Actually, Europe is Not Falling Apart
by Christopher Smart, Spring 2016 IOP Fellow
The latest gloom about Europe’s future has been fueled by renewed Russian mischief in eastern Ukraine, the perennial deadlock over Greek loans and tomorrow’s Brexit vote. Handwringing over the vast flows of new immigrants hasn’t helped much either.
But take this brief test and see if it doesn’t offer a little more perspective.
1. Which countries actually imposed stiff financial sanctions on their largest gas supplier over the principle of territorial integrity — when none of their own borders were at risk?
2. What “currency union” overcame fierce political firestorms to bail out one of its most recalcitrant debtors with enormous new loans?
3. Facing the threat from one of its largest members to quit economic and political institutions, what regional organization conceded little more than cosmetic changes to its rules?
Europe is the remarkable correct answer to all three questions.
And test yourself again. Which of these outcomes would you have predicted comfortably just a few years ago?
The conventional wisdom has long been that Europeans are spineless and spellbound before the threats and charms of Vladimir Putin, and would quickly cave over the annexation of Crimea. Close observers insisted it was illegal to lend money to a cash-strapped Greek government, let alone hundreds of millions of euros in three separate packages. And the very threat of Britain exiting the European Union seemed likely to extort a significant re-think of the terms of membership.
There is clearly something stronger at work here that outsiders often fail to see.
Indeed, while Europe’s slow and awkward institutions remain unpopular in themselves, the logic of greater integration that founded the postwar Coal and Steel Community continues to drive the agenda. The more key resources and responsibilities are pooled, the less likely any return to armed conflict.
They are also motivated by the prospect of a more or less coordinated response to threats on their borders, whether from Russia, the Middle East or North Africa. Finally, as Europeans survey global trends, they realize they need to speak ever more with a single voice on global issues in a world increasingly shaped by the United States and China.
In that regard, they have empowered a single negotiator in Brussels to strike global trade deals on behalf of all 28. They have stood up a single financial regulator in Frankfurt with the right to intervene its largest banks. Since the financial crisis, they have actually welcomed one new member into the EU itself (Croatia) and four new adherents to the euro-zone (Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).
Even a decision by British voters tomorrow to leave the EU creates less of a risk to Europe than most commentators imagine. The day after a hypothetical ‘leave’ vote, Britain will be forced to renegotiate an entirely new set of political, trade and social agreements that will look very similar to the current arrangement.(The real question is why the remaining 27 EU members would cut them a better deal?)
Still, none of this to say that the European Union is inevitable or that its structural problems are not real.
There is mounting concern that unelected bureaucrats are making more intrusive decisions, and more must be done to encourage voters to participate in European elections.
Perhaps the most immediate threat comes from the EU’s clumsy handling of refugee flows, which generates fierce emotions on all sides. On the one hand, it’s in Europe’s self-image as a beacon of human rights; on the other, it sparks a yearning for better border controls and greater security.
So far, at least, the populists have been diverted by a classic combination of EU compromise, half-measures and wishful thinking. For now, Turkey has agreed to process the bulk of asylum-seekers ostensibly in return for negotiations over visa-free travel to Europe for Turks. The tenuous deal has left half of Europe squirming because it may fall apart and the other half feeling guilty over the poor immigrants that have been consigned to the vagaries of Turkish due process.
While it is well within the means of the world’s richest regions to absorb a few million immigrants (less than a percent of the current population), this issue may test Europe’s resilience more than the financial crisis itself. Burden sharing will continue to be difficult and the reflex to reclaim control over internal European borders will remain strong.
But recent history suggests that the creativity of European officials to kick a difficult issue down the road is only exceeded by the long-term commitment of Europeans themselves to build a more integrated continent. Not even the departure of its most skeptical member will divert them from the mission.
Dr. Christopher Smart is a 2016 Spring Fellow in the Institute of Politics at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Previously, Smart served in the Obama Administration as a senior policymaker for international economic affairs. As Special Assistant to the President at the National Economic Council and the National Security Council, he was principal advisor on trade, investment and a wide range of global economic issues. From 2009–13, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury, where he led the response to the European financial crisis and designed U.S. engagement on financial policy across Europe, Russia and Central Asia.
Follow Christopher Smart on Twitter at @csmart.
