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The Religious Canard about “Objective Morality”
How preposterous religious convictions can taint the theist’s philosophical analyses
What are the chances that if you were very confused about one thing, you’d be confused about some other things too?
True, we’re able to mentally compartmentalize so that we might excel at some tasks even if we’re hopeless at others. A Christian, for instance, might surrender her critical-thinking skills when practicing her religion, yet adopt those skills in other areas of life.
But there’s also a spillover effect, especially when the same fallacies we perpetrate in one line of inquiry might find purchase in others. Similarly, when pride drives us to excuse some of our cognitive deficiencies, we might taint our involvement in other matters. This would be like the one lie that snowballs into many lies. (“What a tangled web we weave…”)
I’ve noticed this snowballing pattern in Christian apologetic talk of the so-called problems with secular morality. The problem of evil is supposed to count against theism, but theists attempt to turn the criticism around on atheists, arguing that atheists need a robust sense of morality even to frame the question of why God would allow evil to occur, a sense that requires a divine lawgiver.
