Food as a Weapon of War in Ukraine — and what we can do about it
A year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we now have a much clearer understanding of how food and hunger are used as a calculated strategy to induce and deepen global vulnerability. Countries are at risk to the extent of their dependence on imports — illustrating the fragility of food systems, not only to conflict, but to the ongoing shocks and crises we face as a global community: pandemics, climate change, war, and migration. We must act now to make the global food system more resilient.
This week marks the one year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine are together among the world’s largest exporters of barley, wheat, and sunflower oil, all fundamental commodities in the global food system. Russia’s blockade of the Black Sea ports blocked the supply of these commodities to the rest of the world, causing global grain prices to rise nearly 20% within a month.
Our collective dependence on Ukraine and Russian exports has a short history. Since World War II, food self-reliance has been steadily eroding, and now most countries depend on international markets. The concentration of these markets and food trade in the hands of a few corporations has displaced local food systems; threatening agricultural biodiversity, landscapes, cultural traditions and diverse diets. This concentration has made it easier for food to be used as a weapon.
The spike in global food prices, catalyzed by the Russia/Ukraine war, has affected the whole world, but it is devastating for the Global South where people spend a far higher proportion of their income on food. Hotspots already mired in conflict and on the edge of famine, like Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Somalia, rely heavily on Ukrainian wheat distributed by the World Food Programme. The rampant inflation and price spikes contributed to a record-high number of people facing acute food insecurity — 349 million people, more than twice as many since before the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ukraine and Russia are also critical global suppliers of the raw ingredients for agricultural inputs, especially oil and natural gas. The skyrocketing cost of fossil-fuel based fertilizers and farm inputs left many smallholder farmers unable to make a decent living; especially in the Global South, where profit margins are slim and farmers have come to depend on these inputs to turn degraded landscapes arable. The continued reliance on fossil fuel inputs for food production means continued risk: the rising agricultural input costs and food export restrictions combined could cause food prices to rise by 60–100% of 2021 prices in 2023.
None of this is surprising to food experts, who have long warned of the concentration of commodities in global markets. Russia used this concentration to its advantage. It understood how the combination of trade bans, port blockades, crop spoilage, and the destruction of food storage facilities would lead to a dire supply shortage of all three food staples. These shortages have led to higher prices for food, giving Russia leverage when brokering agreements.
The UN-negotiated deal in July 2022, to open several of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports to ship grains and fertilizer, was certainly progress. In November 2022, the deal was renewed for at least another four months; but this is not a permanent solution, and again puts global food security in the hands of Russia, who could pull out of the deal at any time.
Geopolitical unrest is not the only threat to our global food security. The worsening effects of climate change on food production became clear as flooding in Pakistan and drought in the Horn of Africa destroyed harvests in 2022. COVID-19 has also shown how supply chains can be easily disrupted by external events such as infectious diseases. Disruptions to key trade routes and infrastructure — like the Suez canal blockage — can also lead to food shortfalls and price spikes.
To manage future risks to the global food system, we need to take the long view: anticipating shocks and crises, and building resilience to avoid worsening consequences. There are three clear paths of action that policymakers can take to build resilience.
First, we need to diversify our food systems by reviving biocultural landscapes and cuisines. This means breaking up the concentration of agribusinesses that supply the global market, and becoming less reliant on a few key commodities. To support this shift, policymakers should encourage greater dietary diversity in food consumption, particularly of regionally grown varieties of different crops.
We also need to diversify inputs for farming. One starting point is unraveling the dependence of food production on fossil fuel intensive fertilizers: Russia’s hold on global natural gas markets was a contributing factor to fertilizer price spikes. This involves moving away from imported artificial fertilizers towards natural fertilizers and agroecological and regenerative farming practices. Evidence demonstrates that these practices yield better harvests, and sustain farming livelihoods and the land on which they depend.
Diversifying food systems will require stronger governance and regulation of supply chains, and economic incentives to develop local and regional food supplies that are not dependent on the whims of the global market.
Second, we need to recognize and tackle the links between food systems, climate change and nature. Critically, that means reducing the negative impact of commodity agriculture on our environment, and shifting towards regenerative farming practices. Food systems are responsible for one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions, and are the main driver of biodiversity loss. We cannot meet climate goals without acting on the way we grow, harvest, transport, and waste food, and if we fail to tackle climate change farming will continue to be at the mercy of worsening climate impacts.
Reducing farming’s dependence on chemical inputs, and choosing nature-friendly farming methods, will support climate and nature goals, but also increase the resilience of rural economies by making them less dependent on global commodity markets. Fundamentally, meeting our climate targets requires a repaired relationship between food systems, nature and people.
Finally, we require greater investment to maintain, strengthen and rebuild resilient food systems. Like the transition to renewable energy over the last two decades, this demands longer term horizons, investment in new regional infrastructure, and creative financial mechanisms to facilitate this transformation.
A blend of financial and non-financial investments should be directed towards food-focused businesses and initiatives that account for the environmental, social, and health costs of their activities. We already have many examples of what these initiatives and systems can look like, prioritizing locally produced food and supporting local livelihoods. These initiatives are growing, but to accelerate this transformation we need innovative public and private finance that uses holistic metrics that value the environment, health and well-being over a simplistic focus on yields.
The Russian/Ukraine crisis over the past year has been a stark reminder of how food and hunger are used as a weapon of war, a result of our collective vulnerability to global food trade dynamics. The lurch from crisis to crisis will only intensify unless the systemic weaknesses are addressed. That starts with transforming our food systems to mitigate future risks and enhance the resilience of food systems.
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Lauren Baker, Deputy Director of the Global Alliance for the Future of Food
