As Israel prepares for its third election in 11 months, is there any reason to believe that this time, there will be a winner?
Last April, Israelis went to the polls in a highly anticipated race to determine whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would retain his decade-long grip on power. When that election failed to produce a governing coalition (at least 61 Knesset seats), Israelis returned to the polls in September. But it was deja vu all over again as the two largest parties, Netanyahu’s Likud and Benny Gantz’s Blue and White, both tried and again failed to create coalitions. Begrudgingly, Israelis were left with no option but to endure a third national election, this one set for March 2020.
Still, there have been some murmurs of optimism that a third election could offer a more definitive outcome, given the changing political landscape in the country. For instance, since the September election, Netanyahu has been indicted on bribery, fraud, and breach of trust charges. That, paired with Blue and White’s decision to scrap a highly unpopular party leadership and prime ministership rotation agreement between current chair Benny Gantz and his deputy, Yair Lapid, has left some confident that the end is near for Netanyahu’s reign.
But recent polling indicates that the charges against Netanyahu, which he has declared a “witch hunt,” have had almost no impact on his support — and he easily retained his party leadership position, further underscoring his strength. Those same polls show likely deadlock in Knesset seat allocations once again. That is, it seems that those most likely to be swayed by Netanyahu’s indictment weren’t supporters to begin with.
Even President Trump — not exactly known for shying away from picking winners and losers — seems to be hedging his bets. He has invited both Netanyahu and Gantz to the White House to discuss his upcoming Middle East peace plan. Trump, like the rest of the world, doesn’t know who will earn the mandate to run Israel, nor does he know when.
Meanwhile, from an empirical standpoint, there is little evidence that a new election will be more definitive. That’s because the March 2 election still meets baseline criteria often associated with strong turnout, as did the previous two (67 percent in April and 69 percent in September). For instance, in most democracies, the higher the perceived competitiveness of the race, the higher the turnout. In Israel, the election has essentially turned into a best-of-three, winner-take-all contest. It is hard to argue, then, that it is possible for this race to be any more competitive. Marginal voters likely already vote. Similarly, high stakes elections generally yield far higher turnout than perceived “lower stakes elections” (think presidential versus Congressional versus city council races— the higher the perceived stakes, the higher the turnout). Clearly in this case, though, the stakes could not be higher.
A final structural consideration — one Israeli politicians seem to fear — is voter fatigue. The concept is simple: Israeli voters, skeptical that this time will be any different, may avoid the polls altogether, saving themselves the hassle. That would turn the race into a battle of political organizing and get-out-the-vote efforts, a decidedly different framework than in the first two elections, and thus one more likely to produce a definitive outcome. While it’s a digestible narrative and one Israeli politicians continue to push, there is little empirical backing for it, especially within the context of this national, competitive, and generally extraordinary election.
For instance, a 2017 study on German elections found that voter fatigue did not impact federal elections, and that it only manifested itself when regional elections were held within three months of one another. More broadly, a growing body of research indicates that fears of voter fatigue raised by scholars in the 1980s were overblown.
So, if current polling and historical data both support a pessimistic case of a definitive Israeli election, what could break the cycle of democratic ineptitude?
Three paths stand out.
First, Netanyahu’s legal status, while not hurting his support to this point, is unpredictable. With Blue and White openly plotting to strip Netanyahu of immunity before the election, might some voters get spooked, either staying home or voting for the other major party? Benny Gantz is betting on it. Additionally, two right-wing parties, the New Right and Jewish Home, have decided against running on a joint list. This could mean that one or both parties fail to squeeze above the 3.25 percent threshold needed to earn seats in the Knesset. If Likud falls even a few seats short of projections and other right-wing parties fail to reach the threshold, it could spell doom for Netanyahu.
A second scenario, and one that could complicate the electoral math further, is if Arab-Israeli voters continue their turnout uptick. Turnout among Arab-Israelis jumped ten points to nearly 60 percent from April to September. In a tightly contested race, if the Arab vote continues its dramatic upward swing and surpasses its 2005 level of 63.5 percent, it could shift the seat allocation just enough to force a compromise between Gantz and left-leaning parties. Furthermore, Ayman Odeh, the leader of the mostly-Arab Joint List, has already declared he will do what it takes to get Netanyahu out of office — part of his larger tactical shift to influence Israeli politics from within, rather than via protest. This possibility, while against the odds, has become more serious in the wake of two left-wing parties, Labor and Meretz, announcing a joint ticket to consolidate support.
Finally, it is possible that in this game of political chicken between Netanyahu and Gantz, someone eventually blinks. Maybe one of the two (read: Gantz) will put the public’s waning faith in Israeli democracy before the endless battle for power, exchanging the premiership for cabinet strength and hope for a better future. It would seem both men have taken this too far for that outcome now. But if the choice is between a fourth election, one that could call into question the very foundation of Israel’s democratic institutions, and a concession, anything is possible.
