faster and wider adoption of clean energy technology, such as energy efficiency and renewable energy. Problems like these are being faced by these developed countries which if not improved could delay the process of achieving the objective of Net Zero for these countries. While the transition is an urgent issue in contemporary times, countries of the North, as well as those of the South, to arrive at a better position in their journey towards Net Zero, will and have been facing hindrances towards their economies, as well as development, creating a pile-up of difficulties for the government.</p><p>India is more than committed to playing a positive role in this direction too. Under PM, the government has approved India’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to be communicated to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The updated NDC seeks to enhance India’s contributions towards the achievement of the strengthening of global response to the threat of climate change, as agreed under the Paris Agreement. Such action will also help India usher in low emissions growth pathways. It would protect the interests of the country and safeguard its future development needs based on the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC.</p><p>To sum up, to cut their emissions and create a low-emissions economy, regions with lower GDP per capita and more fossil fuel resources would need to invest more money compared to GDP. And a few of them will have to deal with a double burden of transition adjustments as well as increasing physical hazards. After all, it is upon the developed countries to attain the aim of Net Zero earlier than that of the developing countries, creating a pathway and putting forward an example, hence motivating the developing countries towards the same.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong>:</p><ol><li>Cran-McGreehin, Dr Simon. “Net Zero: Why Is It Necessary?” Energy &amp; Climate Intelligence Unit, January 2022. <a href="https://eciu.net/analysis/briefings/net-zero/net-zero-why#:~:text=In%20order%20to%20meet%20the">https://eciu.net/analysis/briefings/net-zero/net-zero-why#:~:text=In%20order%20to%20meet%20the</a>.</li><li>EROL MADAN, ŞEBNEM . “How Can Developing Countries Get to Net Zero in a Financeable and Affordable Way?” blogs.worldbank.org, February 2022. <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/how-can-developing-countries-get-net-zero-financeable-and-affordable-way">https://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/how-can-developing-countries-get-net-zero-financeable-and-affordable-way</a>.</li><li>Mekala Krishnan, Danielle Imperato, Weige Wu, Annabel Farr, Humayun Tai, Tomas Nauclér, Dickon Pinner, et al. “Net-Zero for Countries: The Economic Impact of the Transition | McKinsey.” <a href="http://www.mckinsey.com,">www.mckinsey.com,</a> January 2022. <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/how-the-net-zero-transition-would-play-out-in-countries-and-regions">https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/how-the-net-zero-transition-would-play-out-in-countries-and-regions</a>.</li><li>Berglöf, Erik. “How Developing Countries Can Reach Net Zero | by Erik Berglöf.” Project Syndicate, November 2, 2022. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/developing-countries-net-zero-goal-requires-state-capacity-by-erik-berglof-2022-11">https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/developing-countries-net-zero-goal-requires-state-capacity-by-erik-berglof-2022-11</a>.</li><li>United Nations. “INTEGRITY MATTERS: NET ZERO COMMITMENTS by BUSINESSES, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, CITIES and REGIONS,” n.d. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/high-level_expert_group_n7b.pdf.</li><li>IEA. “Net Zero by 2050 — Analysis.” IEA, May 2021. <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050</a>.</li><li>Black, Simon, Jean Chateau, Florence Jaumotte, Ian Parry, Gregor Schwerhoff, Sneha Thube, and Karlygash Zhunussova. “CLIMATE CLIMATE Getting on Track to Net Zero Accelerating a Global Just Transition in This Decade,” 2022. <a href="https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Staff-Climate-Notes/2022/English/CLNEA2022010.ashx">https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Staff-Climate-Notes/2022/English/CLNEA2022010.ashx</a>.</li><li>Shankar, V. “What Developing Countries Need to Reach Net-Zero | by v. Shankar.” Project Syndicate, October 11, 2021. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/emerging-economies-net-zero-by-viswanathan-shankar-2021-10">https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/emerging-economies-net-zero-by-viswanathan-shankar-2021-10</a>.</li><li>LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS. “Governance Pathways to Credible Implementation of Net Zero Targets.” Grantham Research Institute on climate change and the environment, 2023. <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/governance-pathways-to-credible-implementation-of-net-zero-targets/">https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/governance-pathways-to-credible-implementation-of-net-zero-targets/</a>.</li><li>Imperial College London. “What Are the World’s Countries Doing about Climate Change?” Imperial College London, 2022. <a href="https://www.imperial.ac.uk/grantham/publications/climate-change-faqs/what-are-the-worlds-countries-doing-about-climate-change/">https://www.imperial.ac.uk/grantham/publications/climate-change-faqs/what-are-the-worlds-countries-doing-about-climate-change/</a>.</li><li>Georgieva, Kristalina. “Getting Back on Track to Net Zero: Three Critical Priorities for COP27.” IMF, November 4, 2022. <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/11/04/getting-back-on-track-to-net-zero-three-critical-priorities-for-cop27">https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/11/04/getting-back-on-track-to-net-zero-three-critical-priorities-for-cop27</a>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e23f54a9faef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/developing-vs-developed-countries-the-case-for-net-zero-e23f54a9faef">Developing vs Developed Countries: The Case for Net Zero</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is the Win a Win?: Decoding the Impact of the Recent Elections in South Asia on India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/is-the-win-a-win-decoding-the-impact-of-the-recent-elections-in-south-asia-on-india-dcdf41c7e6c3?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dcdf41c7e6c3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 09:01:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-06T11:18:58.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Amidst the numerous nations going to the polls in South Asia this year, associate editor </em><strong><em>Abhinav Poludasu </em></strong><em>examines the elections of India’s neighbours and their subsequent effect on Indian foreign policy and geopolitics.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/590/0*CRj8XazxFdVOj1-k" /><figcaption>Source: Centre for Geopolitics, Cambridge University (Credits not given)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Year of Elections:</strong></p><p>The electoral landscape of 2024 in Asia, anchored by the imminent Indian General Elections in May, marks a consequential chapter in the region’s political narrative. With an unprecedented one billion registered voters engaged in various elections across the Asia-Pacific, the decisions made in these democratic processes will wield a profound influence on the economic and diplomatic trajectories of the region for the foreseeable future.</p><p>Against this backdrop, the gaze naturally turns towards India, a prominent player in the South Asian and Asian geopolitical tableau. Understanding the implications of these elections on India is paramount. How will the outcomes reverberate through the intricate dynamics of the Indian subcontinent? What political, economic, and diplomatic shifts lie ahead? These questions beckon an exploration into the future scenarios that will undoubtedly shape the course of the region. As the dust settles from the just-concluded elections in India’s neighbourhood, the horizon unfolds with anticipations and uncertainties, presenting an array of possibilities for the trajectory of the Indian subcontinent.</p><p>This article shall direct its attention toward a nation-specific analysis, delving into the concluded elections in Bangladesh and Bhutan, while also discussing the upcoming elections in Pakistan next month. Notably, although Sri Lanka is scheduled to hold elections this year, the historical <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/sri-lanka-government-develops-cold-feet-calls-off-local-elections/">pattern of persistent delays</a> in their elections introduces an element of uncertainty. Therefore, the focus within this article shall remain centered on Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan, as these nations provide a more immediate and substantial scope for examination.</p><p><strong>Bangladesh:</strong></p><p>Bangladesh, with its population of 170 million, is the first South Asian country to hold elections this year. Incumbent Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, in a historic move, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/world/asia/bangladesh-election.html">secured a fourth consecutive term in office</a>, solidifying her position as the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The elections, however, were marred by the absence of the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-bangladeshs-widely-boycotted-election-reveals-about-its-future/">boycotted the electoral process.</a> This decision followed Hasina’s refusal to resign and permit a neutral caretaker government to oversee the election. This electoral landscape holds significance not only for Bangladesh but also reverberates on the Asian stage, as it underscores the evolving political dynamics in the region.</p><p>Hasina’s electoral victory holds the potential to bolster the Delhi-Dhaka ties, given her close association with India. However, the persistence of U.S. sanctions citing democratic processes in Bangladesh post-election could introduce complications, prompting the Indian government to play a mediating role. Meanwhile, China appears poised to leverage advantages with Hasina’s return to power. As reported by Al-Jazeera, Beijing exhibits “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/1/4/bangladesh-elections-mark-a-pro-china-tipping-point-in-south-asia#:~:text=beijing%20has%20strong%20strategic%20compulsions%20%22Beijing%20has%20strong%20strategic%20compulsions%22">strong strategic compulsions</a>” to solidify Bangladesh as a state heavily dependent on China, akin to its influence in Myanmar and Cambodia. This strategic move aims to facilitate Chinese access to Indian Ocean sea lanes, circumventing the Malacca Strait through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), connecting Yunnan province to the seaport city of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Geographically, the Ganga-Padma-Brahmaputra delta provides the shortest land route for mainland China to access sea lanes. With Hasina in power, the political climate is poised to be predictable, stable, and favorable, ensuring the safeguarding and advancement of China’s substantial infrastructure investments in Bangladesh.</p><p>Despite these nuances, India stands to reap significant benefits from Hasina’s continuation in power. Key issues such as illegal migration and counter-terrorism efforts, which have consistently been at the forefront of India-Bangladesh relations, are expected to maintain their prominence. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sheikh-hasina-election-india-bangladesh-modi-victory-explain-bilateral-new-delhi-dhaka/article67738278.ece">bilateral ties </a>extend beyond security concerns, as highlighted by India’s Ministry of External Affairs in November 2022, recognizing Bangladesh as India’s <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/bangladesh-india-trade-cooperation-expanding-market-for-mutual-benefit/#:~:text=When%20it%20comes%20to%20trade,reached%20an%20impressive%20$14.22%20billion.">largest trade partner in South Asia.</a> The cooperative efforts in the power sector have emerged as a hallmark of India-Bangladesh relations in recent years, signaling a trajectory that both nations are likely to desire to preserve. This continuity in bilateral cooperation reinforces the anticipation of a sustained and mutually beneficial relationship between India and Bangladesh under Hasina’s leadership.</p><p><strong>Bhutan:</strong></p><p>Former Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/9/bhutan-votes-in-fourth-election-as-economic-challenges-loom">emerged victorious</a> in the January 9 runoff election in Bhutan, prevailing over former bureaucrat Pema Chewang and the Bhutan Tendrel Party (BTP). The PDP secured a substantial win, claiming <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/pro-india-tshering-tobgay-set-to-be-bhutans-pm-for-2nd-time/articleshow/106676930.cms">30 out of 47 seats in the national legislature.</a> The participation of 3.2 lakh Bhutanese voters, out of a registered 5 lakh, underscores the democratic engagement within the country. This election followed a November 2023 primary election that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-party-face-old-guard-bhutans-fourth-free-vote-2023-12-01/">witnessed the ousting of three parties</a>, including Lotay Tshering’s ruling centre-left Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa party. The election outcome sets the stage for continued political stability in Bhutan and reinforces the democratic values upheld in the nation’s electoral processes.</p><p>Economic considerations significantly influenced Tobgay’s election, particularly given Bhutan’s economic landscape. <a href="https://time.com/6553813/bhutan-election-togbay-economic-crisis-happiness/">The World Bank’s estimation</a> of Bhutan’s GDP growth averaging just 1.6% over the last five years underscored the economic challenges facing the nation. Youth unemployment, standing at 29%, has been a persistent issue, prompting a notable exodus of young people seeking job opportunities abroad.</p><p>Tobgay’s electoral promise to stimulate the economy hinged on attracting increased foreign investment and expanding the tourism sector. This economic agenda aligns with his party’s commitment to uphold Bhutan’s unique national philosophy, emphasizing success measured by the “<a href="https://time.com/6553813/bhutan-election-togbay-economic-crisis-happiness/">happiness and well-being of the people.</a>” The election outcome reflects a collective desire for economic revitalization while preserving Bhutan’s distinctive approach to holistic well-being and happiness.</p><p>India continues to play a pivotal role as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26534909">Bhutan’s primary donor and ally</a>, holding a crucial position in supporting the nation’s economic recovery. India’s funding extends to various infrastructure initiatives, including the <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/nri/latest-updates/india-bhutan-soon-to-be-connected-by-train/articleshow/103558972.cms">recently announced railway project. </a>Additionally, Bhutan possesses untapped hydroelectric potential, with New Delhi emerging as a potentially lucrative client for the country’s energy resources.</p><p>New Delhi will closely monitor the new Bhutanese government’s engagements with China, particularly regarding the boundary delimitation agreement signed with Beijing in September. Of significant interest is Bhutan’s ambitious <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/10/bhutan-dreams-of-building-the-first-mindfulness-city_6419781_4.html">Gelephu Mindfulness City</a> (GMC) mega-project, unveiled by its fifth King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck in December. This initiative, requiring substantial funding, investment, and development, is poised to involve collaboration between the government and Indian private entities in infrastructure, health, and IT sectors. The dynamics between India and Bhutan in navigating these initiatives will significantly shape regional relationships and the economic landscape.</p><p><strong>Pakistan:</strong></p><p>The upcoming elections in Pakistan, scheduled for February 8, 2024, unfold against a backdrop of a one-sided contest. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan and prominent leaders of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/05/former-pakistan-prime-minister-imran-khan-jailed-for-three-years">find themselves in prison</a>, despite maintaining substantial popularity.</p><p>Simultaneously, Pakistan grapples with a persistent economic crisis, affecting millions of citizens and prompting the country to secure its <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-likely-to-get-700-million-from-imf-as-next-tranche-of-bailout-this-month-report/article67697925.ece">23rd bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)</a> since 1958. The ongoing economic challenges have led interim finance minister Shamshad Akhtar to contemplate an additional IMF loan, citing the “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-67494013#:~:text=shamshad%20akhtar%20even%20raised%20the%20prospect%20of%20seeking%20an%20additional%20imf%20loan%20due%20to%20the%20%22fragile%22%20economy%20%22Shamshad%20Akhtar%20even%20raised%20the%20prospect%20of%20seeking%20an%20additional%20IMF%20loan%20due%20to%20the%20%22fragile%22%20economy%22">fragile</a>” state of the economy. The consequences of the IMF’s lending conditions are evident, as the government phased out energy subsidies, resulting in sharp increases in energy prices and other essential commodities. These economic dynamics underscore the critical intersection of politics and economic hardships shaping the upcoming elections in Pakistan.</p><p>In the current scenario, everyone predicts the three-time former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif to be the likely victor. Sharif has signaled a distinctive approach by expressing his intention to <a href="https://theprint.in/go-to-pakistan/ex-pakistan-pm-nawaz-sharif-india/1898836/">cultivate improved relations</a> with Pakistan’s neighbors, notably India. Sharif emphasized this vision during an election rally, highlighting his previous tenures during which both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan.</p><p>Regardless of the election outcome, it is anticipated that the winning candidate, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/nawaz-sharif-returns-to-pakistan-the-army-playing-a-safe-bet/">aligned with the military</a>, will initially maintain an uneasy status quo in relations with India. The military seems inclined to avoid new outreach efforts, and if Sharif pursues reconciliation, it might lead to tensions with the Army. However, the overarching strategy is expected to avoid provocations, allowing undivided attention on economic recovery. As this political narrative unfolds, the implications of this election extend beyond Pakistan, shaping regional dynamics, especially in the realm of diplomatic ties with India. The eventual outcome and ensuing policy shifts will undoubtedly influence the trajectory of Pakistan’s relations with its neighbors.</p><p><strong>India and the World:</strong></p><p>This year, it seems clear that domestic policy, rather than geopolitical events, could be a major factor in foreign policy in international politics, given that more than a fourth of the world, in terms of population and number of countries, will go to vote during the year. For India, which will hold the world’s largest election, the diplomatic calendar and focus will be decided by countries in the neighbourhood, global powers and major countries in the Global South.</p><p>It is imperative to underscore the profound implications of the Indian general election on the nation’s foreign policy landscape. India’s ascendancy on the global stage has been unmistakable, consistently showcasing its potential to evolve into a modern superpower. The remarkable events of 2023 have solidified India’s standing — <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">surpassing China as the world’s most populous nation</a>, along with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66594520">India’s soft landing of a rover on the moon in August</a>, marking the country as the fourth globally to achieve such a feat. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66682770">Hosting the Group of 20 (G20) Summit</a> in September provided New Delhi with a platform to extend its leadership beyond national borders amid escalating political turmoil worldwide.</p><p>While these achievements remain significant, the forthcoming months will unfold as a pivotal period to discern the priorities of both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Prime Minister Modi and the opposition’s I.N.D.I.A (Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance) in terms of foreign policy. This juncture not only shapes the trajectory of India’s diplomatic engagements but also holds implications for the nation’s role and influence on the global stage for 2024. The decisions made in the upcoming political landscape will undoubtedly steer India’s path as a key player in international affairs.</p><p><strong>Bibliography:</strong></p><p>“The Sri Lanka Government Develops Cold Feet, Calls Off Local Elections.” The Diplomat, 2 Feb. 2023, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/sri-lanka-government-develops-cold-feet-calls-off-local-elections/">thediplomat.com/2023/02/sri-lanka-government-develops-cold-feet-calls-off-local-elections/</a></p><p>“Bangladesh Leader Headed to 4th Straight Term in Vote Marred by Crackdown” The New York Times, 7 Jan. 2024, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/world/asia/bangladesh-election.html.">www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/world/asia/bangladesh-election.html.</a></p><p>“What Bangladesh’s Widely Boycotted Election Reveals About Its Future.” Atlantic Council, 18 Jan, 2024, <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-bangladeshs-widely-boycotted-election-reveals-about-its-future/.">www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-bangladeshs-widely-boycotted-election-reveals-about-its-future/.</a></p><p>“Bangladesh Elections Mark a Pro-China Tipping Point in South Asia.” Al Jazeera, 4 Jan. 2024, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/1/4/bangladesh-elections-mark-a-pro-china-tipping-point-in-south-asia.">www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/1/4/bangladesh-elections-mark-a-pro-china-tipping-point-in-south-asia.</a></p><p>“Sheikh Hasina’s Election Victory: Explaining the Bilateral Impact on India-Bangladesh Relations.” The Hindu, <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sheikh-hasina-election-india-bangladesh-modi-victory-explain-bilateral-new-delhi-dhaka/article67738278.ece.">www.thehindu.com/news/national/sheikh-hasina-election-india-bangladesh-modi-victory-explain-bilateral-new-delhi-dhaka/article67738278.ece.</a></p><p>“Bangladesh-India Trade Cooperation: Expanding Market for Mutual Benefit.” The Geopolitics, <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/bangladesh-india-trade-cooperation-expanding-market-for-mutual-benefit/">thegeopolitics.com/bangladesh-india-trade-cooperation-expanding-market-for-mutual-benefit/#.</a></p><p>“Bhutan Votes in Fourth Election as Economic Challenges Loom.” Al Jazeera, 9 Jan. 2024, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/9/bhutan-votes-in-fourth-election-as-economic-challenges-loom.">www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/9/bhutan-votes-in-fourth-election-as-economic-challenges-loom.</a></p><p>“Pro-India Tshering Tobgay Set to Be Bhutan’s PM for 2nd Time.” The Economic Times, <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/pro-india-tshering-tobgay-set-to-be-bhutans-pm-for-2nd-time/articleshow/106676930.cms">m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/pro-india-tshering-tobgay-set-to-be-bhutans-pm-for-2nd-time/articleshow/106676930.cms.</a></p><p>“New Party to Face Old Guard in Bhutan’s Fourth Free Vote.” Reuters, 1 Dec. 2023, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-party-face-old-guard-bhutans-fourth-free-vote-2023-12-01/.">www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-party-face-old-guard-bhutans-fourth-free-vote-2023-12-01/.</a></p><p>“Bhutan’s Election: Togbay Faces Economic Crisis Amid the Pursuit of Happiness.” Time, <a href="https://time.com/6553813/bhutan-election-togbay-economic-crisis-happiness/">time.com/6553813/bhutan-election-togbay-economic-crisis-happiness/.</a></p><p>Srivastava, Juhi. “BHUTAN: A SUCCESS STORY FOR INDIA.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 76, no. 3, 2015, p.666. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26534909.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/26534909.</a></p><p>“India-Bhutan Soon to Be Connected by Train.” The Economic Times, <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/nri/latest-updates/india-bhutan-soon-to-be-connected-by-train/articleshow/103558972.cms">m.economictimes.com/nri/latest-updates/india-bhutan-soon-to-be-connected-by-train/articleshow/103558972.cms.</a></p><p>“Bhutan Dreams of Building the First Mindfulness City.” Le Monde, 10 Jan. 2024, <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/10/bhutan-dreams-of-building-the-first-mindfulness-city_6419781_4.html.">www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/10/bhutan-dreams-of-building-the-first-mindfulness-city_6419781_4.html.</a></p><p>“Former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan Jailed for Three Years.” The Guardian, 5 Aug. 2023, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/05/former-pakistan-prime-minister-imran-khan-jailed-for-three-years.">www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/05/former-pakistan-prime-minister-imran-khan-jailed-for-three-years.</a></p><p>“Pakistan Likely to Get $700 Million from IMF as Next Tranche of Bailout This Month.” The Hindu, <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-likely-to-get-700-million-from-imf-as-next-tranche-of-bailout-this-month-report/article67697925.ece.">www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-likely-to-get-700-million-from-imf-as-next-tranche-of-bailout-this-month-report/article67697925.ece.</a></p><p>“Ex-Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif’s Views on India.” The Print, <a href="https://theprint.in/go-to-pakistan/ex-pakistan-pm-nawaz-sharif-india/1898836/">theprint.in/go-to-pakistan/ex-pakistan-pm-nawaz-sharif-india/1898836/.</a></p><p>“Nawaz Sharif Returns to Pakistan: The Army Playing a Safe Bet.” The Diplomat, 2023, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/nawaz-sharif-returns-to-pakistan-the-army-playing-a-safe-bet/">thediplomat.com/2023/10/nawaz-sharif-returns-to-pakistan-the-army-playing-a-safe-bet/.</a></p><p>“UN DESA Policy Brief №153: India Overtakes China as the World’s Most Populous Country.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, <a href="http://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/.">www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/.</a></p><p>“Chandrayaan-3: India makes historic landing near Moon’s south pole.” BBC News, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-66594520.">www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-66594520.</a></p><p>“Delhi G20: How India is asserting its global presence at G20 summit.” BBC News, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66682770.">www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66682770.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dcdf41c7e6c3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/is-the-win-a-win-decoding-the-impact-of-the-recent-elections-in-south-asia-on-india-dcdf41c7e6c3">Is the Win a Win?: Decoding the Impact of the Recent Elections in South Asia on India</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[India’s role in UN Peacekeeping and its Changing Dynamics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/indias-role-in-un-peacekeeping-and-its-changing-dynamics-72c52a0fe7ae?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72c52a0fe7ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peacekeeping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Dec 2023 18:55:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-03T12:02:01.381Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Associate editor Yusra Khan</em></strong><em> describes the intricate role of India in UN Peacekeeping forces and the nature and function of modern peacekeeping operations, while also exploring India’s role in future UN missions.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*xnftKhnomuBPBi8tsZQrKg.png" /><figcaption>The largest contingent of women peacekeepers from India serving in the United Nations Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the UN mission to the Abyei Area, which is located between Sudan and South Sudan.</figcaption></figure><p>The motive behind the UN’s Peacekeeping Strategy is to assist the countries towards the path of peace and tranquillity, away from conflict and troubles. Under peacekeeping, the UN peacekeepers offer protection, political support, and assistance to help nations make the challenging early transition from conflict to peace. Today’s multi-layered peacekeeping missions are needed to support the organization of elections, protect and advance human rights, help restore the rule of law, protect civilians, and assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants in addition to preserving peace and security. A unique global partnership lies between the members, bringing together the general assembly, security council, and secretariat, along with other troops and forces, in a joint effort to hold up security and peace with each other.</p><p>The United Nations Security Council has the authority and duty to act together to uphold global peace and security under the terms of the United Nations Charter. For this reason, the Security Council is typically relied upon by the international community to approve Chapter VII authorizations for peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping mission has been a very crucial and productive role of the UN in maintaining peace globally. No other alternative to this can be as effective as it has been, and the reliance and trust of the nations on the UN for its role in maintaining peace has been immense.</p><p>Since it began participating in UN peacekeeping operations, India has sent more personnel than any other nation. Over 2,53,000 Indians have participated in 49 out of the 71 UN peacekeeping missions deployed globally since 1948. India currently ranks fifth among nations that send troops to UN peacekeeping missions, deploying roughly 5,500 soldiers and police.</p><p>India has sent female staff members to UN peacekeeping missions too. India was the first nation to send an entirely female contingent to a UN peacekeeping mission in 2007, to strengthen the capabilities of the Liberian police, the Formed Police Unit throughout Liberia offered round-the-clock security and carried out night patrols in the nation’s capital, Monrovia. These female police officers not only helped Liberia’s security situation return to normal, but they also helped the country’s security sector employ more women. Indian veterinarians assigned to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) volunteered to assist cattle herders who were losing a large portion of their herd to sickness and starvation in the country’s war-torn landscape. The Indian presence in South Sudan has repaired a substantial number of roads in addition to offering vocational training and life-saving medical aid. In response to an urgent request from the UN Secretariat, India sent two medical teams, each with 15 medical personnel, to Goma (DRC) and Juba in September 2020. (South Sudan). Goma, in the DRC, is home to MONUSCO’s primary command and control center. Since it opened in January 2005, the Hospital by India in Goma has employed 90 Indians, including 18 experts.</p><p>According to India, the nature and function of modern peacekeeping operations are rapidly changing, and the international community has to understand these developments. The mandates issued by the Security Council to UN peacekeeping operations must be grounded in the realities of the field and tied to the funding allocated for the operation. Nations that provide troops and police for missions must participate actively in all stages and facets of mission preparation. According to officials, more money and people should be available for peace-building in post-conflict countries where UNPKOs have been assigned. India is particularly relevant in the context of twenty-first-century peacebuilding due to its distinctive mix of being the largest democracy in the world with a strong heritage of respect for the rule of law and a successful experience in nation-building. India is a participant in the Peacebuilding Commission’s organizational committee (PBC).</p><p>While advocating for a positive attitude and a “lighter touch” by the PBC in extending advice, support, and expanding its role, India strongly supports nationally-led efforts for peace consolidation. Additionally, India has made donations to the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Many valiant Indian troops have sacrificed their lives to make the world a more peaceful place. 168 Indian troops have already paid the ultimate price while serving beneath the blue banner. More than 160 Indian peacekeepers have paid the ultimate price for peace by losing their lives while serving under the UN flag as of September 2022. To date, India has participated in 49 peacekeeping missions with its total contribution exceeding 200,000 troops, consisting of many police personnel too.</p><p>With 7,860 personnel deployed with 10 UN Peacekeeping Missions in 2014, India ranked third in terms of troop contributions (TCC), 995 of whom are police officers, including the first female police unit established by the UN. Indian peacekeepers have recently received praise from the UN for their efforts in halting the slaughter in the South Sudan conflict that claimed the lives of two of its men. In December 2010, India was reappointed for a third two-year term to the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission. While advocating for a positive strategy and a “lighter touch” by the Peacebuilding Commission in extending advice, support, and involvement, India supports nationally-led efforts for peace consolidation. Moreover, India has made donations to the UN Peacebuilding Fund too. However, there are various concerns related to the deployment of security forces by India in UN peacekeeping missions.</p><p>The Dynamics relating to India’s participation in UN peacekeeping mission is changing due to various experience, especially the recent one where the troops were killed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is important to note that participation in peacekeeping missions is becoming more and more challenging in the face of growing violence in disturbed areas and due to the absence of any political process. It is important to note here that peacekeeping missions should be given clear and realistic mandates along with the requisite resources. Also, the problem is that the peacekeeping force contributing countries do not have any significant role in the decision-making process.</p><p>There should be a proper exchange of information and effective coordination with the host governments to enhance the safety of the troops. There should be means and procedures to facilitate justice against the perpetrators of crime and there should be very strong and smooth coordination between the leadership of the peacekeeping mission with the host country. India is also planning to introduce a new technology called the “unite aware” platform to enhance the safety of peacekeepers and it has been addressed for deployment in Uganda. it is very important looking at the changing dynamics that the peacekeeping missions should factor in an exit strategy from their very inception.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>1. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/india">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/india</a></p><p>2. <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/data/75-years-of-peacekeeping-indias-contribution-to-uns-peace-missions/article66911999.ece">https://www.thehindu.com/data/75-years-of-peacekeeping-indias-contribution-to-uns-peace-missions/article66911999.ece</a></p><p>3. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/submenu__1260383365.pdf</p><p>4. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/49151pkeeping.pdf</p><p>5. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en</a></p><p>6. Choedon, Yeshi. “India and the Current Concerns of UN Peacekeeping: Issues and Prospects.” <em>India Quarterly</em> 63, no. 2 (2007): 150–84. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/45073218.">http://www.jstor.org/stable/45073218.</a></p><p>7. <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/34192">https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/34192</a></p><p>8. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military</a></p><p>9. <a href="https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping">https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping</a></p><p>10. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/video/does-un-peacekeeping-work-here%E2%80%99s-data#:~:text=If%20you%20look%20at%20the,help%20make%20peace%20agreements%20stick">https://www.un.org/en/video/does-un-peacekeeping-work-here%E2%80%99s-data#:~:text=If%20you%20look%20at%20the,help%20make%20peace%20agreements%20stick</a>.</p><p>11. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72c52a0fe7ae" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/indias-role-in-un-peacekeeping-and-its-changing-dynamics-72c52a0fe7ae">India’s role in UN Peacekeeping and its Changing Dynamics</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BRICS Expansion: A Whistlestop Tour]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/brics-expansion-a-whistlestop-tour-f6d6a253653d?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6d6a253653d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[narendra-modi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Dec 2023 18:55:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-03T12:02:01.679Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Three months on from the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, </em><strong><em>associate editor</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>Yingbo Zhu</em></strong><em> investigates the expansion of the organisation, examining the makeup and resources of those countries which received an invitation to join in 2024, while also comparing and contrasting the evolving nature of the BRICS bloc with that of the G7.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h2X-MtFXaa0w2g5y" /><figcaption>BRICS Leaders at the latest BRICS Summit in South Africa, August 2023. Source: REUTERS/Alet Pretorius/Pool</figcaption></figure><p>Although some sixty countries attended the BRICS summit and over forty expressed an interest in joining the organisation, an invitation to actually do so was only extended to a motley crew of six — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Argentina and Ethiopia. In reaching the final decision, there was undoubtedly much negotiation and compromise between the original five member states, each with different and at times competing national priorities and interests. In a simplified summary of events, in agreeing upon BRICS expansion, a middle path had to be taken, and some trade-offs were made.</p><p>It is clear that China was keen on expanding BRICS, whereas Russia was on the fence, while Brazil and India were less than so. Evidently, the Chinese were eager to bring in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. To balance this and promote their own interests, Russia hoped to bring into the fold an ally through Egypt, while South Africa wanted another fellow African state, just as Brazil wanted another Latin American nation — Ethiopia and Argentina were invited respectively on each’s behalf. Together, the six nations invited to join what in 2024 will become BRICS+ each have the potential to make notable contributions. Most importantly, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are each dominant oil producers and big commodity producers. However, oil production appears to be not the only significant consideration when it comes to BRICS expansion.</p><p>Iran has the potential to be an enormously rich and powerful country, if its resources and institutions are organised properly. It has long been anxious to get out of the sanctions systems imposed upon it by the United States and has seized upon the opportunity to join BRICS in an attempt to establish better trade links and take steps to stabilise its financial system, a significant and well-calculated move.</p><p>Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are two key players in the Gulf, exerting substantial influence in both regional and international affairs. As stated previously, both are major oil producers and have traditionally cooperated very closely together. Throughout the past year, overtures of both the diplomatic and economic strands have been made by China and Russia towards the region, enhancing cooperation between states and expanding their influence.</p><p>From these three nations, it is evident that Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide a real core substantial benefit to the BRICS. Oil remains the world’s most widely traded commodity, being the definitive indispensable commodity. With most major oil exporters posed to be in BRICS by January 1 2024, the bloc appears strategically placed to eventually back their fledgling financial system with oil. It is not inconceivable that in the distant future, trade in oil could be done through a BRICS financial system, granting greater international influence to the organisation.</p><p>Staying in the MENA region, Egypt is the largest country in the Arab world, part of the African continent and most importantly is strategically located through its control of the Suez Canal, one of the world’s major sea routes. It has a large population, is willing to industrialise and has a strong relationship with Russia, which has been taking an active role in promoting industrialisation in the country with plans to build an industrial park there. As a country of considerable domestic issues, it is clear that it could potentially benefit hugely from joining BRICS in associating itself with the world’s largest food exporter, which Russia is gradually becoming. For Egypt to join BRICS, it would bring another traditional US ally in the Middle East into the remit of the global south.</p><p>Ethiopia is a particularly interesting choice for BRICS membership, being a large and potentially very rich country as well, which until recently had a rapidly growing economy. It has many educated people and is also rich in raw materials. Despite its many food problems and famines, if agriculture is organised properly, it could potentially be agriculturally rich as well. It has the longest history of the African states and historically has a very close relationship with Russia stretching back to the 19th century. If Ethiopia were to stabilise her domestic situation, coupled with an economy which just years ago was achieving double-digit growth, it is not without reason that she could become a major player in BRICS, while also offering a counterbalance to South Africa.</p><p>On the other hand, Argentina is going through a massive economic crisis, and the political situation there is potentially very unstable. The article is being written during Javier Milei’s election triumph, who had promised to take Argentina out of BRICS — nonetheless, this piece will consider Argentina’s possible contributions as a member all the same. Ultimately, if Argentina does manage to get its problems behind it, joining BRICS may be the best plan of action. She too is a potentially enormously rich country and is a massive food producer. It possesses mineral riches, a highly educated population and a significant industrial base. She also serves to complement Brazil, whose president had staked a lot to bring her in.</p><p>Thus we have a conglomeration of big commodity producers — Argentina, Brazil and Russia are all significant food producers, with Ethiopia having the potential to be one as well. BRICS in 2024 can also boast membership of several massive oil producers and exporters through Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It would appear that the BRICS nations are taking a different approach to the G7 nations, who seem to be focused more on services and financial markets, as opposed to commodities, such as oil, gas, agriculture, food and minerals. This highlights the attempt by the BRICS countries to create an actual trading system in real goods, of commodities and industrial goods, and not so much about trade anymore. There is also much emphasis on promoting industrialisation and future potential.</p><p>Another key distinction between the two blocs is how the G7 is a very narrowly constituted bloc, comprising the United States, her European allies and Japan. In other words, it involves the core countries built and integrated into the American system as it has existed since the end of the Second World War as longtime American allies. BRICS in contrast is an expanding group, seeking to bring in more countries across the world not just into a trading system between themselves, but potentially ultimately a global trading system.</p><p>So what lies ahead for BRICS? First on the agenda is the matter of working out their financial architecture. This would not be an immediate move to set up a reserve currency, which is far from ready. Yet there are now banking systems being built, and accounting systems being sorted out and the situation is ever-developing. Second on the agenda would be a renewed attempt between member states to reach a detente and work out their concerns with each other. Just as the Saudi Arabia had assessed the situation and considered what the US were willing to offer, but joined the BRICS effort all the same, India too has considered her options and for the time being has decided to push forward with BRICS. It is thus in the cards that just as Saudi Arabia and Iran came to some form of a reconciliation, that it is not entirely unimaginable that a similar attempt would be made between China and India.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6d6a253653d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/brics-expansion-a-whistlestop-tour-f6d6a253653d">BRICS Expansion: A Whistlestop Tour</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Global Connectivity, The Indian Way — The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/global-connectivity-the-indian-way-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-32cb79bde421?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32cb79bde421</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[narendra-modi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[g20]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Dec 2023 18:54:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-07T16:07:25.887Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Global Connectivity, The Indian Way — The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor</h3><p><em>Two months on from the formation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), </em><strong><em>Abhinav Poludasuurajan </em></strong><em>explores the purpose of the initiative, the interests of the participating states and the wider geopolitical implications of a larger geopolitical corridor.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dtNRCPGBkiv9Xi-A" /><figcaption>World leaders meet at the G20 Summit in New Delhi, India (September 2023). Source: Prime Minister’s Office (GODL-India)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>What is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor?</strong></p><p>The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) materialised at the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-world-leaders-launch-a-landmark-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/">G20 summit </a>convened in New Delhi during September 2023, when leaders representing France, Germany, India, Italy, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and the European Commission introduced this trade and investment endeavour. The initiative delineates an eastern corridor interlinking India with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, in addition to a northern corridor establishing connections between these Middle Eastern nations and Europe. IMEC, conceived to complement extant road and maritime transit networks, aspires to augment connectivity and foster economic integration between Asia and Europe through the facilitation of energy infrastructure, railways, high-speed telecommunications cables, and maritime routes.</p><p>This strategic transportation corridor assumes significance in consolidating the pivotal role of energy-rich Gulf Arab states within the global economic landscape, as the locus of geoeconomic influence progressively shifts from the Western hemisphere to the East and the Global South — a trend accentuated following the <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-and-its-aftermath">global financial crisis</a> of 2007–08.</p><p>The Biden administration’s endorsement of IMEC primarily emanates from its endeavours to reassure Middle Eastern allies and partners, underscoring Washington’s unwavering commitment to the region, while concurrently presenting a viable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.</p><p>The notion of advanced nations, including the United States, collaboratively countering the Belt and Road Initiative by fostering alternative corridors and transregional mini-lateral frameworks is not a novel concept. In 2021, the establishment of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/i2u2/">I2U2 Group</a>, comprising the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and India, aimed to enhance collaboration across diverse domains such as energy, water, food security, transportation, health, and space, leveraging private sector capital. IMEC, building upon the foundation laid by the I2U2 Group, aspires to pursue a more ambitious array of objectives.</p><p><strong>How do the Stakeholders view the IMEC?</strong></p><p>Diverse geopolitical interests and perspectives on multipolarity shape the way each country along the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) interprets this initiative.</p><p>The United States, in its strategic lens, perceives IMEC as a means to counter China’s geoeconomic ascent in the Middle East and align Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states more closely with Western influence. Conversely, officials in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh regard IMEC as a tool to balance their networks across Europe, North America, China, and other Eastern and Global South nations. The Emiratis and Saudis, diverging from supporting U.S.-led efforts against Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, approach IMEC with the intent to establish their countries as vital bridges between the West, East, and Global South. Essentially, IMEC stands as the latest opportunity for the UAE and Saudi Arabia to emerge as pivotal hubs of inter-regional connectivity, facilitating their plans for economic diversification away from hydrocarbons.</p><p>For India, the strategic value of IMEC lies in the reconnection with the Arabian Peninsula, providing a substantial return on investment. Aiming to join a regional coalition of like-minded powers to enhance stability and counter China’s influence motivates this reconnection. The spillovers on the security front are implicitly acknowledged by all participant countries.</p><p>Geopolitical dynamics surrounding IMEC are notably influenced by tensions between India and China. The strained relations, stemming from their border dispute, prompt New Delhi to counterbalance China’s influence across the Himalayas and South Asia. The heightened competition between China and India allows Indian Ocean island-states such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka, along with GCC members, to leverage friction between Beijing and New Delhi to their advantage. IMEC enables Modi’s government to capitalise on India’s growing interconnectedness with Gulf Arab states, seen as a strategy to curtail China’s rising influence in the Middle East and beyond. India’s assertiveness against Beijing further enhances Washington’s perception of New Delhi as a crucial partner in the “new Cold War,” particularly during India’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c4b76cb3-aecb-466c-a998-ee8eb5fee867">unprecedented feud</a> with America’s NATO ally, Canada, incentivizing the White House to avoid aligning too closely with Ottawa against the sub-continental powerhouse.</p><p>The India-Pakistan tensions also assume a significant role in this context. India’s consistent opposition to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)</a> primarily stems from its objection to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses land controlled by Pakistan but claimed by New Delhi as its sovereign territory. Consequently, New Delhi perceives the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as an avenue to establish <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/#:~:text=therefore,%20new%20delhi%20sees%20imec%20as%20an%20opportunity%20to%20secure%20greater%20economic%20leverage%20over%20china%20and%20pakistan%20by%20joining%20a%20natural%20alternative%20to%20the%20bri.%20%22Therefore,%20New%20Delhi%20sees%20IMEC%20as%20an%20opportunity%20to%20secure%20greater%20economic%20leverage%20over%20China%20and%20Pakistan%20by%20joining%20a%20natural%20alternative%20to%20the%20BRI.%22">greater economic leverage</a> over China and Pakistan by participating in a natural alternative to the BRI. Historically, Pakistan held a de facto veto over overland connectivity between India and the West. According to an Indian foreign policy analyst, IMEC is poised to break this Pakistani veto, paving the way for heightened economic integration between India and Europe via the Middle East without necessitating negotiations with Islamabad while territorial disputes between India and Pakistan linger unresolved.</p><p>The evolution of Delhi’s perspective on the Arabian Peninsula is noteworthy. In recent years, India has gradually shed its post-independence reluctance to engage strategically with the Peninsula. During the Cold War, India expressed concern over Washington’s close ties with Pakistan for promoting security arrangements in the Middle East, rejecting security groupings such as the Central Treaty Organisation. However, the changing dynamics in India’s partnership with the United States, coupled with Washington’s reduced emphasis on Islamabad, have reshaped the regional landscape. Growing trust between India and the United States has enabled Delhi to overcome historic inhibitions regarding strategic engagement with the Gulf. Against this backdrop, Delhi’s ties with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have witnessed significant growth.</p><p><strong>The Obstacle of Geopolitics and Conflict</strong></p><p>Actively involving India in the commercial corridors of the Middle East seems like a practical move to bring some economic sense into a region that’s dealing with its fair share of conflicts.</p><p>A senior Turkish official <a href="https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/how-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-opens-up-a-passage-of-possibilities/article67344064.ece#:~:text=A%20senior%20Turkish,the%20Kashmir%20region.%20%22A%20senior%20Turkish%20official,%20who%20wished%20to%20remain%20anonymous,%20told%20Frontline%20that%20it%20was%20not%20only%20the%20feeling%20of%20being%20bypassed,%20but%20also%20that%20the%20sea%20route%20for%20this%20corridor%20between%20Haifa%20and%20Piraeus%20passes%20through%20disputed%20waters.%20The%20Greek%20and%20Turkish%20navies%20frequently%20clash%20in%20these%20waters%20as%20they%20are%20yet%20to%20demarcate%20the%20exclusive%20economic%20zones%20(EEZs)%20and%20maritime%20boundaries.%20He%20recalled%20that%20India%20had%20raised%20similar%20concerns%20about%20China%E2%80%99s%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative%20(BRI),%20which%20passes%20through%20disputed%20land%20in%20the%20Kashmir%20region.%22">told Frontline</a> that Turkey perceives itself not only as being bypassed but also raises concerns about the sea route between Haifa and Piraeus passing through disputed waters. Similar to India’s past concerns about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) traversing disputed land in Kashmir, this maritime corridor encounters tensions between the Greek and Turkish navies, yet to demarcate exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and maritime boundaries.</p><p>In the Middle East, Washington’s role in normalising Israel’s relations with several Arab states has been pivotal in establishing the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). However, the war in Gaza poses an unforeseen obstacle. The conflict between Hamas and Israel jeopardises efforts, potentially impacting the Saudi-Israel peace initiative. Rising anger in the Arab world over Israel’s offensive in Gaza may overshadow initial outrage over Hamas’s actions in southern Israel.</p><p>Moreover, in New Delhi, within key infrastructure ministries, there is an acknowledgement that the US-led project was <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-economics/israel-hamas-india-europe-imec-corridor-8993474/#:~:text=in%20new%20delhi,%20across%20some%20key%20infrastructure%20ministries,%20there%20is%20an%20acknowledgement%20that%20the%20project%20%E2%80%93%20spearheaded%20by%20the%20us%20%E2%80%93%20was%20perhaps%20announced%20prematurely,%20well%20before%20any%20implementation%20details%20were%20finalised,%20or%20communicated%20at%20a%20country%20level.%20%22In%20New%20Delhi,%20across%20some%20key%20infrastructure%20ministries,%20there%20is%20an%20acknowledgement%20that%20the%20project%20%E2%80%93%20spearheaded%20by%20the%20US%20%E2%80%93%20was%20perhaps%20announced%20prematurely,%20well%20before%20any%20implementation%20details%20were%20finalised,%20or%20communicated%20at%20a%20country%20level.%22">prematurely announced</a> without finalised implementation details, funding plans, completion timelines, or clarity on the project’s alignment.</p><p><strong>A Bumpy Road Ahead?</strong></p><p>Considering that the IMEC was only announced recently, predicting all the geopolitical consequences of this multicontinental corridor remains challenging, especially given the numerous unknown variables at this early stage. IMEC is likely to underscore a fundamental difference in how Washington and Gulf Arab capitals perceive China’s rise and the global shift away from US-led unipolarity. Unlike US policymakers who often view the competition with Beijing in a zero-sum context, where any of China’s geoeconomic gains in the Middle East are seen as a loss for the West, officials in GCC states hold a different perspective. The Emirati and Saudi governments see their relationships with the West and China as part of a positive-sum game. Policymakers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia reject the notion that they must choose sides between Washington and Beijing in the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/23/opinion/cold-war-china-chips.html">new Cold War.</a>” The GCC members are resolute in expanding their networks simultaneously in the West, the East, and the Global South.</p><p>With Washington exhibiting newfound restraint in the region, the growing Indian presence is expected to bring a balancing effect to the Middle East. The minilateral arrangement involving India, Israel, UAE, and the US is a manifestation of this evolving trend. India’s expanding role in the Middle East also presents the Gulf Arabs with a new partner for strategic diversification.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32cb79bde421" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/global-connectivity-the-indian-way-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-32cb79bde421">Global Connectivity, The Indian Way — The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter: Fisheries Dispute with Sri Lanka, Relations with France…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter-fisheries-dispute-with-sri-lanka-relations-with-france-129db7c9bc97?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/129db7c9bc97</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fishermen]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 02:33:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-13T09:16:10.188Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter: Fisheries Dispute with Sri Lanka, Relations with France, India’s Role in the South China Sea, and More from the First Issue</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rhXfpdLLOHLxsPbHZDyXkQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Editor’s Note</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pUjwgYE8oKNrqTvtpto4OQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Troubled Seas: Why India and Sri Lanka are Waging a ‘Silent War’ in the middle of the ocean?</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/9e6149329e8a">Ishaan Pandey</a></p><p>The waters between India and Sri Lanka have long been the battleground for a less-known but highly significant conflict — the Indo-Sri Lanka fishery dispute. This simmering issue, marked by clashes and arrests, has placed the livelihoods of fishermen on both sides of the border in peril and strained diplomatic relations between the two nations.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/troubled-seas-why-india-and-sri-lanka-are-waging-a-silent-war-6f33b4a4cabb">Read More</a></p><h3>Strengthening Diplomatic Ties: Exploring the Evolving India-France Relationship</h3><p>Sanjay Gururajan</p><p>The 13th of July marked a watershed point in the strategic partnership between India and France, with the completion of the silver jubilee phase and the establishment of a new path for expanding the strategic alliance between Delhi and Paris for the next twenty-five years.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/strengthening-diplomatic-ties-exploring-the-evolving-india-france-relationship-fce8edaa1efe">Read More</a></p><h3>Challenger in the Making on a New Battleground? — India’s Role and Rise in the South China Sea</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/c3b0e3af969e">Abhinav Poludasu</a></p><p>The South China Sea holds immense global significance. <a href="https://ocean.csis.org/spotlights/illuminating-the-south-china-seas-dark-fishing-fleets/">In 2019, it accounted for approximately 12 percent of the world’s total fish catch</a>. Moreover, a substantial portion of the world’s maritime trade, valued at around <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22586.30?seq=2">$3.37 trillion in 2016</a>, passes through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Notably, in 2017, <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA2000/PEA2021-1/RAND_PEA2021-1.pdf">40 percent</a> of the world’s liquified natural gas traversed these waters. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">Estimates</a> by the U.S. Energy Information Administration suggest that beneath the South China Sea lie vast reserves, including 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/challenger-in-the-making-at-a-new-battleground-indias-role-and-rise-in-the-south-china-sea-fdba53ce8dd3">Read More</a></p><h3>Current Affairs — September 2023</h3><p>1. Financial Indices and Indian Bonds:</p><p>JPMorgan Chase’s decision to include Indian government bonds in its emerging markets index is a noteworthy endorsement of India’s growing prominence in the global financial landscape. This move, which took effect on September 21st, is expected to attract substantial foreign investments, with an estimated $25 billion likely to flow into Indian markets by March 2025. This reflects the increasing allure of India for international investors.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/current-affairs-september-2023-f07e53c95649">Read More</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=129db7c9bc97" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter-fisheries-dispute-with-sri-lanka-relations-with-france-129db7c9bc97">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter: Fisheries Dispute with Sri Lanka, Relations with France…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Current Affairs — September 2023]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/current-affairs-september-2023-f07e53c95649?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f07e53c95649</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[g20-india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 02:29:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-13T02:29:06.343Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Current Affairs — September 2023</h3><p>1. Financial Indices and Indian Bonds:</p><p>JPMorgan Chase’s decision to include Indian government bonds in its emerging markets index is a noteworthy endorsement of India’s growing prominence in the global financial landscape. This move, which took effect on September 21st, is expected to attract substantial foreign investments, with an estimated $25 billion likely to flow into Indian markets by March 2025. This reflects the increasing allure of India for international investors.</p><p>However, it’s important to note that not all major indexers are following suit. FTSE Russell, a prominent indexing provider, has chosen not to include Indian bonds in its indices. Their decision stems from concerns about the functioning of financial markets in India. These differing stances among index providers highlight the complexities and considerations involved in assessing India’s financial environment.</p><p>2. India’s Economic Prospects and Explosive Industries:</p><p>The remarkable surge in share prices of Premier Explosives and Solar Industries, two explosive manufacturing companies, since April has drawn attention as an indicator of India’s economic health. This growth reflects positive changes in the country’s overall economic landscape.</p><p>Premier Explosives, for instance, reported a substantial 20% year-on-year revenue growth and an 18% quarter-on-quarter increase, reaching Rs 61.95 crore in revenue. With a robust order book of Rs 1,108 crore, these figures underscore the dynamism of India’s economic sectors.</p><p>3. India’s Women’s Reservation Bill passes in the Special Session of the Parliament:</p><p>On September 19, Prime Minister Modi addressed the Indian Parliament and made a significant announcement regarding the Women’s Reservation Bill, formally known as The Constitution (108th Amendment) Bill, 2008. The proposed bill, once passed into law, aims to provide one-third reservation for women in the lower house of Parliament, state assemblies, and the Delhi Legislative Assembly. Under the bill’s provisions, one-third of the seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes will also be allocated to women belonging to those groups in the Lok Sabha and legislative assemblies. These reserved seats may be rotated among different constituencies within states or union territories. Notably, the bill states that this reservation for women will continue for 15 years following the commencement of the Amendment Act.</p><p>It’s essential to understand that the bill’s implementation is contingent upon the completion of the delimitation process, which involves restructuring assembly and Lok Sabha constituencies based on a recent census. This means the bill cannot come into effect until after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, or likely not before 2027. Moreover, the bill requires approval from a minimum of 50 percent of state assemblies after both Houses of Parliament pass it.</p><p>4. G20 Summit in India</p><p>India’s hosting of the G20 leaders’ summit in New Delhi on September 9th and 10th marked a historic moment as the summit had never been held in India before. Despite initial concerns about key leaders’ attendance, the event proved successful. India demonstrated a novel approach to diplomacy focused on consensus, inclusiveness, and solutions. The summit yielded progress in various critical areas, including digital public infrastructure, cryptocurrency regulation, climate financing, and the reform of multilateral development banks.</p><p>5. India’s G20 Presidency and Trade Opportunities:</p><p>India’s G20 presidency has yielded substantial outcomes, particularly in the realm of trade, where micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) stand to benefit. India’s leadership has put digitalized trade systems in the spotlight, paving the way for improved access to global trade for MSMEs. Additionally, the G20 presidency has seen unprecedented participation from African nations and a push for the African Union’s inclusion as a permanent member of the G20. These developments underscore India’s commitment to fostering inclusive global cooperation and trade opportunities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f07e53c95649" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/current-affairs-september-2023-f07e53c95649">Current Affairs — September 2023</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Strengthening Diplomatic Ties: Exploring the Evolving India-France Relationship]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/strengthening-diplomatic-ties-exploring-the-evolving-india-france-relationship-fce8edaa1efe?source=rss----65d53e4648d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fce8edaa1efe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[french-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[King's College London Sattva]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 02:11:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-13T02:11:51.770Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sanjay Gururajan</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2uZw-lRRaBmhSq8PCjn3mA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The 13th of July marked a watershed point in the strategic partnership between India and France, with the completion of the silver jubilee phase and the establishment of a new path for expanding the strategic alliance between Delhi and Paris for the next twenty-five years. The Tri-Services of India and France marched together at the Bastille Day Parade on Champs-Elysees Avenue, as President Emmanuel Macron asked Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to attend as the Parade’s Chief Guest. Since both countries are democratic and uphold the same fundamental principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, this connection is regarded as special. The “Legion of Honor,” France’s highest civilian and military decoration, was presented to the Prime Minister of India. All of this emphasizes the strong, positive ties that exist between the two major powers in their respective geopolitical contexts, despite various obstacles, and how they have collaborated on issues of vital importance, including the Indo-Pacific, global multilateralism, international terrorism, and even within organizations like the G-20 and the UN Security Council that impact the world. Furthermore, the significance of individual leaders cannot be overlooked in diplomacy not only do they have significant power in building strategic partnerships but also assist the international community in shaping policies that make the world a better place. What topics of strategic importance were discussed by the two countries during this historic meeting, keeping all of this in mind, and what conclusions may be drawn from them?</p><p>Towards the future: Horizon 2047</p><p>The important topics that were discussed in the strategic meeting were development in the fields of Defense, Space and Climate change, Security, and technological innovation. These topics are crucial in not only developing the existing relations between both nations but also addressing the key issues and confirming that steps are taken for the benefit of the planet. Defensively, India and France have agreed to jointly produce and develop sophisticated defense technology and a strong industrial base. For the Indian Airforce, there is a combat aircraft engine that’s going to be built jointly, powering heavy lift helicopters was ensured by the shareholders’ agreement between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Safran Helicopter Engine under the Indian Multi-Role Helicopter program. For the Indian Navy, Mazgon Dockyard Limited of India, and the Naval Group of France for the construction of 3 fresh submarines signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). For surface ships, Naval Group France signed another MoU with a different company Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. (GRSE). Finally, India plans to set up a technical office at the Indian Embassy in Paris. An important note here for the Indo-Pacific, a region that China continues to threaten militarily. Modi and Macron assured that the area needs peace and stability, and both India and France have special responsibilities to maintain it. Delhi and Pairs together have launched two trilateral cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and Australia for cooperative behavior in the region. To maintain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) of the United Nations, both partners are working to set the Indo-Pacific Triangular Cooperation to increase green technology development in the region focused on innovations based on SDG and Climate. It helps in ensuring that the funds are transparent to the innovators in the area which acts as an auxiliary towards maintaining connectivity between Delhi and Brussels. The Indo-Pacific has most of the Global South nations that lack resources for development and small island nations over there face the risk of being submerged. The triangular cooperation in the Indo-Pacific allows funds to be effectively used to help the development process sustainably and prevents these nations from falling into the Chinese debt trap.</p><p>In the field of Space, ‘Climate and Environment’ are going to be the new faces for the Indian Space Research Organisation and The National Centre for Space Studies (France) focusing on the decisive TRISHNA mission that helps in climate monitoring. Secondly, the Space Climate Observatory partners will investigate matters of marine resources, air quality monitoring, and water resource management. In the aspect of future space endeavours areas of Maritime monitoring, For the Gaganyaan program manned flights and launchers will be done and Commercial launching to space will be by the collaboration done by Arianespace and New Space India Limited and further exploration of space. The inference drawn from this Space partnership is to ensure that the Planet is safe from any external threats and to look after the well-being of the planet Earth. Both nations will strengthen their partnership in the development of advanced technologies alongside maintaining their sovereign access to space. In the field of Security, especially terrorism, both nations have agreed on cooperation to stay ahead of the threat that evolves quickly. This includes countering online radicalisation, operational cooperation, combating the financing of terrorism, and multilateral action. Internal Security between Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale of France and the National Security Guardhave begun the formalization of cooperation on matters of financial crime, environmental crime, and human trafficking. Perception of Security cooperation is crucial as both nations have suffered catastrophic terrorist attacks in the last decade such as the Pulwama attack and the Nice attack, coupled with the rise in the radicalization of youth through online propaganda and financing of activities related to terror through illicit means making individual government agencies hard to track funds. Through these cooperative measures undertaken by Paris and Delhi, there is the joint working of both security agencies that ensure the safety of citizens and prevent money laundering that hinders the economy and raises poverty levels, stop human trafficking, and finally educate people on the importance of the environment which is crucial in combating climate change and tackle terrorism.</p><p>In the area of technological innovation: Health and Digital Economy had intense focus. By signing the Letter of intent, they plan to work toward digital health, Biotechnology, AI for healthcare, and Medical Waste Treatment Technology. They intend to have a crossover of medical doctors to train against future health epidemics/pandemics. A further focus is to be done on Health Emergencies Prevention, Preparedness, and Response with further development done toward the pharmaceutical sector, skilling, and Human Resources. The message to be obtained from here is that both nations have decided to be self-reliant in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic that rendered the WHO and other nations paralyzed as they were not prepared for the health risk. Through cooperative behavior, both nations want to prevent future cataclysmic events that have a major impact on lives and want to send a clear message that state or non-state actors cannot simply utilize bioterrorism to fulfil their objectives, and the world is now prepared to face the obstacles present. With newer diseases emerging due to changes in lifestyle and Climate change, both partners have decided to take preventive measures to reduce the major impact of these diseases. The Digital Economy plays an interesting role as UPI payments have been linked between India and France and have been in use since September this year. This is a huge boost as it helps in increasing bilateral trade and the demand for the Indian Rupee with the boost in Indian tourists visiting the nation strengthening the Rupee and benefiting the Indian Economy.</p><p>In conclusion, the celebration of the friendship between France and India’s 25 years symbolizes a tremendous achievement. Important topics like defense, space, security, and technology breakthroughs were discussed. Both countries want to work together on cutting-edge defense technologies, maintain Indo-Pacific peace, and achieve sustainable development in fragile areas. They are committed to addressing global issues, as seen by their focus on space exploration and environmental protection. Additionally, they have given priority to collaboration against various crimes and terrorist initiatives. Their commitment to mutual progress and security is demonstrated by their readiness for medical emergencies and their facilitation of digital payments to increase trade. This summit highlights India and France’s shared commitment to using a cooperative approach to handle complex global issues, reiterating their strong and enduring friendship. However, there could be new avenues of significant development in the areas of sports, women’s rights, education, tourism, and poverty alleviation that can elevate the strategic partnership between Delhi and Paris. This helps them to address contemporary problems that matter in international relations. There are however limited resources present with nations that need to be put into use optimally, however with the collaborative multilateral initiatives, India and France can be pioneers in engineering small states to gear up for matters such as climate change that is significant and impacts them on their livelihoods.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fce8edaa1efe" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter/strengthening-diplomatic-ties-exploring-the-evolving-india-france-relationship-fce8edaa1efe">Strengthening Diplomatic Ties: Exploring the Evolving India-France Relationship</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arthashastra-the-kcl-sattva-newsletter">Arthashastra — The KCL Sattva Newsletter</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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