The Relationship Between Desire and Sexual Objectification
Sex meets philosophy
According to Canadian philosophy professor Patricia Marino, objectification is using a person as a mere means for sexual pleasure, and according to American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum, objectification means regarding or treating a human being as an object in the context of a sexual relationship. This would mean we reduce them to a physical object devoid of their own choices and agency, purely existing to provide the pleasure we desire.
In some relationships, desire and objectification no doubt overlap or are identical. For example, when meeting up with a stranger via Tinder and having sex without even having a conversation or getting to know them, but getting it on purely based on physical characteristics. Both parties may objectify the other person here and agree to the objectification, and Iād dare say this is perfectly moral and unproblematic.
Non-physical attraction
Importantly, there are other relationships, where the physical aspect may play only a secondary role, or one role among others when desiring another person. For example, we may be attracted to an author and desire them because of their intelligent writing. The reader may have no idea what the author looks like physically but desire them just the same. Here, the desire is based on intellectual or personality aspects, or distinct other properties of the person that are not related to their appearance or physical body, so we canāt consider this objectification by definition. I take from this that desire and objectification can and frequently do concur, but they donāt necessarily have to occur simultaneously, and one is certainly possible without the other.
āObjectification can be covert tooā
Some philosophers argue that it is problematic if we set aside another personās humanity to be able to have sex with them. We may pretend weāre someone weāre not to get them to agree to have sex based on false pretences. In other words, we objectify them by misleading them and thus denying them their own agency to make informed choices. Their desire is then based on misrepresentation, which would mean theyāre being objectified ā albeit without being aware that this is the case. So although on the surface consent is given and the person believes theyāre acting autonomously, this is actually not the case. What this means is that objectification can be covert too and linked to desire in a way we may not realise at the time.
Marino further states that desire can and usually does lead to what she terms āweak instrumental use,ā a form of objectification that she does not consider a problem in the right context. Examples she cites are cases where A may be so lost in desire that they temporarily ignore Bās wishes and focus only on their own needs or BDSM relationships where A very much desires to be dominated and objectified by B for Aās own fulfilment.
Objectification is a necessity?
Whatās more, as Nussbaum points out, sexual desire often involves a temporary focus on our own pleasure. But, interestingly, she claims that this kind of self-absorption pleases both the āuserā and the āusedā individual because such intense desire causes someoneās focus to be only on their own pleasure for a period of time is actually considered part of an ideal sexual encounter. So, in this case, objectification is considered a positive and almost necessary element of desire. Although Nussbaum believes that such objectification is okay only if we generally respect our sexual partnerās wishes otherwise and in a larger context, and she further claims that such a relationship necessarily needs intimacy and care as well.
āTemporary objectification is not objectionableā
I must admit, Iām not convinced by this claim. Rather, Iād argue that this type of desire-led objectification is also possible ā and even desirable ā in casual sexual encounters without the partners having a shared history or intimate relationship outside the sexual one. If itās sexually pleasing to both partners, temporary objectification is not objectionable. On the contrary, a casual relationship (think f*ck buddies) or a lack of familiarity of both partners (hello, Tinder hook-up!) might even be conducive to such desire and its fulfilment because it allows both parties to focus only on their physical pleasure ā typically the goal of sexual encountersā without needing to take the whole person and their needs or sensitivities into consideration.
Consenting to be used?
Interestingly, Marino claims that if we consent to be used, then it is by definition no longer objectification at all. But Iād argue that it is still objectification because the āuserā desires their partner only as a sexual object at that particular point in time, whether or not their consent was given. The consent or lack thereof does not affect the feelings of desire in the user because theyāll experience these regardless.
Whatās important, in my opinion, is the basis of our desire. If itās focused on our partnerās physical features alone, it would indeed be considered objectification because the other person is no longer regarded as an autonomous individual but rather a piece of flesh to be used to fulfil our current desire.
āConsent does not affect feelings of desireā
If, on the other hand, weāre aroused by another personās intellect or other non-physical characteristics or traits, this desire canāt be considered objectification based on the standard philosophical definitions discussed here. Thatās because the person in question isnāt considered merely a physical object but, on the contrary, our desire is fuelled by their non-physical properties.
Final thoughts
Desire can certainly be based on objectifying our partner ā and in many circumstances, this isnāt objectionable ā but desire can also occur without objectifying our partner if itās based on an appreciation of non-physical features rather than only the idea of physically using them.
Naturally, both can also coincide. We can desire a partner both physically and intellectually at the same time. And although thereās certainly an element of objectification present, this isnāt troublesome to many philosophers since the desire is also partly based on an appreciation of the other personās qualities beyond the physical.
