Are terrorists causing civil wars?
By Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies’ Center for International Security and Cooperation. These remarks were originally given at the United Nations in November 2017.
Since the 1980s jihadism, a form of violent transnational activism, has mobilized civil war rebels, outside entrepreneurs, foreign fighters, and organizers of transnational as well as local terrorism. This mix is integral to the jihadist trend, even though jihadism accommodates competing power centers, divergent ideological orthodoxies, and different priorities and strategies. Much remains to be learned about these largely understudied interconnections. The combination of civil war and transnational terrorism also poses difficult problems for states and international institutions hoping to manage either or both.
What vectors might lead from civil war to transnational terrorism?
Probably the first connection that comes to mind is that civil war facilitates terrorism by providing safe havens for groups planning attacks in distant locations. However, sanctuary may not be necessary for organizing transnational terrorism, and it is easier to achieve under stable sympathetic governments or in ungoverned but secure spaces. The advent of drone warfare also decreases safe spaces and disrupts the operations of armed groups.
Second, civil wars can mobilize outside support, including the recruitment of foreigners for local fighting and the activation of “homegrown” terrorists. Civil wars where Muslims appear to oppose non-Muslims are propaganda assets for jihadists. As ISIS leader Baghdadi admonished in a September communication, “Do not let the crusaders rest in their homes and enjoy life and stability while your brethren are being shelled and killed.” Afghanistan is of course a case in point, and foreign volunteers came to fight in Bosnia as early as 1992. In addition, experienced fighters may return home to commit acts of terrorism or to start or join rebels in local conflicts. If their home countries prevent them from returning they may join transnational networks (in Europe, for example).
Third, civil wars have spillover effects. Jihadist rebels can use terrorism defensively to punish or deter hostile neighboring states or distant enemies. Defeat at home can lead them to move their operations across borders. Striking enemy civilians at home can be initiated from the outside (the 9/11 attacks), the inside (Orlando 2016), or a mix of the two (Paris and Brussels 2015–2016).
Fourth, civil wars furnish convenient targets for terrorism within the conflict zone, including foreign militaries. Admittedly the question of whether or not attacks on military targets can be considered terrorism is contentious. But the targets of opportunity also include UN civilian agencies and other neutral or humanitarian organizations, which are attractive to spoilers. The UN in particular is also regarded as a proxy for the United States. (Note that attacks do not occur exclusively in civil war contexts; as early as 1993 the UN headquarters in New York was targeted in the “landmarks” plot that was linked to the first bombing of the World Trade Center). The effects of such terrorism can be extremely detrimental to conflict resolution. For example, when such “soft target” actors withdraw from conflict zones under pressure, or peace processes collapse, the terrorist cause gains.
Other vectors lead from terrorism and the mobilization of foreign fighters to civil war.
Both connections to transnational jihadism and the presence of foreign fighters might lead to escalation and complicate conflict resolution, especially if jihadists are a type of absolutist religionist rebels. The introduction of transnational jihadist networks can “Islamicize” essentially nationalist or separatist conflicts that might otherwise be amenable to negotiation and compromise. Al Qa’ida has shown itself to be particularly adept at co-opting and exploiting local grievances. Conversely, the jihadist “brand” often attracts independent local groups such as Boko Haram. New allegiances alter both targets and tactics. For example, signing on to jihadism is often a precursor of suicide missions.
Terrorism can be a useful propaganda tool for recruiting foreign fighters as well as mobilizing external support for terrorism and civil war rebels. There are links between foreign fighters and suicide terrorism in civil conflicts (foreign recruits are often inexperienced at combat but zealous to the extreme). At the same time, foreign fighters are not necessarily an asset for civil war rebels. However, as mentioned earlier, as jihadists suffer defeats they may initiate or escalate transnational terrorism as a substitute. Thus the loss of the territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria may encourage more terrorism by ISIS and sympathizers.
Possibly jihadists are more prone to use terrorism as a tactic in civil wars than are non-jihadists. To some scholars this association implies that jihadist rebels are unlikely to win in the long run. Other researchers find that armed groups that use terrorism are more likely to secure concessions in negotiated settlements to civil conflicts. These questions remain to be answered.
Last, there are feedback loops.
Terrorism against outside powers can provoke military intervention, which not only intensifies and internationalizes civil war but also sparks more terrorism against the occupiers and their local allies. Domestic terrorism can undermine the stability of local host governments, thus impeding the withdrawal of foreign forces, whether peacekeepers or combatants. Consequently an important question is whether or not powerful states can resist terrorist provocation. In searching for an answer, should we be thinking of alternatives to military force (such as negotiated solutions) or the smarter application of coercion? In either case, we cannot continue to treat terrorism and civil war as distinct and autonomous phenomena.
