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Shaping and constraining the next administration’s foreign policy agenda

By Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute

Many scholars and policymakers worry legitimately about President-elect Donald Trump as a commander in chief and central foreign policymaker. As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump said some very disturbing things about American foreign policy.

He threatened America’s commitment to defend our allies in Europe and Asia unless they paid us more; suggested that South Korea and Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, raising the risks of nuclear war, accident and terrorism; praised some of America’s adversaries, including most consistently, Russian President Vladimir Putin; promised to tear up the nuclear deal with Iran; pledged to build a wall on America’s southern border, a costly and unnecessary project; pledged to impose a 45 percent tariff on all Chinese imports, an act that would trigger a trade war between the two largest economies in the world; and never once advocated for promoting values in the conduct of our foreign policy.

In parallel to his novel proposals regarding foreign policy, candidate Trump proposed many extreme ideas regarding American domestic policy. The pursuit of his proposed domestic agenda would trigger major political battles at home, and thereby distract the United States from playing a leadership role in the world. President-elect Trump also seems to lack the temperament to deal with complex foreign policy issues. He has a quick temper, trusts his instincts over analysis, allegedly does not like to read, and has a short attention span.

Yet, there is cause for optimism, both because Trump might amend his foreign policy ideas and because he will be constrained in implementing them.

Regarding amendment, there is always a gap between campaign rhetoric and actual policymaking. President-elect Trump already has hinted that he may not pursue his most extreme ideas regarding illegal immigrants and the Affordable Care Act, suggesting that he might temper some of his foreign policy proposals as well. That 45 percent tariff against China could become much smaller. That “beautiful” tall brick wall could become a chain-link fence.

Aside from his views on trade and immigration, Trump also does not have many deep convictions regarding foreign policy, and therefore can change his mind easily, especially if he appoints a national security team with firmer views. In addition, President Trump will focus on domestic issues of greatest concern to his supporters, such as job creation, immigration reform and tax policy. Trump has to do something for the roughly 80,000 voters in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin who made him president. Weakening NATO or détente with Putin are not high priorities for them.

But even if Trump tries to pursue his campaign pledges on foreign policy, he will face constraints.

1. On Jan. 21, 2017, he will face the frightening inbox. I remember well my first day of work at the National Security Council on Jan. 21, 2009. The morning started with high-fives and elation at a swearing-in ceremony conducted by our new boss, President Obama. By the end of the day, however, after I had been read into all the scary secret details about issues for which I now had responsibility, there were no more high-fives — just the weight of the incredible responsibility of keeping America safe and secure. Trump and his team will face the same.
2. The professional staff at the National Security Council, the State Department, the Pentagon and other agencies will constrain wild policy swings. When I met my new staff on my first day of work at the White House, every single one of them had worked for President Bush the day before. These experienced professionals have views of their own, and will take the edges off extreme policy proposals.
3. The U.S. Congress, including senior members of the Republican Party, will also have a say in the formulation of the new administration’s foreign policy. Those initiatives perceived as weakening our alliances, for instance, will be met with bipartisan resistance. Likewise, policies undermining trading opportunities for American corporations will not be popular with representatives from districts where jobs are created and sustained by trade. Senators John McCain (R) and Ben Cardin (D) will make sure that issues of human rights promotion are not completely forgotten.
4. Civil society will continue to engage to shape U.S. foreign policy. The American Chamber of Commerce, Human Rights Watch, the dozens of foreign-policy think tanks around the country and the hundreds of NGOs working on global issues will not wither away. Likewise, the media must continue to scrutinize Trump foreign policy initiatives; their role has never been more important.
5. With hope, our allies will constrain extreme Trump ideas. The first summit between President Trump and Chancellor Merkel should help to reduce his enthusiasm for confronting NATO, embracing Putin, tearing up the Iran nuclear deal, or walking away from the climate change agreement, or our trade obligations. If pressed, our allies will push for amendment, not abandonment, of the multilateral agreements and treaty obligations.
6. Our competitors get a vote. If Trump imposes draconian tariffs on Chinese exporters, President Xi will respond, either by appealing to the World Trade Organization to rule on the legality of such an action, or by deciding to buy fewer Boeing and more Airbus airplanes. Iranian conservative clerics will not agree to renegotiate the nuclear deal, but instead dare the United States to impose sanctions again, without the support of Russia, China, Germany, the United Kingdom or France. And without the reward of sanctions relief, Iran is likely to restart its nuclear program. And then what?

Finally, national security experts and public intellectuals have a role to play in shaping the Trump foreign policy agenda. The most direct way in influence policy is to join the new administration. If called, our best and brightest should serve, while also keeping ready to resign the moment Trump does something beyond the pale. For the rest of us, we have two options: propose concrete, new policy ideas, supported by data and analysis, that might be adopted by the new administration; or push logic, recommendations, and proposals designed to contain the damage of the worst of Trump’s proposals. Both actions — selective engagement and selective containment — are necessary now.

And that’s exactly what some of us at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) plan to do on Medium.com in the coming weeks, months and years. FSI is a non-partisan, interdisciplinary research institution at Stanford University, committed to understanding and explaining international affairs and then proposing ideas for how to solve some of the world’s hardest problems.

Not every global issue has an American component. Nonetheless, the United States still plays an outsized role in almost every international policy domain, and therefore seeking to impact the formulation and implementation of the administration’s foreign policies, including resisting the implementation of some ideas, must remain a central focus of our applied efforts. Each week, FSI faculty will share their recommendations for the new Trump administration. We look forward to your feedback here or on Twitter: @FSIStanford.

Michael McFaul is director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Hoover fellow at Stanford University, and a contributing columnist to the Washington Post. He was previously special assistant to President Obama at the National Security Council from 2009 to 2012, and former U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014.