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Games, Agents, and Incentives

Short posts that accompany papers presented at the 2020 Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop (GAIW).

Sequential Online Chore Division for Autonomous Vehicle Convoy Formation

Sequential Online Chore Division for Autonomous Vehicle Convoy Formation

Birds do it. Cyclists do it. Why shouldn’t vehicles?
Go to the profile of Harel Yedidsion
Harel Yedidsion
May 9, 2020
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don’t Add Up

Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don’t Add Up

A summary of a paper of the same name authored by Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, and Yair Zick
Go to the profile of Mithun Chakraborty
Mithun Chakraborty
May 6, 2020
What cooperative game theory says about the Israeli parliament

What cooperative game theory says about the Israeli parliament

Learning Cooperative Solution Concepts from Data
Go to the profile of Alan Tsang
Alan Tsang
May 5, 2020
Keep Your Friends Close

Keep Your Friends Close

Land Allocation with Friends
Go to the profile of Alan Tsang
Alan Tsang
May 5, 2020
Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding

Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding

TL;DR. Civic crowdfunding, the process of raising voluntary contributions from interested agents for public projects, such as public parks…
Go to the profile of sankarshan damle
sankarshan damle
May 3, 2020
Weighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

Weighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

(This post is based on joint work with Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, and Yair Zick)
Go to the profile of Warut Suksompong
Warut Suksompong
May 1, 2020
Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation

Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation

Condorcet extensions — or Condorcet-consistent voting rules — have long held a prominent place in social choice theory. A Condorcet…
Go to the profile of Sirin Botan
Sirin Botan
May 1, 2020
Infochain: A Decentralized, Trustless and Transparent Oracle on Blockchain

Infochain: A Decentralized, Trustless and Transparent Oracle on Blockchain

Based on our upcoming IJCAI-PRICAI 2020 paper. Joint work with Cyril van Schreven, Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Boi Faltings
Go to the profile of Naman Goel
Naman Goel
Apr 29, 2020
Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules

Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules

TL;DR: In the paper “Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules”, we analyse the strategic behaviour that can occur in voting systems when the…
Go to the profile of Alexander Lam
Alexander Lam
Apr 28, 2020
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