Where does China go? Scenarios for political evolution
Around a year ago, on the 13th of July 2017, Liu Xiaobo died. Liu was a Chinese intellectual, one of the leaders of the 1989 protests and a champion of democracy and human rights. His non-violent fight for human rights even granted him a Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. However, many claim that along with his death, the pro-democracy movement also died. Xi Jinping’s iron fist and the prospect of his leadership to be extended even after the end of his term in 2022, probably reduces the hope for reforms toward political liberalization to the lowest level since 1989.
This essay’s purpose is to analyze why short-medium term changes at the political level are unlikely. At the same time, the factors that are becoming a treat for China’s political stability and the Communist Party legitimacy in the long term will be considered.
From the Tiananmen protests of 1989, Chinese leaders have been deriving important lessons. Especially relevant are the recognition that economic development is not a sufficient condition for legitimacy and stability and the belief that institutionalization and political liberalization damages political control. Moreover, the acknowledgement that the population, who increased its economic standard, started caring more about civil liberties and political rights, caused worries inside the government. Since then, the CCP inverted the path that was set with the political reforms of the 1980s aimed at differentiating the Party from the government and establishing formal rules to reduce excessive power of some party officials. Indeed, the CCP increased the control on public and semipublic agencies and intensified the so-called “waiwen”, the system of stability maintenance.
Nowadays, the centralization of power in China is strengthen by Xi Jinping’s ability to concentrate and personalize power. His increasing influence and accumulation of titles granted him the recognition of most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping. After being called the “chairman of everything”, Xi also gained the title of “core leader”, granted only to outstanding personalities such as Mao or Deng before. This title, in a period of economic challenges and political tensions and following the decrease in civil liberties that characterize his administration, is a great source of power legitimization.
What else is Xi doing to maintain stability and legitimacy? First of all, he is leading a great fight against corruption, both at the central level, in order to eliminate internal ideology struggles and potential opponents, as well as, the local level. Corruption is a huge problem and people always view favorably policies to fight corruption, also because following the Confucian culture influence, officials are expected to hold power according to their merit.
On the other hand, the control over society has been strengthened, as well as the system of stability maintenance. People who spread information about social problems are being arrested and censorship and control of internet has increased. Social control has increased to a point that a “social credit system” is being introduced. This system, through companies that act on behalf of the government, is supposed to control people data and online activity to check individual trustworthiness. The score level will influence the single citizen possibilities, such as the possibility to get loans, get education, etcetera.
Another important card that might be in Xi’s favor is the shift from a fast-economic growth to the privilege for a growth characterized by quality. This is done through higher R&D expenditure and investments in education, health and pensions, as well as the relaxation of foreign investments’ restrictions.
Furthermore, the strategy for enforcing legitimization is reflected also in the foreign policy. Xi, leveraging on the loss of soft power of the US followed by Trump election, is trying the acquire legitimacy from the international community and influence on the international agenda. This is done by increasing participation and contribution to multilateral organization, such as the UN, by promoting cooperation and by fighting against global issues on the frontline, such as those regarding the environmental sustainability. International influence is built also by the increase of FDI and by building economic links inside and outside the region, the One Belt One Road Initiative is an example worth to mention in this context.
Xi, is also trying to maintain stability through the nationalistic fervor. That is why his foreign policy is becoming more assertive, especially when it comes to the territorial disputes. The plan to “strive for success” and to become a world class military power by 2050 along with the appeal to nationalism can play a huge role in maintaining stability and legitimacy in the short-medium term.
The treat of political change in the short term appears minor, because of other factors as well. The social protests are under control, indeed, they are isolated, constrained and disorganized; the students lost political fervor and the economic crisis of the west undermined the image of the western model. Most importantly, the Party’s constitution was also reformed to include Xi’s thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and Xi will most likely remain China’s most important leader even after 2022, given that there is no clear successor and the new members of the Politburo Standing Committee do not meet the age requirement to stay after 2022.
However, there are factors that will most probably threaten the political regime in the long run. One of these factors are the environmental issues. China has adopted world class regulation, but they are failing to implement it, due to lack of incentives of the local officials and corruption. The costs in terms of healthcare, water shortages and productivity among the others are already raising protests in the society and the environmental activism is increasing. The governments eased the repression versus the action of the environmental NGO, in order to push the local branches to comply with regulation. However, this environmental movement combined with the power of social media, can lead to bigger organized movements that can challenge the regime stability.
Another factor incompatible with the current political situation is the fact that if China keeps growing a greater part of the population will experience a shift in ideology, from materialism to post-materialism. Currently, only a small percentage of the population reached that phase, but as the percentage keeps growing, granting civil rights and political liberties will be required to maintain stability.
Other problems in the long term will be related to the petitioning system and the stability maintenance system, their cost will be unsustainable in economic terms. Moreover, the waiwen system is leading to the illegitimate use of force by local authorities and the petitioning system is generating disruptive behavior used by some people to be heard by central authorities.
These are just few of the factors that may undermine stability in the long run. Other factors, of course, such as the status of the economic growth, will play a determinant role as well.
Regarding the response of the party, it will probably be characterized by gradual reforms towards the granting of greater civil rights and political liberalization. However, the form of government will probably not be going to look like western forms of democracy. Most likely either a Maoist or Confucian influence will persist, such as the persistence of technocracy and meritocracy at the government level.
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