Why African Defence Review is combating misinformation using satellite imagery
How did a series of satellite images set the record straight over an Al-Shabaab attack on a Kenyan military base?
Imagine you’re tasked with covering a breaking story taking place in a remote location that’s not only physically inaccessible, but is also at the centre of an active conflict. How would you go about checking what the facts are and making sure that whatever’s being said either by official or unofficial sources is actually true?
This was the focus of January’s Hacks/Hackers Nairobi Meetup, which focused on the work that African Defence Review, an innovateAFRICA grantee, is looking to solve the problem of misinformation and inaccurate reporting around conflicts using satellite images, remote sensing and data analysis.
As with many military operations, Kenya’s ongoing operation in Somalia is shrouded in secrecy, and establishing what is actually going on on the ground is difficult due to the lack of official communication.
Rather than moving to establish an official account, especially in the event that an incident attracts a lot of public attention, government policy is often one of silence, with ‘National Security’ being the most common explanation.
As a result, the true situation may be difficult to gauge, and this is where misinformation is most likely to thrive.
According to Richard Stupart, the features editor at African Defence Review, the thing to consider is not just getting the information, it’s also about testing this information as rigorously as possible.
“When trying to report on a situation”, he explains, “you often have one of two situations — too few resources, where nobody is covering the story, and too many resources, where a lot of conflicting reports result.
“It is important to verify this information first before the story is published”, Richard adds. “This is especially important when the sources are scattered and the information is coming in from a number of unknown or unconfirmed sources contributing to this narrative.”
ADR has used satellite images to investigate and confirm information around several conflict-related news stories. Most notably, they were used in the case of the attack by notorious fundamentalist group Al-Shabaab on Kulbiyow, a forward operating base set up by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), as explained by Conway Waddington.
Kulbiyow FOB is one of several bases set up as part of Operation Linda Nchi, a series of security operations undertaken ostensibly to secure Kenya’s border with Somalia and suppress the threat to Kenya’s national security posed by Al-Shabaab.
Linda Nchi ran from October 2011 to May 2012, before it was absorbed into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). KDF troops provide key personnel and logistical support, and operate as the AMISOM operation’s southern contingent.
On January 27 2017, the Kulbiyow FOB was reportedly overrun and destroyed by forces linked to Al-Shabaab, who controlled a significant portion of southern Somalia at the time. This attack took place just over a year after a very similar attack on another KDF base, at El Adde, further north in Somalia.
The KDF’s response to the Kulbiyow attack was similar to El Adde — denials published on social media and in the mainstream media as well. However, these denials were later rescinded and the KDF was forced to later admit that the garrison had been almost entirely wiped out.
According to the KDF, nine soldiers were killed in the attack on Kulbiyow, with a further 15 injured. Al-Shabaab claimed that the number of casualties was much higher, at more than 50 by its estimate.
Reports around the incident were hard to verify, as there was a limited media presence in the area, and the conflicting reports by KDF and Al-Shabaab only served to complicate the situation further.
The two key narratives following the incident did show that the base was indeed attacked, and there were several casualties. However, there were several key differences over the extent of damage sustained to the base. Al-Shabaab released a video showing the ongoing attack within the Kulbiyow FOB, and the KDF insisted that the attack was comprehensively defeated.
That’s where the satellite imagery comes in. By locating the base and looking through images taken before and immediately after the attack, it would be possible to check the authenticity of these two accounts using open-source intelligence (or ‘OSINT’), as Richard explained.
One problem encountered in locating the exact area of the attack was the variations in spelling. The area is known as Kulbiyow, but it also appears as ‘Kolbio’ and ‘Colbio’ in other maps from various sources. To counter this, ADR tried partial spelling and trial and error to locate the base on the satellite images they had collected, and also using other AMISOM bases as a reference point.
Satellite imagery was used repeatedly to debunk claims around the attack, as well as to cross-check video evidence from both sides. According to KDF base commander George Osano, the closest the Al-Shabaab got to the base was 600 meters, while satellite images showed significant damage characteristic of previous Al-Shabaab attacks, which used vehicle-based improvised explosive devices to initiate a breach of the perimeter, followed by an attack by ground forces.
Using satellite images, therefore, ADR was able to verify that the video shot by Al-Shabaab was indeed genuine, and the KDF had to rescind their claim that the attack was repelled.
Another such instance where ADR used satellite imagery to debunk a false narrative is in an attack on a MONUSCO base in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in which 14 peacekeepers were killed, the deadliest in the UN Mission to Congo’s history. Initial reports linked the attack to Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group that started in Uganda.
The relatively high number of casualties, especially coming after a lull in rebel activity in Nord-Kivu province, led some to conclude that ADF would launch more sophisticated follow-up attacks in the area, but satellite images showed that the reason why so many were killed was that security at the MONUSCO base was generally lax, with soldiers walking around without armour and protective gear. The base’s perimeter had been left largely unguarded due to the general lack of rebel activity in the area, so an attack that could have been prevented proved to be far more deadly than expected.
If there are reports of mass graves or displacement of people, for example, one can look through satellite images before and after the incident is reported, and telltale signs can be identified for further investigation.
Africa Defence Review gets its data from a variety of sources, among them social media reports — photos and videos from social networks as well as public websites, satellite images from ADR’s own Oya Platform and Visual Database Filter, satellite data from Terraserver, conflict data scraped from media reports by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), and humanitarian databases such as the Humanitarian Data Exchange.
Satellite imagery and other open source intelligence resources can also be used to access areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to reporters, such as the drone bases operated by the US military in Africa, where ADR has been able to identify various aircraft.
ADR is also using image recognition to identify weapons used in various conflicts on the continent in order to identify possible weapons smuggling activity. In one photo taken during the Libyan Crisis, a soldier is seen holding a sniper rifle that was identified to be a Truvelo sniper rifle, manufactured by a South African company.
Using this information, arms manufacturers can be held to task over the conflicts that their weapons are involved in, and the link that’s often missing between arms smugglers and the fighters on the ground can be established and investigated.
Other potential applications include tracking environmental degradation over time through tracking the rate of deforestation in an area, as well as checking whether infrastructure projects such as roads, railways or pipelines are actually being built as claimed.
Another area that this technology can be applied is in monitoring the high seas, where fishing vessels often operate in a lawless environment, pillaging fisheries and other marine resources. It is difficult to police these open waters, but by identifying the vessels involved in illicit activities and tracking them down to their ports of origin, it is then possible for action to be taken on the ships and their owners.
By looking at satellite imagery, therefore, it is possible to establish a timeline and identify several key factors that contributed to a particular outcome. Satellite images may not replace actual eyewitness accounts, but they are useful in corroborating or debunking these reports, providing a clearer view of what is happening on the ground.
The worlds of hackers and journalists are coming together, as reporting goes digital and Internet companies become media empires.
Journalists call themselves “hacks,” someone who can churn out words in any situation. Hackers use the digital equivalent of duct tape to whip out code.
Hacker-journalists try and bridge the two worlds. Hacks/Hackers Africa aims to bring all these people together — those who are working to help people make sense of our world. It’s for hackers exploring technologies to filter and visualize information, and for journalists who use technology to find and tell stories. In the age of information overload and collapse of traditional business models for legacy media, their work has become even more crucial.
Code for Africa, is the continent’s largest Open Data and civic technology initiative, recognises this and is spearheading the establishment of a network of HacksHackers chapters across Africa to help bring together pioneers for collaborative projects and new ventures.
