5. No Logic Like No-Logic

— Re-Defining ‘Definition’ —

[Continued from here.]

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Z E U D O L O G I C
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A Concrete Example
  • Deviation is existent = Deviation
  • No Deviation is existent = Zero Deviation
  • Zero deviation = Zeviation
  • Deviation ≠ Zeviation

Deviation not being Zeviation, both — however — would be Viations, meaning:

De ≠ Ze

If the relationship between De and Ze is for the De to be non-equal the Ze, then:

Definition ≠ Zefinition

Pseudo-logically

Psyllogisms:

  • If X can deviate, is un-Ze.
  • If X can be defined, is un-Ze.
  • If X deviates not, is Ze.
  • If X [ineffable statement], is Ze.

Jumping to conclusions

  • Definition containeth not Zeviation.

Related metaphor

  • There is no place like home. (Note Ze necessary negation.)

Relating metaphor

Structurally the conclusion and the metaphor above both depend upon including a negation to be able to express what they express. (Note we are not saying anything is defined here.)


Question

If

  • we define A to be not A,

then

  • are we saying ‘A equals non-A’ [‘anti’-A?]

or

  • A equals All that which is not A’

?


Point Given

This is no mere wordplay (pet peeve: wordplays usually are not ‘mere’ wordplays), but intended to be an illustration of what is above.


Example

If

  • ‘A equals Apple’,

is non-A

  • a) an anti-Apple, something like a photographic negative of A, an ‘opposite’,

or

  • b) everything, but with Apple subtracted from everything,

or

  • c) all things un-Apple,

or

  • [et cetera, et Zetera]

?


If X, then Y

If the simplest of definitions, the canonical Aristotelian A equals A, is inherently ambiguous, then the simplest of definitions allow for deviation. A equals A in being defined is also deviant.

To make explicit is not to make exact.


Principle of Implosion

If

  • A = A

and

  • A = ambiguous

then

  • anything follows.

An alternative and affine A?

Perhaps when relating A to itself, which is a recursive operation, implying endlessness and the possible existence of a self arising, contemplating its activity, we could experiment with replacing definitions with affinitions.

Take Aristotle. Lead Aristotle to Alexander’s wife. Male is male, A equals A, but Alexander’s wife nevertheless will not consider Aristotle the equal of Alexander. ‘Male’ is of interest only if all other factors are equal, meaning if the context is the same. But context is not defined by A. To the extent it can be defined, it can be defined only provisionally.


Context will change. If context is amorphous, A is ambiguous. If A is ambiguous, we have no grounds for saying that Aristotle and Alexander are somehow the same because they are men.

It would seem they are not. It would seem that saying Aristotle is the equal of Alexander disregards affinities.


Affinities?

So, what would affinitions be about?

In short:

  • Triangulation
  • Contextualization
  • Clustering
  • Critical mass-investigations

Perhaps we could then also look at the idea of equals as worthy of reconsideration. It presupposes identical units, meaning it presupposes that identity can be repeated, in itself a notion that seems, well, self-contradictory. Identity seems to relate rather to unique than duplicate.

Perhaps we may at that point want to consider whether the A that can be defined, the A-finis, is an A that equals Anything.

To rephrase the Tao Te Ching, it may be that:

An A that can be defined is not the infinite A.