Applying Political Theory to Optimism Governance
The Optimism collective is a common; which, in turn, requires proper governing for the benefit of all users. In order to achieve quality governance, one must draw upon existing governance structures and political thought.
In The Politics, Aristotle discusses the typologies of various governments and concludes that the most just form of governance is the “Polity”. The Polity seeks to balance the interests of the elites and the people, insofar as giving both limited power in government. Intentionally or unintentionally, the bicameral legislature of the Optimism Collective is descended from Aristotelian thinking. Aristotle argues that there are essentially two ways in which a government can allocate power to its constituents: by worth and by number. Aristotle’s definition of worth is antiquated–it refers to nobility as well as wealth–but it is still useful in describing the underlying philosophy of the bicameral legislature. Optimism, as with many DAOs, is structured to favor those with wealth: functionally, token ownership.
Those who hold a significant voting share, delegated or owned outright, must be duly considered according to that voting share. If not, there is a significant risk that animosity will develop toward constituents allocated votes based on number (the Citizen House). However, as is clear both in history and especially blockchain, this animosity will lead to greater concentration of governance. Optimism Governance has certainly not reached the point of plutocratic control. If the top 20% of delegates control 82% of delegated tokens (32MM OP), this only amounts to approximately 11.2% of the circulating supply (~234MM OP). Therefore, the issue at hand is not a failure insofar as concentration of power; rather, an issue which plagues virtually all DAOs–low engagement.
There are two clear approaches to increasing engagement: increasing the number of delegates, and increasing the power of the Citizen House. Both are predicated on the goal of greater stakeholder involvement. Increasing the number of delegates would create a sort of representative republic. Were small token holders to concentrate their voting power in the hands of several delegates, they would be able to check the voting power of delegates with fewer patrons delegating larger stakes. This would increase the number of circulating tokens used in voting, and create a more pluralistic profile of delegates.
Optimism Governance may otherwise be altered to better balance power between the Token and Citizen Houses. Currently, the structure of Optimism gives procedural control to the Token House. Ideally, the Citizen House would be able to check this control, but their purview is limited to Retroactive Public Goods Funding. In The Discourses of Livy, Machiavelli observes that one of the primary reasons for the liberty experienced by the Roman people in the Republican Period was the role of the Tribune of the Plebeians. In short, this was a person who had the ability to veto the actions of the oligarchical upper class, in defense of the people. Were this the preferred approach, it would be in the interest of all parties to expand the rights of the Citizen House to include the veto of a proposal, by the majority vote of a quorum of citizens. The Token House would limit their sovereignty, but would exchange this for greater involvement from users of the protocol.
In order to encourage adoption of Optimism by the wider population, it is necessary to create efficacious governance. This means encouraging the involvement of all parties, from users to developers. Further work is needed to achieve this end. Optimism has one of the most engaged communities, and therefore must champion creative solutions drawn from a wealth of knowledge to set an example for the future of DAO governance.
