5. No Logic Like No-Logic
— Re-Defining ‘Definition’ —
[Continued from here.]
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Z E U D O L O G I C
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A Concrete Example
Perhaps when relating A to itself, which is a recursive operation, implying endlessness and the possible existence of a self arising, contemplating its activity, we could experiment with replacing definitions with affinitions.
Take Aristotle. Lead Aristotle to Alexander’s wife. Male is male, A equals A, but Alexander’s wife nevertheless will not consider Aristotle the equal of Alexander. ‘Male’ is of interest only if all other factors are equal, meaning if the context is the same. But context is not defined by A. To the extent it can be defined, it can be defined only provisionally.
Affinities?
So, what would affinitions be about?
Perhaps we could then also look at the idea of equals as worthy of reconsideration. It presupposes identical units, meaning it presupposes that identity can be repeated, in itself a notion that seems, well, self-contradictory. Identity seems to relate rather to unique than duplicate.
Perhaps we may at that point want to consider whether the A that can be defined, the A-finis, is an A that equals Anything.
To rephrase the Tao Te Ching, it may be that:
An A that can be defined is not the infinite A.
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