A Playful Mind
Play is the vital essence of life. Without play, life is a grinding, soulless machine. But playfulness might be at odds with rationality. How can one be rational and playful at the same time? An open-minded approach can save both.
Why Do We Play?
According to the physician Stuart Brown (2009), we play
- to have fun,
- to sharpen our skills,
- to learn new tricks or techniques,
- to socialize with others,
- to exercise our freedom,
- plus a few more reasons.
Play is critical for human development, particularly in the early stages of life. It shapes the brain and makes us smarter and more adaptable. It fosters empathy and makes possible complex social groups. It is a core driver for creativity and innovation.
But play seems inconsistent with rationality as axiomatized in economics and game theory. Why would a rational person play a game? Surprisingly, the answer is not trivial. Let us see why.
The Fun Paradox
If a player is 100% certain to win a non-monetary game, would he or she enjoy playing the game? For most people, the answer would be no. The game must be challenging, and this requires that there must be a real possibility of loss. But we hate to lose! For a rational person, the risk of loss means accepting the possibility of loss. If we enjoy adventure and taking risks, we must enjoy the implied loss, but we don’t.
The paradox is most obvious if we follow the model of the “economic man” or homo economicus. This is the benchmark for mainstream economic theory. Homo economicus is assumed to possess maximum rationality, which means he is perfectly consistent, has perfect information, is a supercomputer, and cares solely about his own utility.
When playing a game, homo economicus cares only about his payoffs. He obviously prefers to win and hates to lose. If the payoffs are uncertain, he computes the expected value to decide whether to play. For the same expected value, homo economicus strictly prefers a certain game to one with uncertain payoffs.
The preference for adventure is not reducible to its outcome
But this is not how normal humans behave. Normal humans have an intrinsic preference for adventure, learning, and exploring new possibilities. They enjoy creativity, discovery, and entrepreneurial activities.
Playfulness is a manifestation of these preferences. They all relate to an adventure that might result in a loss or gain, but they are not reducible to either. If we were driven solely by the outcomes of the game, like the homo economicus, we’d not enjoy any of these activities. Life would be boring.
Moral and Playful
The preference for adventure is not an anomaly. It reflects the norm of a free market and life in general. “No pain, no gain” is the first principle of economic activities. The failure of homo economicus to internalize the risk-return relationship results in oddities like the Fun Paradox. No wonder, mainstream economic theory has no place for entrepreneurship and adventure.
“It is no secret,” writes Sidney Winter (2016, p. 15), “that the place of entrepreneurship in economic theory is an awkward one, and has been so for a long time.” William Baumol (1993, pp. 12–13) points out that, for fifty years, he was particularly puzzled why formal economic theory has so little to say about entrepreneurs, where “virtually all theoretical firms are entrepreneur-less.” A neoclassical firm, he notes, is a mechanical calculator that replicates precisely its previous decisions, day after day, year after year.
Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow (1988) observes that “Innovations, almost by definition, are one of the least analyzed parts of economics, in spite of the verifiable fact that they have contributed more to per capita economic growth than any other factor” (p. 281).
The reason neoclassical theory ignores adventure, creativity, and entrepreneurship is that the process of choice itself is left out of the theory. Choice is said to be “path-independent” — i.e. it doesn’t matter how one arrives at the chosen bundle of commodities or what were the initial conditions or past experiences (Hands, 2006).
This approach makes it irrelevant how one earns his income, whether by hard work or by blind luck; by honesty or by cheating. The utility of the outcome is insensitive to these aspects (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998).
By leaving out the process of choice, not only does the theory have no room for values and ethics, it has no room either for playfulness. Surprisingly, morality and playfulness emanate from the same source: a preference system that incorporates the choice process and is not confined to the final outcomes.
Self and Meta-Self
A preference regarding other preferences or the process of choice is described as a “meta-preference.” Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (1977) argues that a single preference ordering cannot be enough to describe the complexity of human decisions.
Homo economicus might be rational in the sense of the absence of inconsistency, but he has little structure to his preferences. He is more of a “rational fool,” Sen argues, than a normal human being. To explain commitment and moral values, Sen suggests having rankings of preference rankings, or meta-rankings, to express moral judgments (p. 337).
A preference for play is a meta-preference
A preference for play is a meta-preference. It is different from the preference for the game’s payoffs. The same is true for adventure, creativity, discovery, and learning. For each of these, the source of joy transcends that of the outcome of the choice.
How do meta-preferences relate to the preferences for outcomes?
If we are to maintain the rationality assumption, then meta-preferences cannot be part of the outcome preferences. If the consumer is assumed to possess maximum rationality, then he is modeled as a formal axiomatic system rich in arithmetic. While such a system achieves maximum logical powers, it has critical limitations as dictated by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. In particular, the Second Theorem dictates that such a formal system cannot prove a global property of itself like its consistency (Smullyan, 1987). In other words, the system cannot view itself from the outside and assess its global properties.
Alternatively, if homo economicus is a robot, again with maximum computing powers (a universal Turing machine), then by Alan Turing’s theorem on the unsolvability of the Halting Problem, the robot cannot systematically tell in advance its behavior in response to non-trivial stimuli.
To be able to view the system from the outside, we need a higher system with somehow stronger abilities. Hence, we need to introduce a “meta-self” that transcends the self and thus can systematically provide the input that the self would not be able to obtain if it were assumed maximally rational.
Introducing the meta-self is closely related to the concept of “multiple selves” that economists are familiar with (Elster, 1986). Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling (1984, 2006) adopts the multiple selves approach to explain anomalies related to commitment, voting, addiction, suicide, and other issues the standard economic model fails to explain. He (1984, p. 93) suggests framing “rational choice” for the individual consumer as a “collective choice” problem. He therefore proposes “self-management” or “egonomics” as a field of scientific study (p. 63).
Economists resort to “introspection” to analyze homo economicus more than any other source of information (Blaug, 1992, p. 57). Introspection is inconceivable without a meta-self. To the extent that axioms of choice are normative, economists are stating their meta-preferences about consumer preferences: preferences on how ideal preferences should be.
The relationship between the meta-self and the self is analogous to the relationship between a coach and a player, or a director and an actor. The coach provides the guidance and instructions, while the player is responsible for the action.
Within this framework, the meta-self holds the meta-preferences while the self holds the outcome preferences. The meta-self is able to influence the preferences of the self in a way such that the self maintains its rationality. This can be modeled by assuming the meta-self to modify some of the axioms of the self without destroying its consistency.
So, while the self is assumed to be perfectly rational, combined with the meta-self, the resulting behavior will be closer to normal human beings. The overall preference for a game in this framework would be something like a weighted average of the preference for playing the game and that of the outcomes of the game.
How to model the meta-self? This is not a simple question. Following Scott Aaronson (2016, p. 175), the meta-self might be modeled as a “non-algorithmic, non-random, trans-Turing system.” This topic is beyond the scope of this article, but, in general, the integration of the self and meta-self is very likely to result in a non-algorithmic system.
Essence of Play
What does it mean to play? What does it mean to be serious?
Play involves the creation of an imaginary world — a “parallel universe” so to speak. Within the imaginary world, the person will behave rationally subject to the rules of that world. To be “serious” means to stick to the “real world” — the world described by the data obtained by our senses.
In both worlds, the person behaves rationally, but that does not mean the behavior will be the same. The behavior might be as different as the imaginary world is from the real world. Rationality is conditioned by the “axioms” determining the environment in which the person resides.
One source of fun in play is that it involves visualizing oneself as a third person. An artificial game, by design, is constructed in an imaginary world. Within the game, the player is not the same person as in the real world. Hence, he or she visualizes himself as a third person.
We tend to make fun of others when they blunder or make silly mistakes. Viewing oneself as a third person allows the player to make fun of himself when he loses. The detachment from the self alleviates the pain of losing and brings fun to the play process. This can explain the quote from Charlie Chaplin:
“Life is a tragedy when seen in close-up, but a comedy in longshot.”
When we are fully immersed in the challenges, they often feel overwhelming and insurmountable, much like a tragedy. However, taking a step back to view the challenges from the outside, the “longshot,” allows us to realize that these same challenges are part of a larger experience of learning and exploring further challenges.
According to philosopher John Morreall (2023), an editorial in the American Journal of Psychology that appeared in 1907 said of humor:
“Perhaps its largest function is to detach us from our world of good and evil, of loss and gain, and to enable us to see it in proper perspective. It frees us from vanity, on the one hand, and from pessimism, on the other, by keeping us larger than what we do, and greater than what can happen to us.”
Detachment is also important for learning. To learn means to imagine oneself playing differently from the way he or she currently does. Learning is an important source of joy and satisfaction as it implies self-growth and development. Learning is what transforms an actual loss into a potential future win. Play, therefore, is inherently dynamic. No fun can be obtained from a strictly one-shot game.
We can now see how a “playful mindset” can approach real-world challenges. An entrepreneur would enjoy exploring new products or systems knowing well that loss is a real possibility. The joy of learning and creativity counterbalances the loss.
A Playful Mindset is a Growth Mindset
Imagination is essential for almost all human activities. Without imagination, we lose the essence of our intelligence.
Philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1971) notes that no animal other than man appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. Only these second-order desires, or meta-preferences, that identifies the free will of humans.
Psychologist Thomas Suddendorf (2013) argues that what sets the human race apart from other species is our ability to imagine the future and construct novel scenarios. Mental time travel, into the past and the future, is uniquely human. Rephrasing René Descartes,
“I imagine, therefore I am”
To imagine oneself in an alternative reality requires visualizing the self from the outside. But this is not possible for the self if the self were strictly rational, as discussed earlier. This is why there is a need to introduce a meta-self. The meta-self, just like the coach, would determine the world in which the self (or the player) is supposed to be playing.
This shows how a playful mindset can deal with real-world problems. When we face real losses, we have an opportunity to learn and grow. A fixed mindset, in contrast, limits potential achievements.
According to psychologist Carol Dweck (2016), people with a growth mindset have better capability for self-insight. They can assess their abilities much more accurately than those with a fixed mindset. And this allows them to make better choices and take on relatively greater challenges. It also allows them to convert setbacks into future successes.
The ability to imagine a future world in which we are able to win is the playful mindset that mitigates the pain of real losses. This mindset is what makes a game fun: Play opens the door to a new world where we acquire new and enhanced skills. Only with an open mindset we can have fun in play. And only then we can make real-life challenges as enjoyable as playful games.
Meaning of Life: A Never-ending Journey
Renowned psychiatrist Viktor Frankl once wrote: “Man’s concern about a meaning of life is the truest expression of the state of being human” (Klemke, 2000, p. x).
What does the meaning of life have to do with play?
An unexpected link was proposed in 1927 by mathematician and philosopher Moritz Schlick. Schlick argues that the meaning of existence is revealed only in play. Play, in the philosophical sense, is any activity that takes place entirely for its own sake, independently of its effects and consequences. He writes (2018, p. 60):
“It is the joy in sheer creation, the dedication to the activity, the absorption in the movement, which transforms work into play.”
This approach to play is in harmony with the above discussion whereby satisfaction arises from the process of choice itself not only its outcomes.
However, Schlick emphasizes that play is exercised for its own sake without a purpose. But to argue that play will bring joy only if it were purposeless is paradoxical. The absence of purpose becomes itself a purpose. A rational person, moreover, cannot make a choice for no purpose whatsoever. Purposefulness is integral to rationality. If play is characterized by the absence of purpose, we again face a tension between play and rationality. So how to reconcile the two?
Guided by the earlier discussions, we can argue that the purpose of playing a game today is not the outcome of that game but instead to play a better game tomorrow. And the purpose of playing a better game tomorrow is an even better one the day after tomorrow, ad infinitum. In other words, the purpose of play is self-growth. In this manner, the play has no immediate or bounded purpose. Instead, its purpose lies forever beyond any particular game. Playfulness, therefore, requires an open and unbounded future.
The purpose of play lies forever beyond any particular game
Renowned mathematician Kurt Gödel showed that mathematics is inexhaustible (Wang, 1996). This can be true only if imagination is inexhaustible. Since imagination is part of existence, this implies that existence is also inexhaustible. The future, therefore, is inexhaustible. To view the future as confined by the limited material existence means to lose the most essential attribute that makes us human: imagination.
Interestingly, the above conclusion conforms to that of Viktor Frankl (2006) regarding man’s search for meaning. He argues that the true meaning of life cannot lie within man’s own psyche, as though it were a closed system. He argues, furthermore, that what is called “self-actualization” is not an attainable aim, for the simple reason that the more one strives for it, the more he would miss it. “Self-actualization,” he writes, “is possible only as a side-effect of self-transcendence” (p. 110).
Self-actualization is paradoxical because it assumes a fixed potential of the self. But this is inconsistent with an open mindset approach where imagination is inexhaustible and the future is unbounded.
For life to be meaningful, therefore, life must be an open, unbounded system. With an unbounded future, we can enjoy playfulness at all stages of life.
Conclusion
Play is not incompatible with rationality. Rather, playfulness is required to maintain rationality within normal human behavior. A playful mindset is a future-oriented mindset. Today's challenge is an opportunity for a better one tomorrow, ad infinitum. Every game is a step for self-growth which faces no bounds. A playful mind is the key to an endless quest for the meaning of life.
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