Clash of Two Goliath at the South China Sea
As it became a public secrecy, the rise of China as an ‘emerging power’ state potentially matched the U.S.’ foothold as an ‘established power’ state, either in the region or the world. Despite the U.S.’ strength is still far outweigh China in aggregate, but in the Asia-Pacific region, China is currently the dominant power. An astonishing economic development and a stable domestic circumstances has let China to modernize their military fleet. According to one of Chinese state official, China’s military expenditure has increased by 10% from the last year, with the navy fleet’s modernization as primary agenda.[1] China also eager to assert their position as a powerful state and expose their military power by doing the reclamation in the vicinity of disputes area at South China Sea such as Subi Reef, Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Johnson Reef. The purpose of the reclamation itself is to establish a naval base which most of the other states, particulary US, perceive as threat towards the stability in the South China Sea area.[2]
The revival of China’s national power as result of their economic strength has influenced the dynamics of power distribution in international system. The China’s rising was not only sound an alarm between the neighboring states since it was linked to China’s aggressive behavior in South China Sea disputes between China and other claimant states, but also the U.S. as stabilizing actor in Asia. Despite the U.S.’ current focus was a security in the Middle East region, the rise of China’s strength in politic, economy, and military has encouraged U.S. to shift their orientation back to Asia-Pacific.[3]
The slackening of dominance in Asia-Pacific will become a huge loss for U.S. U.S. themself was an established dominant power that already present in Asia-Pacific since a long time ago, and have a role to stabilize the region. In this region, U.S. have an interest to vouch their allied state’s security such as Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia, besides containing the persistent China’s influences in military, economy, or politics.[4] Thereafter, U.S. were also have an interest in strategic and geographical values of Asia Pacific region to ensure what they called as the ‘Freedom of Navigation’ in South China Sea. Not to mention an economic potential in Asia Pacific as an employment market for U.S. Hence, rebalancing the China’s strength is an important strategy for US to protect their vital interests in Asia-Pacific region.[5]
In the latest national security strategy that issued on February 2015, there are four U.S.’ national interests; (i) advance the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners, (ii) advance a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity, (iii) advance respect for universal values at home and around the world, (iv) advance an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. It also mentioned that rebalancing the Asia-Pacific region were also a part of U.S.’ national security strategy with perpetual security preservation in the main trade lane.[6] The U.S. also assert that they intend to enhance their position in the Asia-Pacific region and commit a close monitoring effort towards China’s military strength and presence in the region.[7]
The U.S. persistently assert their role and position as a “world policeman” state towards the international norms or values in any spheres, including the maritime. In this occasion, U.S conducting a sea operation called ‘Freedom of Navigations Operation (FONOP) which has been conducted regularly in all over the world and also targeted another states, including U.S.’ ally, since 1979.[8] The general purposes of the operation are to challenge maritime claims that the U.S. considers excessive under international law and stand as a legal exercises to reinforce the U.S.’ interpretations of international maritime law. While in South China Sea case, the purpose of this operation is to contest claims made by most of the South China Sea claimants, including China.[9] This operation is undertaken by the U.S. Navy with the deployment of an Arleigh Burke-Class destroyer vessel USS Lassen in the vicinity of disputed areas (Subi Reef, Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay, South Reef, and Sandy Cay) within the 12 nautical miles distance of the areas.[10]
Besides exercising the international law enforcement, U.S. also intend to protect their allied states. In Asia-Pacific region, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Philippines were U.S.’ primary allied states. U.S. themself have a respective considerations towards each of them related to their plan in the region. Japan and South Korea were the states that relies on sea access at South China Sea because most of both countries’ energy supplies came through those trade lanes.[11] Australia, despite didn’t include among Asian states, always put their attention towards the region related with the economic potential or security matters. Like China, Australia’s economic interests relay on international trade regarding nearly two-thirds of Australia’s export commodities pass through the South China Sea. Therefore, it is make sense if Australia relied on South China Sea as their main trade lane and maritime security reference. While in the meantime, Philippines was one of the claimant states in South China Sea disputes as an intersection of trade lanes from Middle East, Europe, and South Asia. This circumstance delineate how the four U.S.’ allies relied on US presence in Asia Pacific to protect them from the security threats in the region, especially from China’s assertiveness.
The economic interests of U.S. allied states in Asia-Pacific makes them vulnerable to the threats against sea access security because any impediments that threatened the trade lanes would jeopardize their economic development. Considering U.S. has play the rule as a state in charge in keeping the security of those trade lines, the demands to U.S.’ commitment to ensure their allies’ security were increased along with China’s Navy rise and China’s aggressive measures in South China Sea. Despite the U.S.’ official status as a non-disputing states and their desperate attempt to remain neutral, this circumstances would make it futile because the disputes were also related with the interests of the U.S.’ allies where U.S. were obliged to plead as a consequences of the alliance.
From China’s side, the perspective on the Pivot to Asia strategy which carried by the U.S. were dense with the cynicism and suspicions. The reason is because China considers the U.S. intentionally use and exaggerated the dynamics in the South China Sea as an excuse to contain and obstruct the China’s influence in Asia Pacific beside maintaining their dominance in Asia-Pacific at once.[12] China also perceive the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea dispute as a matter of fact exacerbate the status quo in the South China Sea because they deemed the U.S. presence were even increased the probability of open conflict in a larger scale. This is because China considers some minor incidents, such as the disrupting against fishermen and provocation against the armed forces of the belligerent states in the dispute, which occurred in the South China Sea has become commonplace that would never spark the larger conflicts regarding the status of South China Sea as a disputed territory.[13]
In China’s point of view, the U.S. presence in the South China Sea would make the territory become more prone to conflict than ever before. It is because the claimant states parties or who have an interests towards the South China Sea as if to get a fresh breeze of the U.S. presence and become more undaunted to engage more aggressively with China. China deem these countries, Philippines as one of the example, were able to act more aggressively as they lurking behind the U.S.’ Pivot to Asia strategy. These states regard the China’s actions as completely definitive will be defended by the United States given the status of these countries as a U.S.’ ally. Coupled with the presence of warships of the U.S. in the region make these countries feel more protected than ever before. This makes the Chinese feel the only outlet is by upgrading their armed forces capacity, particularly the Navy, in retaliation for an aggressive attitude exposed by the U.S. and their countries allies, who consider China as a threat both to the conditions of South China Sea as well as their position, besides catapult criticism for the actions of these countries.[14]
The China quest for maritime power was answered in study session of Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee on July 2013.[15] At that occasion, President Xi Jinping asserted that he will fight for build a maritime power for China. For China, maritime power is a capability to exploit the maritime resources, developed a maritime economy, and protect China’s maritime rights and interests. This was based on consciousness that the sea was not only have a substantial role for the sake of China’s economy, but also have a strategic values in politics, military, and technology spheres.[16] For China, the quest towards the maritime power is also linked with their economic interest. Recently, China’s economic development is growing rapidly. Among the other’s economic sectors, China’s make an export-import activity as their vein in order to boost the economic growth. As the biggest trading state, China relied on sea and trade lane access. Moreover, most of China’s trade commodities were carried by ships. Hence, China perceive that it is imperative to have a maritime power to make a sustainable viability.
It is enticing to see the contradictions in the way China managing the issue in the South China Sea. On the one hand, they are still able to use their military power as a main suppressing elements for their opponents and maintain their position below the threshold of an open military conflicts. On the other hand, China is also able to maintain the stability and also engage themselves to their opponents by the refined approach through an economic cooperation projects such as Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which also including the claimant states in the South China Sea and a U.S.’ ally in the Asia-Pacific such as Philippines, South Korea, and Australia[17]. The efforts that taken by China generally are not much distinctive from the U.S. that carries the TPP as a way to fulfil their economic interests. The distinction is, the U.S.’ economic cooperation did not involve their opponents and are not generally linked with their efforts of containing and confronting China in the South China Sea. At the same time, China prefer to combine both economic and military instruments as a way to protect their national interests.
If the MSR and AIIB were the core instruments in China’s economic sphere, then Navy (PLA Navy) is the cutting edge in their military sphere. Since 2005, China has been gradually modernizing their naval fleet, both in quantity and quality, with the primary focus on quality improvement of their destroyers and frigates fleet. In addition, China also deployed the aircraft carrier ship, the Liaoning, which also would be included in operations over the South China Sea when it was combat capable.[18] Along with the joint coordination of the China Coast Guard, which in January launched the CCG 3901 and so many called the biggest Coast Guard ship in the world,[19] China intend to utilize their naval strength as a proponent of the coast guard as paramilitary elements which became their precaution in attempt to prevent the broader open military conflict. The utilization of these paramilitary element, which is supported by the military, ultimately related to the willingness of the Chinese that opponents want to compromise with them to ensure the security and stability in the South China Sea were able to be maintained according to the China’s interpretations.
REFERENCES
[1] BBC, ‘China Military Budget to Rise 10%’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-31706989, 2015, (accessed 12 February 2016).
[2] A. Sasongko, “Cina Lanjutkan Reklamasi Laut Cina Selatan’, http://internasional.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/global/15/11/22/ny7zlz313-cina-lanjutkan-reklamasi-laut-cina-selatan, 2015 (accessed 12 February 2016).
[3] J. Pearlman, ‘US Will Shift Focus from Middle East to Asia Pacific, Barack Obama Declares’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/8895726/US-will-shift-focus-from-Middle-East-to-Asia-Pacific-Barack-Obama-declares.html, 2011 (accessed 12 February 2016).
[4] K. Campbell and B. Andrews, Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia, London, Chatham House, 2013, pp. 3–8.
[5] H. Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/, 2011, (accessed 12 February 2016).
[6] White House, ‘Fact Sheet: The 2015 National Security Strategy’, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy, 2015 (accessed 1 March 2016).
[7] White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, Washington DC, 2015, p. 24.
[8] A. Etzioni, ‘Freedom of Navigations Assertion: The United States as the World’s Policeman’, 2015, pp. 3–4. Available from (accessed 9 March 2016).
[9] M. J. Green et al., ‘The U.S. Asserts the Freedom of Navigation In The South China Sea’, http://csis.org/publication/us-asserts-freedom-navigation-south-china-sea, 2015 (accessed 9 March 2016).
[10] A. Panda, ‘Everything You Need to Know About the USS Lassen’s FONOP in the South China Sea’, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-the-uss-lassens-fonop-in-the-south-china-sea/, 2016 (accessed 9 March 2016).
[11] R.D. Kaplan, ‘Why the South China Sea is so crucial’, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2, 2015 (accessed 16 March 2016).
[12] C. Shulong, ‘China’s View on U.S.’s Policy in the South China Sea’, in Perspectives on the South China Sea, Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014, p. 13. Available from: CSIS (accessed in 16 March 2016).
[13] C. Shulong, ‘China’s View on U.S.’s Policy in the South China Sea’, p. 14.
[14] C. Shulong, ‘China’s View on U.S.’s Policy in the South China Sea’, p. 15.
[15] Xinhua, ‘Xi Advocates Efforts To Boost China’s Maritime Power’, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/31/c_132591246.htm, 2013 (accessed 17 March 2016).
[16] Xinhua, ‘China Seeks Maritime Power, No Hegemony”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-08/01/c_132594645.htm, 2013 (accessed 20 March 2016).
[17] P. C. Saunders, ‘The Role of the Chinese Military in the South China Sea’, in Perspectives on the South China Sea, Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014, p. 127. Available from: CSIS (accessed in 20 March 2016).
[18] P. C. Saunders, ‘The Role of the Chinese Military in the South China Sea’, pp. 131–132.
[19] F. Gady, ‘Beijing Builds Monster Ship for Patrolling the South China Sea’, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/beijing-builds-monster-ship-for-patrolling-the-south-china-sea/, 2016 (accessed 20 March 2016).
